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Abstract 
 
Title  The Spillover of Misery: a critical investigation into the social 
purpose of European integration using the case study of migration 
management 
 
Author  Harald Köpping Athanasopoulos 
 
 
Irregular migrants, being defined as asylum seekers, refugees and clandestinos 
(people in the EU without a valid residency permit), live as a subaltern group at 
the fringes of European society. They are materially deprived and excluded from 
regular political culture. In part, this condition stems from the institutions of 
European integration, such as the Dublin Regulation. This dissertation attempts 
to understand irregular migrant subalternity by exploring its structural causes. 
Irregular migration and its management is used as a case study to contribute 
towards a deeper understanding of the social purpose of European integration. 
 Methodologically, this thesis relies on Critical Grounded Theory. This 
novel approach is rooted in critical realism and thus rejects the tabula rasa-view of 
traditional Grounded Theory, maintaining that empirics and theory should 
continuously inform one another. The Gramscian concept of hegemony is 
employed to contextualise European integration within neofunctionalism as an 
ideological practice and neoliberalism as a hegemonic agenda. Vulgar 
neofunctionalism postulates that integration occurs as the result of spillover of one 
policy area into another and that European integration is pushed forward by 
technocratic elites. To illustrate the relationship between neofunctionalism and 
neoliberalism, to lay bare the consequences of neoliberal and neofunctionalist 
practices, and to further capture the social purpose of European integration, 
fieldwork was carried out in five locations (Brussels, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and 
Germany) with different groups of interviewees (European Commission staff, 
national public officials, asylum seekers, clandestinos, fruit farm workers, asylum 
accommodation staff). 
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 It was found that neoliberal neofunctionalism has generated a common 
outlook on migratory movements which has resulted in the partial harmonisation 
of asylum legislation and the simultaneous fortification of the EU’s external 
border. This has had a significant impact on the lives of irregular migrants, who 
are exposed to reification, commodification, biopolitics, the state of exception, 
xenophobia and lacking recognition. The emergence of group consciousness is 
undermined, preventing them from overcoming subalternity. The social purpose 
of European integration is identified as the (increasingly authoritarian) neoliberal 
restructuration of the EU which relies on neofunctionalism as its vehicle and 
justification. This restructuration is self-contradictory as it aims at neoliberalism 
while producing nationalism, biopolitics and the EU’s deepening internal 
division. Within the context of the European Union’s democratic deficit and the 
weakness of social democracy, nationalism may represent an alternative to 
neoliberalism, speeding up the EU’s disintegration. 
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“For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, 
against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against 
spiritual wickedness in high places.” 
       Ephesians 6, 121 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Scripture quotations from The Authorized (King James) Version. Rights in the Authorized 
Version in the United Kingdom are vested in the Crown. Reproduced by permission of the 
Crown’s patentee, Cambridge University Press. 
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Introduction 
 
In April 2011 I visited the European Parliament in Brussels during its annual open 
day. While it is usually difficult to enter buildings hosting a European institution, 
this day represents an exception, and the huge corridors of the Alterio Spinelli 
building were teeming with life. Being interested in migration issues, I came across 
a policy brief produced by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, published 
by the European Parliament and edited by the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. On page 14 one finds the 
following excerpt under the heading ‘Barrier operations – shielding the global rich 
from the tensions and problems of the poor’: 
 
“As the ratio of the world population living in misery and frustration will 
remain massive the tensions and spillover between their world and that of the 
rich will continue to grow. Current trends indicate that our efforts to solve 
this problem at its root – by curing the dysfunctional conditions prevailing 
among some 60 percent of the global population – are likely to fail in a 
significant share of the world. If so the need to strengthen our barriers against 
the spillover of misery will grow. This is a morally distasteful strategy, but 
will be unavoidable if we cannot solve the problems at their root” (Ries, 2010, 
14). 
 
These words truly struck me. Human beings were being described as spillover – 
like the wasted liquid you reluctantly wipe off after having chosen the wrong 
setting on your coffee machine. What left me truly shaken however, is that even 
the staunchest idealist would have to admit, that in practice the author of this 
policy brief was not entirely wrong – Europe cannot absorb every human being 
living in poverty into its own society, even if it wanted to. What I read epitomised 
this dilemma of European migration management. 
 Nevertheless, I knew that there was something profoundly wrong with this 
depiction. I had the feeling that Europe had done its share in the production of the 
misery we supposedly needed to protect ourselves from. Furthermore, this 
‘distasteful’ Europe was not the one that the buildings I stood in represented – it 
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was not the visionary Europe of openness, freedom of speech, wealth and human 
rights. 
From research I did for my Bachelor thesis in Malta, I knew that the 
‘spillover of misery’ that made it across the border often lived in a state of utter 
exclusion. These individuals, who arrived in Europe not with a regular visa but as 
irregular migrants,2 live at the fringes of our society. They are materially deprived, 
excluded from the basic provisions of social welfare, and unable to participate in 
the regular political culture. Often an asylum application is the sole means of 
acquiring a regular European residency permit, even though many of those 
arriving are not technically refugees. The Dublin Regulation in turn, which is the 
corner stone of the European asylum system (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union, 2013), determines that the first country where an asylum 
seeker has entered the EU is responsible for her asylum application. As a result of 
that system, asylum seekers are forced to remain within certain member states at 
the EU’s external border, which are then overwhelmed by the large numbers of 
new immigrants, erecting new barriers to prevent further immigration. At the time 
of my field research, Greece, Spain and Bulgaria had already set up fences along 
their borders with non-EU countries (see Epilogue for current developments). For 
the migrants and refugees affected, the mirage of ‘normative power Europe’3 had 
disappeared, and the EU as a civilizational project had failed. This dilapidation is 
the social problem that I want to address in this dissertation. 
 Fortunately as a student of European integration I thought I knew where to 
start. If European integration and the Dublin Regulation are related to precarious 
state of irregular migrants in Europe, I wanted to trace back the origins these 
institutions. The emergence of the ‘Dublin system’ was the result of the abolition 
of border controls with the Schengen Agreement. One theory of European 
integration is particularly concerned with this ‘spillover’ of integration from one 
policy area (in this case internal migration and transport) to another (immigration 
policy): neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958). The theory regards European integration 
                                                          
2 The term irregular migrants is used throughout this dissertation to commonly refer to asylum 
seekers, clandestinos and refugees. Asylum seekers are people who have submitted an asylum 
application. Clandestinos are people who reside in the EU illegally without a valid residency 
permit. Refugees have successfully applied for asylum. 
3 The idea of ‘normative power Europe’ was presented by Ian Manners in 2002. He argued that 
rather than as a military power, we should think of the EU as a ‘normative power’, which aims 
to reproduce its own ethical principles across the globe. 
17 
 
as an incremental process that is proliferated by a technocratic governance 
apparatus to eventually culminate into a European federal state. I was sceptical 
about the theory from the very beginning – it is strongly positivist4 (van Apeldoorn 
et al., 2003) and lacks an understanding of structural power, which Strange defines 
as “the power to shape and determine the structures [within which institutions] 
operate” (1994, 25).  However, apart from that, during my research into 
neofunctionalism and its analysis of European migration management it became 
clear that the European institutions refer to the logic of spillover to justify the need 
for further integration. The Eurodac Regulation for example (Council of the 
European Union & European Parliament, 2013) creates a database of biometric 
data of all persons who have entered the EU irregularly and is thereby clearly 
relevant for policy and domestic security policy. At the same time it explicitly has 
for its objective the “effective application” of the Dublin Regulation (ibid.). This 
led me to develop the initial conceptualisation of neofunctionalism not merely as 
a theory of integration, but as an ideology that has, in part, shaped the integration 
process. During my explorative fieldwork I carried out interviews with key 
informants in the European Commission, finding further clues that hint at this 
hypothesis. If neofunctionalism had indeed informed the integration process, it is 
not surprising that the evolution of European asylum policy was strikingly close 
to neofunctionalist predictions. 
 However, in the history of European integration there were numerous 
critical junctures at which the integration process might easily have taken a turn 
into a very different direction. The abolition of border controls led to the 
introduction of the Dublin system, but a different outcome could equally be 
imagined. The country responsible for an asylum application could for instance 
be determed using a system of quotas, where each EU member state handles a 
fixed share of all applications. This would have avoided countries along the EU’s 
external borders from being overwhelmed, and the humanitarian situation of the 
asylum seekers themselves would be vastly improved. Why was one outcome 
given preference over another? To answer this question, one would have to 
understand the social purpose of European integration (van Apeldoorn, 2002): 
                                                          
4 Positivism refers to an understanding of social science as being in essence no different from 
natural science. 
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who benefits from the EU? Who is it for? Who is excluded from the benefits of the 
integration process, and what is it like to be excluded? How does migration 
management and its fallout reflect the EU’s social purpose? If I could find answers 
to these questions, I would be able to understand why one outcome of the 
integration process occurred rather than other. I could attempt to show why 
irregular migrants are stuck in a precarious state, and thereby deliver a critique of 
European integration. 
Nevertheless, if the purpose of this dissertation is to say something about 
European integration by looking at the case of European migration management, 
it ought to be explained why the latter represents an appropriate case study. I argue 
that this is the case for three main reasons. Firstly, irregular migration poses a 
challenge to one of the most important historical success stories of European 
integration: the abolition of border controls. If the EU’s external frontiers are 
insufficiently controlled and if the Dublin system seizes to operate as planned, 
member states may see themselves confronted with a situation pushing them to 
re-establish controls on their internal boundaries. Secondly, irregular migrants live 
on the fringes of the European Union. They are often excluded from political 
culture, materially deprived and excluded from basic provisions of the welfare 
state. Often they do not speak the languages of their host communities. They are 
therefore particularly exposed to the social fallout of European integration, which 
in turn may reveal the social purpose of the process. Thirdly, but far from least, 
the EU was developed as a civilisational project to reign in the dehumanising, 
destructive powers that the European wars had unleashed between 1914 and 1945. 
The failure to integrate asylum seekers and clandestinos into its society would 
imply the failure of the EU as a civilisational project. 
 Given the work I had already done, which allowed me to crystallise my 
research agenda, I employ the methodology of Critical Grounded Theory to 
structure and inform this dissertation (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). CGT does not 
necessarily determine research design, but rather guides the research and 
theorisation process as a whole. It rests on the principle of retroduction, which 
attempts to explain phenomena by proposing and identifying mechanisms which 
could produce them (Sayer, 1992). Retroduction inquires into the conditions and 
mechanisms that make the occurrence of a particular phenomenon possible 
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(Easton, 2010; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). It calls for a conversation between the 
abstract and the concrete. It embraces the epistemology and ontology of critical 
realism (Bhaskar, 1986), which postulates that there is an objective underlying 
reality, that we cannot perceive of it or accurately describe it. We can only hope 
to produce approximations of it, knowing that some approximations are better 
than others. As such, all theory is tentative, always dependent on space, time as 
well as on the structural conditions within which it is meant to apply. 
Retroduction therefore requires flexibility and openness to new research findings 
and theories. The retroductive process of CGT is an exploration of knowledge. It 
arguably reflects what actually happens in many fields of science, although the 
predominance of the positivist paradigm prevents researchers from 
acknowledging how knowledge is actually formed. 
 In practive, the CGT process begins with the identification of a social 
problem, which in my case was the precarious situation of irregular migrants. At 
first, this social problem is provisionally conceptualised using everyday and 
scientific theories. While neofunctionalism is certainly not a theory that most 
Europeans are familiar with, it is arguably the most commonly referenced theory 
of European integration. These theories are then explored and initial 
conceptualisations are developed, which is reflected in my conclusion that 
neofunctionalism has had an impact on European migration management in 
particular, and European integration in general. Explorative fieldwork is carried 
out to test these initial conceptualisations. Thereupon a further theoretical review 
is carried out, which is grounded through more elaborate field research. The 
infusion of the results of this second fieldwork stage with the theoretical review 
results in the creation of a critical grounded theory (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). 
 CGT’s rooting in critical realism, and the fact that a social problem 
represents the starting point of the retroductive process, makes the theory 
particularly suitable for the use of critical approaches to social science. As opposed 
to a positivist theory like neofunctionalism, critical theories aim at the liberation 
of “human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, 
244). Critical theories acknowledge that the production of knowledge is always 
for “some purpose” (Cox, 1981, 128). While positivism aims at problem-solving, 
critical theories aim at human emancipation: “The philosophers have hitherto 
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only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1981). 
As such, this dissertation not only strives to contribute to a deeper understanding 
the condition of irregular migrants and the state of European integration, but also 
attempts to contribute to the improvement of irregular migrants’ circumstances. 
During the review of the relevant literature it emerged that one of the most 
promising avenues for this endeavour was developed by Antonio Gramsci in the 
1920s and 1930s. Rather than on a research agenda, Gramsci placed his emphasis 
on an agenda for social change. As one of the founding members of the 
Communist Party of Italy, Gramsci found himself confronted with widespread 
social injustice. He was frustrated by the complacency of those social groups he 
called subaltern or subordinate, viewing theory as a tool for these groups to 
understand their own situation and to eventually emerge out of it. Gramsci 
conceptualised social leadership using the word ‘hegemony’, by which he meant 
the practice of leadership. This leadership is not necessarily malevolent. Indeed, 
subaltern groups can exercise hegemony within a class alliance. Crucially, 
leadership is not established (only) by force, but by a wide range of social 
institutions and conventions Gramsci refers to as the ‘hegemonic apparatus’ 
(1971; 1992). The state can be a part of the hegemonic apparatus – but Gramsci 
defined the state not only in terms of the government, but also in terms of 
universities, schools, associations or clubs. Neo-Gramscian scholars of European 
integration have suggested that the EU itself is part of a hegemonic project (e.g. 
van Apeldoorn, 2002; Horn, 2011; Bruff, 2014). 
 Although the lack of a socialist revolution in Western Europe is arguably 
the starting point of Gramsci’s political thought, the author is often limited to the 
national point of view. In the case of European migration management, this is 
problematic. Firstly, the European Union transcends the nation state, but also has 
not developed fully fledged statehood – the category of the national thus cannot 
be applied to it. Secondly, the phenomenon of migration inherently goes beyond 
national boundaries. Some authors have thus attempted to translate Gramsci’s 
writings to the international level (e.g. Gill, 2003; Cox, 1981). However, these 
attempts have sometimes resulted in hegemony having been defined narrowly in 
terms of domination, which does injustice to Gramsci multi-faceted and complex 
use of the term. In this dissertation I am suggesting two possible avenues into 
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expanding the neo-Gramscian point of view to the global realm. Firstly, a more 
careful reading of Gramsci shows that he was indeed concerned with the 
international. He acknowledged that capitalism works differently very differently 
in different countries, which was arguably precisely the reason for why he 
favoured the national level in his analysis of hegemony (Shilliam, 2004). 
Secondly, the insights of dependency theory have much to add to Gramsci’s 
conceptualisation of the global (Dos Santos, 1971; Frank, 1972). This theory was 
developed in an effort to comprehend why some global regions seemingly remain 
perpetually stuck in a state of dependency to other global regions. It can provide 
insight into the causes of migration as well as into the structure of the European 
Union, where some regions also appear disadvantaged. As both Gramscian theory 
and dependency theory are rooted in Marxism, they can be used in conjunction, 
allowing them to be used for the development of a more nuanced and insightful 
understanding of European integration and migration management. 
 Critical scholars of European integration, and neo-Gramscians in 
particular, have argued that the EU is undergoing a period of neoliberal 
transformation (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Cafruny & Ryner, 2007; Becker & Jäger, 
2012): aspects of the welfare state are becoming privatised (Cafruny & Ryner, 
2003); nation states’ ability to act is being eroded through the introduction of 
upper limits to public spending (Bruff, 2014); the fight against inflation is given 
priority over the fight against umemployment (van Apeldoorn, 2003); the 
liberalisation of the financial markets has increased the concentration of capital in 
the hands of fewer people (Overbeek, 2012). The purpose of neoliberalism is to 
create better condition for the accumulation and concetration of transnational 
capital. European integration has been highjacked to become a tool towards the 
achievement of this goal. 
Although this valuable literature thus provides insight into the social 
purpose of contemporary European integration, it contains some shortcomings. 
Firstly, it contains a bias towards the elites and rather underrepresents the role of 
subaltern groups such as irregular migrants (Horn, 2011). Hence this dissertation 
aims to shed light on whether the experiences of irregular migrants can contribute 
to a deeper understading of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Secondly, while my 
explorative work has shown that neofunctionalism has influenced the trajectory 
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of European integration, the role of neofunctionalism in Europe’s neoliberal 
transformation has not received sufficient attention. I therefore aim to locate the 
practice of neofunctionalist integration within the account of neo-Gramscian 
European integration theory, which furthers our insight into European 
integration’s social purpose. 
 
Through this dissertation I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
social purpose of European integration by means of an examination of European 
migration management. I attempt to do so through a literature review of key texts 
on critical European integration theory and through an examination of the role of 
neofunctionalism in Europe’s neoliberal transformation. However, the 
protagonists of this dissertation are not elites, but the irregular migrants 
themselves. Through fieldwork in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Germany I mean to 
bring the stories and experiences of clandestinos, asylum seekers and refugees into 
the spotlight, which highlight the fallout of contemporary European integration. 
By outlining the phenomena it produces, the European integration’s social 
purpose can be better understood. My thesis comprises of seven chapters, which 
reflect the structure of the CGT methodology. While the first chapter develops 
and explores the research agenda, the second, third and fourth chapters build up 
the methodology. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical material and draw 
conclusions in relation to the research agenda. 
 Chapter 1 represents a critique of neofunctionalism. It analyses in 
particular the neofunctionalist concept of spillover, which suggests that 
integration advances because the delegation of one competence to the European 
institutions creates pressure to similarly integrate other areas: European 
integration creates spillover effects and thus the necessity to create further 
institutions. The moments in time when the need for further integration arises are 
called ‘crises’, highlighting that according to the neofunctionalist logic crises are 
actually instrumental to the integration process. The work of Phillippe Schmitter 
(1971) is singled out as the most elaborate formulation of neofunctionalist theory, 
building the foundation for an application of neofunctionalism to the empirical 
case study of migration management. After briefly discussion the evolution of the 
European asylum system through the theoretical lens of neofunctionalism, the 
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chapter begins its critique. Firstly, it addresses intergovernmentalism which has 
traditionally been represented as neofunctionalism’s major antagonist. 
Intergovernmentalism emphasises the role of the nation state in advancing 
integration while neofunctionalism emphasises the role of the supranational 
institutions. The intergovernmentalist critique is valid insofar as states are clearly 
important gatekeepers in the area of migration management. Thereupon 
neofunctionalism’s epistemological and ontological roots in positivism are 
discussed in detail. Neofunctionalism lacks hermeneutic insight; it is somewhat 
able to explain how European integration advances, but it is utterly unable to 
understand the social purpose of integration. In this respect intergovernmentalism 
and neofunctionalism are in fact strikingly similar, highlighting that the former 
theory is by no means a viable alternative to the study of the contemporary 
European Union. The chapter further discusses neofunctionalism’s inability to 
address structural power as one of the main causes of its failure to understand 
social purpose. However, the most important point of the chapter is that 
neofunctionalism has in fact become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This implies that 
the accuracy of the theory’s predictions may in fact not be due to the strength of 
its analytical tools, but due to its own influence on the integration process. 
 Chapter 2 seeks to identify alternative approaches to the study of European 
integration by means of a literature review, focusing in particular on neo-
Gramscian theory and dependency theory. While both theories are located on the 
Marxist spectrum of political thought, neo-Gramscian theory addresses primarily 
the distribution of structural power among society’s classes and social groups. Its 
analysis of hegemony provides an important method for understanding the 
location of the European project within the practice of a neoliberal hegemonic 
programme which works primarily in the interests of transnational capital. This 
provides the foundation for an exploration of the role of neofunctionalism in 
Europe’s neoliberal transformation. The second part of this chapter addresses 
dependency theory, which addresses the causes of African and Asian migratory 
movements towards the European continent. As neo-Gramscian theory and 
dependency theory are to be referred to simultaneously, the ontological fit 
between both theories is discussed. This chapter thus defines this dissertation’s 
research agenda with increased clarity. 
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 If the purpose of European integration is meant to be understood through 
an investigation into EU migration management and irregular migrants’ 
experience of it, the Gramscian category of subalternity will clearly be of 
significance. Chapter 3 thus attempts to discuss the concept in detail. While 
Gramsci’s narrative of the practice of hegemony has recently been recovered (e.g. 
Thomas, 2013), his treatment of ‘subalternity’ has sometimes been inaccurately 
employed. There has been a tendency to equate subalternity with inferiority and 
the Marxian lumpenproletariat. Gramsci however discusses subalternity in terms of 
its potential to emerge from its own subordination, continually pursuing an 
emancipatory agenda. The chapter also addresses neofunctionalism’s view on the 
subaltern. Indeed, Haas’s theory lacks the theoretical tools to deal with class 
issues, delegating the subaltern to the vague category of exogenous factors. The 
final part of this chapter discusses different ways by which neofunctionalism 
actually produces subalternity if put into political practice. Specifically the concepts 
of commodification, reification and biopolitics are addressed. 
 As the previous chapters have brought this dissertation’s research agenda 
into focus, Chapter 4 contains a discussion of its methodology and research 
design. It addresses the roots, claims, principles and research methods of Critical 
Grounded Theory. This chapter also addresses research design. Field research 
involved interviews with the relevant staff of national and European institutions, 
asylum seekers, clandestinos, irregular migrant workers and the staff of asylum 
accommodation facilities. My fieldwork was carried out at four locations in four 
different countries: Thrace (Bulgaria/Greece), Athens (Greece), Sicily (Italy) and 
Leipzig (Germany). The reasoning behind the recruitment process and the 
selection of the research locations is explained in this chapter. The interviews were 
subsequently transcribed, open-coded and brought into relation with the 
theoretical categories developed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 Chapter 5 initiates the part of this dissertation which presents the research 
findings and draws conclusions with reference to the research questions. It 
establishes the context for the discussion of irregular migrants’ experience of 
migration management. It discusses the impact of neofunctionalism on the 
practice of European migration management. According to the neofunctionalist 
logic, the advancement of European integration in this field had to be preceded by 
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the emergence of a common European outlook on migration. This was facilitated 
by the creation of a common language to discuss this issue by European 
policymakers. Migration policy was transformed into an area that was no longer 
shaped by values and political ideas, but by technocratic decision-making. 
Information was supposedly all that was required to ‘manage’ irregular migration 
flows into the EU, and based on this knowledge, the best decisions could be taken. 
This has caused a seemingly contradictory development. On the internal level, 
spillover has resulted in the increasing harmonisation of the national asylum-
regimes, leading to improved conditions for the reception of irregular migration. 
On the external level, the application of the spillover logic has allowed for the 
fortification of the EU’s external borders and the externalisation of migration 
management to Europe’s neighbours in Asia Minor and Northern Africa. 
 Within this context Chapter 6 summarises the findings that were made 
during field research. After contextualising irregular migrants’ experiences within 
the four national contexts in which it took place, these experiences are discussed 
in several stages that relate to the categories developed in Chapter 3. As the EU’s 
border regime has become ever more restrictive, irregular migrants often have no 
choice but to resort to the services provided by human smugglers. This experience 
has been linked with the concept of reification (Lukács, 1968). Upon first 
reception by European or national authorities, irregular migrants are screened, 
biometrically scanned, quarantined and vaccinated – they are thus exposed to 
biopolitics (Foucault, 1979). Accommodation centres are perpetually operating 
beyond their capacity in a permanent state of exception. The lack of regular means 
of immigration has facilitated the emergence of an irregular labour market for 
clandestinos. The subaltern state of irregular migrants and their visible 
manifestation of material insecurity have triggered waves of xenophobia 
throughout the continent which has become a significant aspects of these 
migrants’ everyday lives. Finally, in line with Gramsci’s emancipatory agenda, 
the chapter discusses the obstacles standing in the way of overcoming irregular 
migrants’ subalternity. 
 Chapter 7 returns to the research questions outlined above, bringing the 
findings presented in the previous two chapters into a theoretical perspective. The 
chapter picks up on the argument that European integration has served the social 
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purpose of creating conditions favourable to the accumulation of transnational 
capital by means of a neoliberal transformation. The chapter discusses the 
relationship between neoliberalism, neofunctionalism and migration 
management. The Washington Consensus, as the prime neoliberal development 
policy, is in part responsible for triggering global migratory movements. 
Furthermore, as neofunctionalism does not determine the development of the 
European Union into a particular direction, the impact of the neoliberal 
hegemonic programme explains why neofunctionalist integration has taken on its 
contemporary form. Indeed, European migration management can be seen as an 
instance of this neoliberal programme. Neofunctionalism in turn has served the 
purpose of technocratically justifying Europe’s neoliberal transformation in the 
context of decreasing public support, underlining that neoliberalism is becoming 
more authoritarian (see Bruff, 2014). The second part of this chapter addresses 
three contradictions that have arisen out of Europe’s neoliberal transformation, 
whose materialisations could be identified during field research. These 
contradictions have the potential to disturb the neoliberal order. 
 In the conclusion I will summarise the main findings of this dissertation, 
and I will also propose a preliminary programme that could be carried out at EU 
level to improve the situation of irregular migrants. I will point towards this 
dissertations shortcomings, emphasising that the CGT process is open-ended, 
always calling for further research. 
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Chapter 1: Neofunctionalism in Theory and Practice 
 
For decades neofunctionalism had represented the obvious starting point for any 
theoretical discussion on European integration. It therefore represents the first 
proto-theory that is discussed here with reference to CGT. The theory, as 
developed by Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963), provided a compelling 
vision of the emergence of a pan-European state. Neofunctionalism puts forward 
that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community had put a process in 
motion that would lead to ever more aspects of national sovereignty to be 
transferred to supranational institutions. It provided an explanation for how it was 
possible that states which had fought each other just a few years earlier would 
voluntarily embark upon their unification. As such, exploring neofunctionalism 
as a way to address the research agenda is an important part of the retroductive 
process of Critical Grounded Theory which begins with the investigation of proto 
theories. 
 This chapter represents a critique of neofunctionalism. After outlining the 
origins and hallmarks of the theory, it will be demonstrated how it would view the 
evolution of the European asylum system. Asylum is the aspect of migration 
management where the European institutions have the most competences, which 
is why it it is focused on in this chapter. On the basis of this analysis, 
neofunctionalism will be critiqued from several different perspectives. The 
theory’s positivist underpinnings, its lack of hermeneutic insight, as well as its 
failure to understand structural power make it inherently incapable of grasping the 
social purpose of European integration. In the case of migration management, its 
technocratic vision of governance furthermore causes it to disregard the the objects 
of asylum policy: asylum seekers. 
 Given these faults, the final argument pursued in this chapter appears 
particularly poignant: neofunctionalism is a self-fulfilling prophecy that has had a 
significant impact on the European integration process itself. While this argument 
is not new (White, 2003; Diez, 1999), the dangers of neofunctionalist ideology are 
highlighted against the backdrop of its methodological and ontological 
shortcomings. 
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Neofunctionalism in Theory 
 
This section is going to outline neofunctionalism’s basic premises, highlighting 
that the theory’s primary concern is to explain why nation states are voluntarily 
surrendering sovereignty to a supranational institution. Nevertheless, before this 
can be done, the emergence of the theory ought to be placed within the intellectual 
context of the 1950s. Neofunctionalism can only be properly understood if its 
roots in functionalism and radical behaviourism are outlined. 
 
 
Origins of the Theory 
 
David Mitrany’s formulation of functionalism (1966) provided the basis of 
neofunctionalist theory. Nevertheless, before addressing Mitrany’s work, I want 
to take one step back to examine the roots of functionalism itself. Functionalism 
should be regarded as an approach rather than a theory because it does not present 
us with a well-defined set of mechanisms of behaviour, but rather with a common 
agenda. Functionalists are principally concerned with finding the optimal method 
for the fulfilment of human needs (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, 46). To best 
accomplish this task, each human being and every community are assigned a 
particular task in the global political system. Functionalists envision technocracy 
as the ideal form of government. This arguably has to do with the rise to influence 
of behaviourism in the United States at around the same time as functionalism. 
The radical behaviourist school of psychology, particularly as expressed by the 
works of Skinner (e.g. 1971) advocated the development of a ‘technology of 
behaviour’, which meant using the hypothetico-deductive method of the natural 
sciences to optimise human behaviour. The scientific method, which had proven 
so very successful in the natural sciences, could thus also be applied to human 
individuals, changing their behaviour, and promising the elimination of 
psychological disorders, the generation of optimal societal efficiency, the 
production of the perfect form of government and the eradication of war. In his 
novel Walden Two (2005) Skinner depicts his utopia in the form of a commune 
that adheres to the radical behaviourist principles, causing it to become perfectly 
29 
 
efficient, technocratically organised, and questioning the efficiency of all societal 
conventions. Functionalism is thus in many ways Skinner’s radical behaviourism 
as applied to the international sphere. Skinner’s (2005) idea of a ‘technology of 
behaviour’ bears striking similarities to one of the founding-fathers of sociology, 
Claude-Henri Saint-Simon. For Saint-Simon “science provides the means to 
predict what is useful,” leading him to suggest that “scientists are superior to all 
other men” (1976). Saint-Simon thus advocates a government formed by 
scientists, as they can “create happiness for [themselves] and for [their] 
contemporaries” (ibid.). Government is seen by Saint-Simon and Skinner as a 
managerial task, which requires no elections. Through his character Frazier, 
Skinner states in Walden Two that “to suggest that everyone should take an interest 
[in government] would seem as fantastic as to suggest that everyone should 
become familiar with our Diesel engines” (Skinner, 2005, 254). The best method 
of government can be determined by scientific examination. This is in fact how 
neofunctionalism portrays governance to be carried out, that it is an elite 
endeavour, and that the technicalities of the problems involved can only be 
understood by experts. 
Mitrany’s functionalism was concerned with finding the perfect way to 
conduct international relations. Rosamond states that “the foundations of 
functionalism reside in a positive view of human possibility, and, to some extent, 
of human nature” (2000, 31). Functionalists believed that politics ought to be 
about finding a way to optimally fulfil human needs, which could only be 
achieved through international cooperation. Global peace and collaboration was 
thus regarded as very much possible, if not inevitable. Mitrany was very sceptical 
about the ability of the nation state to optimally fulfil human needs, which is why 
some tasks are best delegated to the international (or supranational) level. 
Although Mitrany’s “functionalism offers a largely technocratic vision of human 
governance” (ibid., 33), it is also highly normative by all standards, as it wants to 
contribute to the eradication of war, and as it is very critical of the role of the 
nation state, which Harrison states is Mitrany’s “basic enemy” (1974, 28). 
Mitrany was dismissive of European integration, because he believed in a global 
union rather than in a European union. He argued that “between the conception 
of continental unions and that of a universal league there is a difference not merely 
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of degree but of essence,” because “the one would proceed in the old way by a 
definition of territory,” while the other would proceed “by definition of functions” 
(Mitrany, 1933, 116). For him the inefficiencies of statism and nationalism were 
simply transferred to the European level, which he did not regard as a significant 
step forward. 
Mitrany believed that states were essentially a means towards safeguarding 
the fulfilment of human needs (1933). However, particularly within the context of 
the wave of European nationalism in the early 20th century, “the state […] had 
become an end in itself” (Rosamond, 2000, 34). Mitrany was critical of this 
development because he had realised that states were materially interdependent; 
the concept of states hindered flexible and creative thinking about an alternative 
form of government, and states were incapable of dealing with the newly-
emerging double-responsibility of providing for security and welfare. Mitrany thus 
thought that “the ‘material’ interdependence of states meant that the necessary 
innovative thinking ought to yield at least a measure of transnational creativity to 
solve problems of public management, distribution, welfare and communication” 
(ibid., 35). This idea can be regarded as the starting point of European integration, 
and also of Haas’ neofunctionalism. 
 
 
Explaining European Integration 
 
The story of neofunctionalism begins with a question that posed a veritable puzzle 
for political scientists of the 1950s: why is it that states voluntarily surrender parts 
of their sovereignty to a supranational institution? Indeed, against the backdrop of 
the dominance of Morgenthau’s realism (Morgenthau, 2006), the question seems 
truly perplexing; if national interests are at the core of foreign policy-formulation, 
as Morgenthau claims, it seems irrational to establish an institution that effectively 
erodes policy autonomy to pursue those interests. In his preface to The Uniting of 
Europe, Haas argues that European integration may be seen as an “instance of 
voluntary ‘integration’ taking place before [the political scientist’s] eyes, as it were 
under laboratory conditions” (Haas, 1958, xi). European integration formed a 
nearly ideal case study for anyone wishing to tackle this research puzzle, and 
neofunctionalism emerged as the dominant approach to understanding European 
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integration. Haas formulates his research agenda very clearly, stating that “my 
aim is merely the dissection of the actual ‘integration process’ in order to derive 
propositions about its nature” (ibid., xii). By answering the question of how 
European integration occurs, Haas could equally address why it happens. 
Nevertheless, as Rosamond underlines, “neofunctionalism arose in a set of 
particularly extraordinary political circumstances and it cannot really be evaluated 
without recognition of that fact” (2000, 54). It is therefore meaningful to begin 
outlining the hallmarks of neofunctionalism by placing the emergence of the 
theory within the context of the founding of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957. 
When Ernst Haas published The Uniting of Europe in 1958, European 
integration was gathering momentum. The European project began with an 
attempt to create a common market for the French and West German coal and 
steel industries in 1951. Coal and steel were regarded as the essential raw materials 
for an economy that was geared towards war, and placing their production under 
a supranational authority was thought to make war between France and West 
Germany too costly to contemplate. By 1958, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) had evolved into the EEC, which would later remove tariffs 
on trade between its member states, and which brought about a Common 
Agricultural Policy (Bainbridge & Teasdale, 1995). The pace of early European 
integration was so impressive that various other regional integration attempts 
were launched around the globe, albeit with less success. 
Numerous links can be drawn between neofunctionalism and policy 
practice – a fact underlined by Schmitter, when he states that “a good deal” of the 
explanatory strength of  neofunctionalism draws “from using concepts which are 
rather close to the categories used by decisionmakers” (1971, 234). An analysis of 
the Schuman Declaration can serve as a useful starting point for understanding 
Haas’ theory. The Schuman Declaration, made by the French foreign minister 
Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, is identified by Manners (2011) as one of the 
major symbols of European integration. The 9th of May is since 1964 celebrated 
annually as Europe Day, and various rituals are performed to remember the 
beginning of the creation of the European Union. The Schuman Declaration is 
furthermore immensely helpful to understanding neofunctionalism, as it 
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summarises the ‘Monnet method of integration’, which describes the strategy that 
was to be employed to initiate European solidarity, and that was meant to 
culminate in a European federation. The Monnet method can be summarised 
using the following seven points, which have been adapted from Rosamond (2000, 
51-2) with some alterations: 
 
1. Integration must begin in an area of ‘low politics’ (i.e. an area not deemed 
essential to the survival of the state) which is nevertheless strategically 
significant. The Schuman Declaration identifies the coal and steel industry 
as suitable for these criteria, arguing that the creation of a common market 
for coal in steel in France and Germany would make “any war between 
[those two countries] not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” 
(Schuman, 1950). Furthermore, the coal and steel industry forms the basis 
of the manufacturing industry, and numerous sectors of the economy are 
functionally linked to it. 
2. To coordinate the integration process, a High Authority (i.e. Commission) 
should be put in place. This allowed for the circumvention of constant 
clashes between national interests, and overrode the need for the time-
consuming harmonisation of national legislations. The Schuman 
Declaration states that the “decisions [of the new High Authority] will bind 
France, Germany and other member countries,” while at the same time 
assigning it with a functional, depoliticised agenda: “The task with which 
this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the 
shortest possible time the modernisation of production and the 
improvement of its quality” (ibid.). 
3. The Monnet method foresaw that this process would create functional 
pressure to integrate adjacent areas of the economy in a similar fashion. 
The integration of the coal and steel market was seen merely as “leaven 
from which may grow a wider and deeper community” (ibid.). While other 
countries were meant to see the benefits of this common market, the latter 
was also seen as the foundation for further integration. A common coal 
and steel market may thus for example also require a common transport 
network. 
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4. It was hoped that the creation of a powerful High Authority would cause 
a shift in the loyalties of national industries and elites towards the new, 
supranational polity, as they would seek to fulfil their goals and interests 
in the fastest and most effective manner. The Declaration states that “in 
this way, there may be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest 
which is indispensible to the establishment of a common economic 
system” (idib.). Common interests, and new loyalties, would legitimate 
and foster further integration. 
5. The European community becomes more deeply integrated, as a common 
market requires larger and more powerful European institutions and 
bureaucracies. While Rosamond does not explicitly state this, deeper 
integration arguably attracts more countries to participate in the 
increasingly significant common market (cf. Nugent, 1992). 
6. The Monnet method foresees that economic integration will inevitably 
lead to political integration. The Declaration states that “this proposal will 
lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation” (ibid.). The efficient functioning of a common market requires 
for instance a common border regime, which in turn requires common 
migration management. 
7. The Schuman Declaration is very explicit about the finality of the 
European integration process, viewing the ECSC as merely “a first step in 
the federation of Europe” (ibid.). Schuman acknowledges that “Europe 
will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan,” as proposed by 
the federalists. European integration was meant to develop incrementally. 
At the same time he believes that the points outlined above “will change 
the destinies of those regions,” culminating in a European federal state 
“indispensable to the preservation of peace” (ibid.). 
 
The Monnet method was what gave early European integration its momentum. 
As will be seen, it also proved a point of departure for Haas’ development of 
neofunctionalism’s analytical concepts. The emergence of neofunctionalism is 
inseparable from the unique and particular political circumstances in which it took 
place. 
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An investigation of Haas original formulation of neofunctionalism reveals 
the proximity of neofunctionalism to the EU’s founding fathers’ vision of 
European integration. Haas defines the object of regional (European) integration 
as the creation of a ‘political community’ (Haas, 1958, 5). This in turn, refers to 
the “condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central 
political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in 
a definable geographic space” (ibid.). Haas postulates that the nation state forms an 
example of this condition, as its citizens show near-unconditional loyalty towards 
the polity; they habitually obey the injunctions of the state, and they turn to it 
seeking the fulfilment of important expectations. Haas thus sees political 
integration as the process where loyalty is shifted towards a supranational polity, 
a process which is also alluded to in the Schuman declaration. Political integration 
is contrasted with economic integration, which can occur without the presence of 
a supranational political authority, such as the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). Haas acknowledges that multiple loyalties may co-exist. It 
must be noted that while European integration is Haas’ choice of case study, as it 
“provide[s] a living laboratory” of political integration, the processes involved in 
political integration can in principle be applied to any geographical region (e.g. 
Malamud, 2010). 
The shift in loyalties that takes place to facilitate political integration is, 
according to Haas, not necessarily, and perhaps only marginally, linked to 
political ideology or to pressure from the new political centre. More importantly, 
“new loyalties are thought to grow haphazardly in their function as intermediary 
means to some ultimate end” (ibid., 14). This relates closely to the Monnet 
method, which expected that ‘political elites’ strive to realize their interests more 
effectively, thus turning to the European institutions without reference to 
ideology. This process is thought to lead to ‘Europeanism’, if it is continued for a 
sufficiently extensive period of time. One of the cornerstones of neofunctionalist 
political integration is thus the changing expectations and loyalties of political 
elites. Haas defines those elites as “the leaders of all relevant political groups who 
habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers 
in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties” (ibid., 17). Hence 
the leaders of trade unions and major corporations must also be regarded as elites. 
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Haas’ most important mechanism of integration is ‘spillover’. In The 
Uniting of Europe, Haas poses to the reader a series of questions: 
 
“How would six different tax systems affect the conditions of competition? 
Could investments in coal be considered apart from investment in other 
energy sectors? How much distortion in prices can be attributed to six 
different wage and social security systems” (ibid., 103)? 
 
The idea behind spillover is that the integration of one part of the economy will 
exert functional pressure on adjacent sectors, causing further integration. The 
initial integration of the Western European coal and steel industry could thus 
indeed become Schuman’s ‘leaven’ culminating in European federal union. This 
assumes sufficiently interdependent economies, highlighting the particular 
environment in which post-war European integration took place (Mutimer, 1989). 
It is important to note that spillover is merely a label for an underlying process 
which occurs when actors that share a common interest are unsatisfied with the 
results of the level of integration that has hitherto been achieved. They will thus 
attempt to integrate sectors of the economy that they regard as being 
interdependent, optimizing the effectiveness of the strategy employed, and 
speeding up the time required to achieve the desired outcome (Haas, 1958). 
Deeper levels of integration will in turn lead to the loyalty shift described in the 
previous section. The interplay between functional spillover and the loyalty shift 
to the supranational institution creates the momentum necessary to drive the 
integration process towards the final goal of a European political community. It 
can justifiably be argued that Haas assigned a degree of automaticity to the 
European integration process, a view which was later rejected by other 
neofunctionalist authors (cf. Schmitter, 1969). 
 Haas’ understanding of spillover, while being at the heart of his theory of 
neofunctionalism, was quickly made the target of critique because of the 
unidirectional course that it imposed on the European integration process. Of 
particular importance to keeping neofunctionalist theory relevant was the work of 
Phillippe Schmitter (e.g. Schmitter, 1969; 2005). Schmitter identified the need to 
treat “politicization as […] analytically distinct” from spillover (1969, 166), by 
which he meant that spillover from one sector of the economy to another will 
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increase the controversiality of European integration. The more controversial an 
issue, the larger the audience that is interested in it; hence political actors would 
thus eventually have to agree on a “manifest redefinition of mutual objectives” (ibid.). 
European integration seizes to be a technocratic matter and becomes highly 
politicised. Reaching this point is a major obstacle to the momentum of European 
integration, requiring conquest if a political union is meant to be achieved. 
 In 1971, Schmitter significantly elaborated on the idea of spillover, 
authoring one of the clearest formulations of neofunctionalist theory. He 
acknowledged that his previous attempts to develop a general theory of regional 
integration (cf. Haas & Schmitter, 1964), have been, “I think it fair to say, a 
successful failure” (Schmitter, 1971, 232), finding that neofunctionalism should 
not assume the uni-directionality of regional integration. Like Haas, Schmitter 
postulates that “the integration of formally independent political entities engages 
– in the contemporary world – basically the same variables and processes” (1971, 
233). Neofunctionalism is seen as a universal theory of regional integration, 
although results of these processes will differ due to different contexts and 
conditions. Schmitter views the unintended consequences of political action – a 
hallmark of functionalist logic – as the driving force behind spillover. He argues 
that in a regional integration setting, national interests converge into a regional 
institution. These regional institutions then act to achieve common objectives, 
while the decisions they make are sometimes inherently contradictory. Schmitter 
lists four principal reasons for this: 
 
1. A particular action or strategy may deliver an unequal distribution of 
benefits to participants. 
2. Policy areas are treated separately, although they are deeply 
interconnected with other sectors. 
3. In the context of global interdependence, a closed regional unit is 
impossible, and any strategy will cause external ripples. 
4. In a regional organisation, transparency of information causes participants 
to be very cautious about the comparative performance of partners 
(Schmitter, 1971, 235-6). 
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As a result of those contradictions, “actors may be forced to revise their strategies 
and to consider alternative integrative obligations” (ibid., 236). In some cases, 
these alternative integrative obligations may go against the perceived national 
interest.5 Furthermore, the actors’ imperfect knowledge causes integrative policies 
to have unintended consequences. Schmitter describes the periods when these 
consequences become apparent as crises, which cause more authority to be 
transferred to the regional institution.6 This process in combination with the 
habitualisation of cooperation leads to a redefinition of the community’s common 
objectives. Schmitter emphasises that while the redefinition following the 
‘decision cycle’ may result in the need for wider integration (i.e. spillover), actors 
may equally respond with “spill-back,” where they “withdraw from the original 
objective, downgrading their commitment to mutual cooperation” (ibid.). This 
crucial departure from Haas’ original theory frees neofunctionalism from the 
notion of automaticity, while at the same time making it non-falsifiable. 
Schmitter’s neofunctionalism aspires to explain all possible outcomes of the 
integration process and thereby loses much of its attractiveness. Schmitter 
attempts to make up for this by attempting to probabilistically predict which 
outcomes are more likely. He plots the decision alternatives open to a given actor 
on two axes. While the vertical axis refers to the level of authority of the regional 
institution (i.e. its decision-making power), the horizontal axis describes the scope 
of the institution’s authority (i.e. the number of issue areas the institution may 
deal with). A political community is achieved when both the level and the scope 
of the institution are high. Schmitter lists several different strategies actors can 
choose from (see Figure 1 below). In his analysis, the choice of strategy thus forms 
the ‘dependent variable’, which, if plotted against time, may alternate across all 
possible values. The time it takes to achieve a particular goal and the presumed 
                                                          
5 One example of this is the voluntary accession of Mediterranean member states to the Dublin 
regime. When Malta joined the European Union in 2004 it was clear that for many irregular 
migrants Malta would become the state where they would have to lodge their asylum 
application, which may lead to financial, logistical and humanitarian problems. Despite this, 
Malta joined the Dublin regime. At the same time, Malta is the only member state that does not 
permit unlimited EU labour migration, having included an opt-out from a core EU-policy in its 
accession agreement. 
6 An obvious and well-known example is the institutional crisis that erupted from the sovereign 
debt crisis in several member states of the eurozone. Monetary integration resulted in a crisis 
which called for the creation of a debt settlement fund (European Stability Mechanism) and the 
transfer of competences to the European Commission such as budgetary supervision. 
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effectiveness of the strategy serve as independent variables, although actors will 
be constrained to selecting the lowest common denominator. 
 
Figure 2: Plot of Alternative Actor Decision Cycles (Schmitter, 1971, 241) 
 To complete his version of neofunctionalism, Schmitter proposes a series 
of hypotheses predicting trends in decision cycles (1971, 243-6): 
  
1. The Spillover Hypothesis: Contradictions will cause the unexpected 
performance of institutions, causing actors to revise both their scope and 
their level of authority, thereby creating new regional institutions to reach 
the same objectives. 
2. The Hypothesis of Natural Entropy: Integration tends towards a state of rest 
unless disturbed by exogenous factors. 
3. Hypothesis of Increasing Mutual Determination: The predictive power of the 
model increases as the impact of exogenous factors decreases over time 
(Schmitter, 1971, 244). 
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4. Curvilinear Hypothesis: If too many unforeseen events occur at the 
international level, states may react defensively, preferring non-integrative 
solutions. Schmitter calls this hypothesis a “necessary concession to 
reality” (ibid., 245). 
 
The aim of Schmitter’s model, which he developed in conjunction with Ernst 
Haas, is the quantification of the independent variables involved. It is for this 
reason that he “remain[s] ambiguous as to whether it should best move toward 
econometric techniques or simulation” (1971, 264). 7 
 While discussing neofunctionalist expectations and hypotheses, the 
theory’s conceptualisation of crises calls for special attention. Schmitter argues 
that “the manipulation of […] crises by regional actors lies at the core of the 
integrative dynamic” (1969, 164). Crises are crucial turning points in the 
integration process because they reflect its incompleteness. In Schmitter’s logic, 
crises occur because the authority over a particular policy-area has been 
supranationalised to an insufficient extent, leaving decision-makers with 
essentially two choices: advancing integration into the adjacent area concerned 
(spillover) or retrenching sovereignty to the national level (spill-back). It is then 
assumed that “as more tasks become interrelated through inherent links or 
package deals the costs of disintegrative action becomes greater,” limiting the 
number of “political alternatives” (Schmitter, 1971, 826). As a result, “larger crises 
that accompany decreasing alternatives may play a productive role” in the 
integration process (ibid.). In the neofunctionalist vision, European integration 
can thus be said to thrive on crises. 
 These classical formulations of neofunctionalism by Haas and Schmitter 
treat regionalisation and regional integration as global trends, which essentially 
follow the same rules wherever they occur. The success of regional integration 
projects outside Europe has nevertheless been limited at best, and certainly falls 
short of European-based expectations. While Schmitter allows for disintegration, 
he nevertheless develops his theory for any context, rather than just for the 
                                                          
7 Haas himself should be not be regarded as an econometrist, employing descriptive statistics as 
well as process-tracing to describe regional integration in the context of the ECSC (1958). Despite 
Haas’ positivistic research agenda, he is certainly no econometrist. Econometric approaches to 
theorising European integration nevertheless do exist, such as Alker (1971) or Rose (2000). 
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European example. The pretensions of universality have been one of the reasons 
why neofunctionalism as a ‘grand theory’ of European integration fell into dismay 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent attempts to revive neofunctionalism are 
specifically adapted to the European context. Nevertheless, in the text books on 
European integration, classical neofunctionalism has remained prominent to this 
day, as it has “revealed the guiding logic of some of the main protagonists in the 
post-war uniting of Europe” (Rosamond, 2000, 73), as exemplified by similarities 
between Haas’ theory and the Monnet method. 
 
 
Neofunctionalism and European Migration Management 
 
From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, neofunctionalism underwent a crisis that 
was so severe that Haas himself called the theory obsolete (Haas, 1975). European 
integration, if it was to follow a trajectory culminating in a continental federation, 
had experienced several set-backs, and neofunctionalism seemingly failed to 
provide a credible explanation (Gehring, 1996). Nevertheless, since the late 1980s 
neofunctionalism is “no longer obsolescent” (Rosamond, 2005, 251). 
Neofunctionalism has re-emerged, perhaps not as a grand theory of European 
integration, but certainly as a valid framework for analysis of the processes 
facilitating and accompanying the unification of Europe. Corbey attributed the 
revival of neofunctionalism to “the sudden upswing of the EC” (1995, 265), and 
Niemann and Schmitter likewise argue that “the resurgence of the European 
integration process in the mid-1980s” has allowed neofunctionalism to make “a 
substantial comeback” (2009, 45). Furthermore, the increasing depth and width 
of European integration has resulted in a greater academic interest in the EU as a 
whole from which neofunctionalism has benefitted. Even the crisis of the 
eurozone that begun in the late 2000s provides ample examples of spillover 
(Cooper, 2011). Nevertheless, the evolution of European asylum legislation 
arguably represents the neatest fit between neofunctionalist expectations and 
political reality. It is worth addressing how neofunctionalists would understand 
this evolution, as this demonstrates how the theory is applied in practice, while 
simultaneously setting the scene for this dissertation’s empirical focus. 
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Figure 2: The four historic phases of transition in the European asylum system 
 An asylum application is today the most important means of immigration 
to the European Union. Although each member state maintains its own rules on 
who is allowed to enter and reside within its territory, various regulations and 
directives have created a degree of harmony among the 28 national asylum 
systems. Neofunctionalists would regard the evolution from the European 
Economic Community to the contemporary European asylum system as a four 
stage process (see Figure 2). 
The first step involved the abolition of border controls between the 
signatories of the Schengen Agreement of 1985. Taschner refers to this as a 
“natural consequence of the principle of freedom of movement as one of the 
foundations of the Community” (1997, 16). A Commission White Paper states 
that the control of individuals at intra-Community borders is an “affront to the 
principle of freedom of movement within a single Community” (European 
Commission, 1985, 16). The creation of the EEC had created local, transnational 
economies, whose development was obstructed by the existence of frontier checks. 
Transport times within Europe were unnecessarily lengthy as a result of border 
controls. The neofunctionalist narrative would thus regard the Schengen 
Agreement as an example of functional spillover from the EEC, which had 
increased trade volumes requiring a pan-European infrastructure that is 
unconstrained by national borders. Nevertheless, Schengen was an 
intergovernmental agreement that had no impact on the competences of the 
European institutions. 
The second major transition in the history of the European asylum system 
took place because the abolition of border controls that was initiated by the 
Schengen Agreement required a range of ‘compensatory measures’. Open borders 
meant that not only European citizens, but anyone residing in the Schengen Area, 
including clandestinos and potential asylum seekers, could travel freely between 
the member states. This could lead to ‘asylum shopping’, which refers to the idea 
that refugees would apply in several member states, hoping to improve their 
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chance of being accepted.  The Dublin Convention was thus set out to determine 
which member state was responsible for an asylum application. Lavenex confirms 
that the Dublin Convention was a “reaction of national governments to the 
forthcoming abolition of internal border controls in the context of the single 
market project” (1999, 34). The Convention was signed by all 12 member states 
of the European Community on 15 June 1990. The basic provisions of the 
Convention were the following: 
 
- If an asylum applicant has a family member in a member state, that state 
is responsible for the application. Family members are parents, if the 
person concerned is an unmarried minor, unmarried children or spouses. 
- If the applicant holds a valid residence permit/visa of one member state, 
that state is responsible for the application. 
- If the applicant has several valid residence permits/visas, responsibility lies 
with the member state that has issued the document with the longest period 
of residency or with the latest expiry date. 
- If these criteria do not apply, and if it can be shown that the applicant has 
irregularly crossed the external border of the European Communities from 
a non-member state, the member state of first entry is responsible for the 
application. 
- If this cannot be proven, the member state where an application was first 
lodged is responsible (Belgium et al., 1997). 
 
In practice, it is the final clause that is most regularly applied. 
 The transformation of the Dublin Convention into the Dublin II 
Regulation is significant because it represents the Convention’s conversion from 
an international treaty into European law, and because complementary legislation 
was passed to allow for a more efficient implementation of the Dublin system. 
This occurred within the context of the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and 
Amsterdam (Council of the European Union, 1997). In Article K.1 of the 
Maastricht Treaty, asylum policy was declared to be one of several “matters of 
common interest” in the field of justice and home affairs, thus placing it within 
the overall EU area of responsibilities (Council of the European Union, 1992). 
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Asylum policy being within the remit of the European institutions laid the 
foundation for the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). 
The following elements still characterise the CEAS today: 
 
1. A “clear and workable” system to establish which member state is 
responsible for an asylum application. 
2. Common standards for the asylum procedure. 
3. Minimum reception conditions for asylum seekers. 
4. Common standards on the meaning of the refugee status (European 
Council, 1999). 
 
The first point refers to the Dublin Convention which was integration into EU law 
as the Dublin II Regulation. There was some resistance to this by a group of 
member states championed by Greece, which questioned whether ‘first entry 
member state’ clause was still applicable (Filzwieser & Sprung, 2010, 27). This 
resistance was overcome by the larger group of states led by Germany, France and 
the UK. The other three points of the CEAS are included because if an EU 
regulation is to determine which member state is responsible for an asylum 
application, there should also be legislation making sure that the standards in all 
member states are harmonised. Furthermore, the Eurodac Regulation created a 
database of the biometric data of all persons who had entered the EU irregularly. 
Eurodac is characterised by “strict accessoriness to the purposes of the Dublin 
Regulation” (Hermann, 2010).  From the neofunctionalist perspective, this is 
another example of spillover from one area of politics (border controls) to another 
(asylum and security). 
 The transition from Dublin II to the Dublin III Regulation forms the 
second stage of the creation of the Common European Asylum System, and is the 
fourth and most recent step in the evolution of the European asylum system. The 
basic provisions of the Dublin Regulation itself were left untouched, although 
several humanitarian clauses were introduced. The Eurodac-Regulation in the 
other hand had been changed very fundamentally (Council of the European 
Union & European Parliament, 2013). The original Eurodac-database was only 
meant for asylum purposes, while the recast version allows for data to be used by 
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national law enforcement authorities and Europol. The use of the Eurodac-
database for criminal investigations is however only permissible for investigating 
“terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences” (ibid., 14). To manage and 
control access to the database, Council and Parliament established the ‘European 
Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice’ (Council of the European Union & European 
Parliament, 2011). The intrusion of European legislation into the area of police 
and security police was thus consolidated and new institutions were set up to 
manage the new European competences, which follows the logic of 
neofunctionalist spillover. Nevertheless, the changes that the reform of the CEAS 
brought are moderate, which is why this transition can be seen in the light 
Schmitter’s hypothesis of natural entropy, which foresees that integration tends 
towards a state of rest. 
 Although this attempt to examine the evolution of the European asylum 
system through a neofunctionalist lens is very basic, several problems have 
nevertheless become evident. Most prominently, asylum seekers and clandestinos 
are absent from the neofunctionalist analysis, despite the fact that they are the 
objects of asylum and migration legislation. They are discarded as exogenous 
factors which may disturb the integration process according to the curvilinear 
hypothesis. The following section will thus critique neofunctionalism from a 
variety of different angles.  
 
 
Critical Analysis of Neofunctionalism 
 
When neofunctionalism is applied to the evolution of European migration 
management a story is generated of evolving legislative documents, institutional 
spillover and functional linkage. However, this story does not mention how 
Europeans have experienced European integration, and it is certainly not the story 
of irregular migrants in the EU. It is not the story of tens of thousands of human 
beings who have drowned in the Mediterranean trying to reach the shores of 
Europe, and it is not the story of the humiliating conditions in Europe’s refugee 
camps and detention centres. This section therefore constitutes a critique of 
neofunctionalism. However, apart from the theory’s moral shortcomings, it can 
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be critiqued by demonstrating how the neofunctionalist approach is inadequate 
for understanding the European integration process even on its own terms. Five 
arguments demonstrating neofunctionalism’s inadequacy will be put forward. 
Firstly, neofunctionalism drastically underestimates the role of national 
governments in European integration (Hoffmann, 1966). Secondly, as critical 
scholars have pointed out, there are significant methodological problems 
associated with the theory’s positivism (e.g. van Apeldoorn et al., 2003). Thirdly, 
neofunctionalism fails to include perceptions in its analysis: there is no distinction 
between perceived functional links and quantifiable functional links. Fourthly, 
neofunctionalism is unable to consider the role of irregular migrants in the 
European integration process. Finally, neofunctionalism ignores the structural 
power that drives the integration process. 
 
 
The Return of the Nation State 
 
Stanley Hoffmann championed the resurrection of the nation state in European 
Studies through his so-called intergovernmentalist reading of European 
integration (1966). Hoffmann shared Hans Morgenthau’s negative assumptions 
about human nature, holding the view that nation states exist within an 
“international state of nature” (ibid., 864).8 He furthermore underlines that despite 
efforts towards supranationalisation, “[nation states] remain the basic units” of 
analysis in the study of international relations (ibid., 863). European integration 
may only proceed as long as supranational institutions are not asked to engage 
with matters of ‘high politics’, that is matters which go beyond internal economic 
affairs and that are of no consequence to relations with the outside world. 
Hoffmann argues that such a point was reached both in the attempt to create the 
European Defence Community in 1954, and in the Empty Chair Crisis which may 
be interpreted as de Gaulle’s attempt to create a European counter-balance to 
American military dominance. Hoffmann critiques neofunctionalism for ignoring 
                                                          
8 The phrase ‘international state of nature’ translates the Hobbesian state of nature to the 
international sphere. Hobbes argued that human beings free of laws and authorities tend to fight 
one another (Hobbes, 1996). Similarly, there are no laws and authorities governing the behaviour 
of states. According to Morgenthau (2006) and Hoffmann and inter-state behaviour is thus 
anarchical and chaotic. 
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that the consent of the nation state is needed to move integration forward. He 
states that “functionalism tends to become, at best, like a spiral that coils ad 
infinitum” (ibid., 909), thus highlighting that the theory’s claims to the 
automaticity of European integration are unrealistic. 
 While Hoffmann’s theory acknowledged that it depended on a particular 
view of human nature, Andrew Moravcsik attempted to create an 
intergovernmentalist theory that could move beyond these ontological 
assumptions. His liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to explain the “broad 
evolution of regional integration” (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, 68). 
However, as with Hoffmann, liberal intergovernmentalism “continues to treat the 
state as a unitary actor” (ibid., 69). Although Moravcsik grants a larger role to 
supranational institutions, it is the state whose preferences are the primary 
determinants of the trajectory of European integration. In turn, state preferences 
are shaped primarily by economic interests and “general geopolitical ideas” (ibid., 
69). In liberal intergovernmentalism, states are seen as rational actors that are 
aware of the economic gains and losses they may make under different conditions. 
In Moravcsik’s view, “EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational 
choices made by national leaders” (1998, 18). This gross simplification, made also 
by Hoffmann, is problematic as it brings with it a methodological rationalism that 
assumes the normalcy and superiority of liberalised markets. Indeed, the type of 
rationality that Moravcsik discussed is that of profit-maximisation. Profit in turn, 
is measured in economic terms; an assumption which ought not to be considered 
universal. Moravcsik thus inadvertently reproduces Hoffmann’s assumptions 
about human nature. This is a fundamental weakness of his approach. 
 Liberal intergovernmentalism continues to be taught to students of 
European Studies as the most important critique of neofunctionalism, and an 
argument is often made that these two ‘grand theories’ of European integration 
are in competition with one another. An influential narrative has been constructed 
whereby intergovernmentalism is defined as the “counter-point to 
neofunctionalism” (Schimmelfennig, 2006, 76). The rationale behind this 
narrative is the delineation of the spectrum of possible explanations for European 
integration. On one side of this spectrum is Haas’ neofunctionalism with its 
unidirectionality, automaticity and strong emphasis on the role of supranational 
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institutions. On the other side of the spectrum is Hoffmann’s 
intergovernmentalism, which emphasises gate-keeping (i.e. for instance the 
importance of European summits as turning points of the integration process) and 
the role of the nation state. Liberal intergovernmentalism and Schmitter’s more 
flexible neofunctionalism are somewhere in between these extremes, supposedly 
delineating the space within which the debate on European integration theory is 
held. Stepping outside this space, critical scholars have launched a more 
fundamental critique at neofunctionalism which is aimed at its methodology. 
 
 
Man as Machine 
 
Critical scholars have pointed out that both intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism “adopt the positivist method, intended as it is to reveal invariant 
causal relations, in order to support a certain transhistorical claim about human 
nature and its inner rationality” (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, 34). Positivists 
assume that the social world is governed by universal laws and regularities in the 
same way as the natural world. They view the world akin to “a watch […] whose 
real workings are governed by springs and wheels” (Hollis & Smith, 1990, 47). In 
the crudest sense, positivism is thus the idea that the methods used in the natural 
sciences can also be applied to the social sciences. It seeks to produce knowledge 
that is “universal, invariable and context-independent” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 57). 
According to Neufeld (1995), positivism is based on three pillars. Firstly, 
positive knowledge must correspond to empirical facts and experience. Positivism 
is thus epistemologically empiricist, as only empirical knowledge is ‘true’ 
knowledge. Ontologically, it is materialist. Human beings are regarded to operate 
not unlike a very sophisticated machine, which implies that their behaviour can 
be predicted and analysed in the same way as a physical phenomenon. 
Secondly, positivist knowledge must be objective. Positivist research 
observes the world searching for patterns and repetitions, requiring the methods 
of the observed to be unbiased, and the findings to be free of ontological 
assumptions (as was highlighted in the previous paragraph, positivism does of 
course have its own ontological assumptions). Historically, according to Comte, 
there have been three kinds of knowledge: theological knowledge, or the 
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knowledge produced by religion, which corresponds to the ‘primitive’ era of 
human development; metaphysical knowledge, the knowledge produced by 
philosophers, which corresponds to the intermediary era of human development; 
and, finally, positive knowledge, produced by scientists, which corresponds to the 
modern scientific era of human development (Neufeld, 1995). It is important to 
note the extent to which historical developments have impacted the understanding 
of knowledge, even according to this Comtean interpretation. Theological 
knowledge, in the case of Christian Europe, is knowledge derived from the Bible 
and divine revelation. Metaphysical knowledge relates to ethics or aesthetics. 
These two types of knowledge are rejected for being insufficiently objective, and 
claims related to the two realms are ignored for being ‘meaningless’ (Passmore, 
1967, 52-7). Positivists argue that the information conveyed in theological and 
metaphysical statements cannot be objectively and empirically measured or 
verified, hence there is no meaning to claims such as ‘the painting is beautiful’ or 
‘God exists’. Positivists acknowledge that scientists do have values, but that “the 
mere statement […] that values underlie all research, does not in itself lead to the 
inevitable conclusion that values must, by virtue of their presence, influence this 
research” (Easton, 1953, 225). Popper too puts forward that “the mind can never 
be a passive register of experience,” but that this has no impact on the validation 
process itself (Hollis & Smith, 1990, 52). 
Thirdly, positivists adhere to the idea of the ‘methodological unity of 
science’. Making the proposition that the methods used in the natural sciences are 
ideally suited for application in the social sciences implies that its adherents 
acknowledge no fundamental difference between the natural and the social world. 
Bechtel argues that the laws of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economic or 
political science would eventually be viewed as “derivative laws which, in 
principle, can be derived from the most basic laws of physics,” and that one day 
those disciplines might be “subsumed within physics as a special application of 
physical laws” (1988, 29). 
There are problems with each of the three tenets of positivism. I will now 
discuss these in some detail. The first assumption, that positive knowledge must 
correspond to the empirically observable reality, fails to capture the quintessence 
of human relations. Weber (1968) and the hermeneutic movement placed a large 
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emphasis on the subjective meanings of human interaction. The central 
hermeneutic theme is that “action must always be understood from within” (Hollis & 
Smith, 1990, 72). Depending on the context of human communication, the same 
word or the same action may have an entirely different meaning. Weber splits the 
two levels of interpretation up into understanding (cf. verstehen) and explanatory 
understanding (cf. erklärendes Verstehen). While the former merely enables us to 
understand what action is being performed, the latter allows us to understand the 
context. Hence in the social sciences context and interpretation ought to be 
considered essential aspects of human relations, rendering inadequate an 
approach to science that is merely based on empirical observation. Positivism 
ignores that human beings have the unique quality of being able to report on their 
subjective experience. 
The positivist claim that knowledge must be objective is equally 
problematic. In the social sciences, the researcher herself has an impact on the 
observed. A good example of this is anthropological field research, during which 
the presence of an observer undoubtedly has an impact on the behaviour of the 
human beings who are being studied. This is a crucial difference between natural 
science and social science, as a natural scientist’s observation of a falling stone 
will not cause it to stop falling. 
The positivist notion of the methodological unity of science reveals the 
ontological foundations of positivism, which turn out be very much value-laden. 
In stating that the social sciences can be studied in the same way as the natural 
sciences, positivism is implying that all human behaviour is rooted in physical 
laws. Positivism is based on a specific belief about the nature and substance of 
human beings and the universe, having a materialist ontology. While this makes 
positivism no less valid than other approaches to social science, its claim to 
ontological neutrality certainly should not make it a preferable approach. As 
Robert Cox writes, 
 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective. When any theory [represents itself as divorced from a standpoint 
in time and space], it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to 
lay bare its concealed perspective” (Cox, 1981, 128). 
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All theory and method is based on a particular ontology. Neofunctionalism is 
based on the positivist approach to social science. It is a problem-solving theory 
with fixed assumptions about the nature of the world. The tendency towards 
spillover assumes for example that “market forces are expressions of an inner 
rationality of universal human nature,” demonstrating that it has an inbuilt bias 
in favour of free markets (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, 18). The consequences of 
neofunctionalism’s positivist underpinnings will be further outlined in the 
following sections. 
 
 
Neofunctionalism and Hermeneutics 
 
Neofunctionalism’s lack of hermeneutic insight that was discussed in the previous 
section becomes truly problematic when applying the theory to one’s case study 
of choice, as the difference between perceived functional linkage between policy 
areas and real functional linkage is insufficiently defined. In the case of border 
controls, the need for their abolition may for instance be falsely identified as a 
functional consequence of the introduction of the common market. Indeed, 
neofunctionalism’s profit-rationality is incapable of sufficiently explaining the 
removal of border controls.9 The United Kingdom has remained outside the 
Schengen Area and still maintains high trade volumes with the rest of the EU. 
Furthermore, from the 2000s onwards, motorway toll systems for lorries have 
been created in many member states, which have produced new border procedures 
                                                          
9 The diversion from Weber’s terminology in this section is intentional (Weber, 1947). 
Differentiating between value-rationality and instrumental rationality is not necessary helpful, 
because particular values underlie instrumental rationality too. The latter is often used to refer to 
profit-maximization, which is a function of the assumption that profit represents an intrinsic 
good. Therefore the type of rationality that strives for profit-maximization may also be called 
value-rationality, with profit being the value in question. At the same time, Weber argues that 
values are created by human decisions (Aron, 167, 206). While Weber “holds that an agent may 
be more or less rational in acting consistently with his values, the choice of any one particular 
evaluative stance or commitment can be no more rational than that of any other” (MacIntyre, 
2007, 26). Weber holds that human beings choose the values according to which they construct 
their rationality and their behaviour. As no choice is more rational than any other, no value is 
intrinsically good, making the choice arbitrary. Value-rationality refers to no particular values, 
and instrumental rationality refers to values which could also be covered by value-rationality. 
Therefore the terms profit-rationality and moral rationality are suggested to be used alternatively. 
While profit-rationality refers specifically to a profit-maximizing course of action which is 
expected of human beings in neofunctionalism, moral rationality refers to a course of action 
which is regarded to be intrinsically good. 
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that have largely reinstated the pre-Schengen complications when crossing 
borders. This has occurred without much protest from the European Commission 
which had previously pushed hard for a Europe inside which borders would be 
invisible. While border controls are perceived to be a symbol of the disunity of the 
EU, motorway tolls have failed to provoke an equivalent response.10 
Neofunctionalism is unable to grasp the different standards that are applied in 
each example. 
Apart from perceptions, neofunctionalism cannot understand the social 
purpose of European integration. This stems in part from the fact that the theory 
views European integration as a sui generis phenomenon, failing to place the EU 
in a global context. Neofunctionalism was originally developed to be a general 
theory of regional integration, describing the conditions necessary for integration 
to occur. The inapplicability of the theory to other world regions has shifted its 
focus exclusively to the EU, which would ideally form a closed system, sheltered 
from the impact of the outside world. This assumption of laboratory conditions is 
to be expected from a positivist theory. However, the influx of irregular migrants 
in large numbers blatantly underlines that the EU is not a closed system, and that 
a proper understanding of its structures calls for an understanding of Europe as 
part of a global political economy. It is only within this global context that the 
social purpose of European integration becomes manifest, which in turn allows 
for a better explanation of the EU’s institutional evolution. 
 
 
The Uncharted Territory of Irregular Migrants 
 
It was highlighted earlier in this chapter that asylum seekers are absent from a 
neofunctionalist analysis of European asylum policy. This is highly problematic 
because the arrival of irregular migrants in the EU is the very reason for the 
existence of legislation to control irregular migration. The inability of 
                                                          
10 There have been calls from the European Commission for the Europeanisation of toll systems 
(cf. EETS), but few advances have been made, possibly due to the significant profit derived from 
the production of the duplicate infrastructure required to maintain toll systems for the 
responsible private enterprises. 
52 
 
neofunctionalism to include irregular migrants in its analysis stems from to two 
primary reasons: the theory’s inward focus as well as its elite focus. 
Firstly, neofunctionalism has a poorly elaborated conceptualisation of 
exogenous factors (see Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of this issue). This 
becomes particularly apparent when discussing the ‘hypothesis of increasing 
mutual determination’. This hypothesis states that the accuracy of the 
neofunctionalist model is lowest when the impact of exogenous factors is highest. 
Schmitter acknowledges that “the integration process begins with a large number 
of unspecified exogenous conditions [,] which are very important in determining 
outcomes” (1971, 847). He then goes on to argue that the impact of exogenous 
factors tends to decline as the integration process moves forward, which in itself 
is seen as retrospective evidence of the accuracy of the model. The latent presence 
of irregular migrants in a neofunctionalism analysis of irregular migration 
management does not only make the model inaccurate, but also impacted upon 
the evolution of the Dublin system at numerous critical junctures. Nevertheless, 
in the neofunctionalist analysis, irregular migrants are regarded merely as a 
volatile, ‘unspecified exogenous condition’, seemingly unworthy of further 
consideration. The theory’s inward-looking methodology prevents the 
contextualisation of European integration within the matrix of exogenous factors. 
It is important to re-emphasise that this is necessarily an aspect of neofunctionalism 
and cannot be rectified through a refinement of the theory. Being a positivist 
theory, neofunctionalism assumes the EU to be a quasi-closed system. This 
assumption is one of the basic foundations of the theory, without which none of 
its hypotheses would hold. 
Secondly, neofunctionalism places a strong focus on elites as determinants 
of decision-cycles’ outcomes. The theory therefore proceeds to consider irregular 
migrants’ impact on integration as insignificant. This is not only empirically 
questionable, but further prevents the theory from understanding the social 
purpose of European integration. The latter can best be understood by examining 
the impact of the process on groups that are most exposed to it. Given the range 
of legislative instruments that deal with migration managements, irregular 
migrants certainly form such a group. 
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Structural Power 
 
Another critique that has been launched against neofunctionalism concerns its 
neglect of structural power. Susan Strange defines structural power as “the power 
to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which 
other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) 
their scientists and other professional people have to operate” (1994, 25). She 
contrasts this with relational power, which essentially refers to getting others to 
do what they otherwise would not do. Neofunctionalism attributes relational 
power primarily to the supranational European institutions, while 
intergovernmentalism primarily attributes relational power to the nation state. 
Both theories ignore structural power, which is, according to Strange, essential for 
understanding the relationship between the state and the market. She stipulates 
that this relationship ought to be the focus of political and economic inquiry. May 
points out that “if we are to analyse bargains between authority and market, and 
the influence of power in these bargains, we should also consider which values are 
being prioritised” (1996, 174). The values concerned here are for example 
“wealth, security, freedom and justice,” and different societies place different 
degrees of priority on these values (Strange, 1985, 237). Strange makes the point 
that if security is prioritised over the other values, states become the centre of 
analysis of global politics, as states are the sole actors with the ability to disrupt 
the international order. If, however, power is defined as the power to create or 
destroy wealth, other actors will need to be considered too (May, 1996, 174). 
Actors have structural power if they are able to define which values are prioritised. 
Van Apeldoorn et al. point out that the focus of neofunctionalism’s 
research agenda is relational power, highlighting that the theory “[fails] to account 
for the structural power that determines the particular trajectory of European 
integration” (2003, 17). In this context, they appeal to an understanding of 
European integration within the presence of American neoliberal hegemony, 
which sets European integration on a particular path characterised by 
deregulation, privatization and commodification. The social purpose of European 
integration ought to be considered and the question asked: which social groups 
benefit from the process and which groups are being excluded? European 
integration thus ought to be contextualised within the social purpose of capital 
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accumulation, which is the primary objective of transnational capital within 
neoliberal capitalism (Durand & Keucheyan, 2015). It should by no means be 
considered as an isolated event. This highlights a serious problem in 
neofunctionalism’s understanding of the European asylum system. While 
Schmitter made clear that spillover is not the only possible outcome of EU level 
decision cycles (1971, 241), he did not sufficiently underline that spillover too can 
result in different outcomes. The Dublin regime is one example of spillover from 
the abolition of border controls, but a distribution quota for asylum seekers was 
an equally plausible alternative solution. Both choices could be explained with 
reference to spillover. To understand why the Dublin system was given preference, 
one would have to understand “which values are being prioritised” (Strange, 
1996, 174). As a result of neofunctionalism’s hermeneutic deficit, the theory will 
inevitably struggle to capture structural power. 
 
 
Neofunctionalist in Practice: From Theory to Ideology 
 
Here it will be put forward that neofunctionalism has a significant influence on 
the European integration process. Taking the deficiencies of the theory into 
consideration, especially its view of human nature, the dangers of neofunctionalist 
policymaking become apparent. To make this argument, this section will also 
discuss the notions of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ and performativity, which 
demonstrate the mechanisms of how a social science theory is turned into a 
political blueprint. The claim of neofunctionalism being a self-fulfilling prophecy 
will be substantiated by references to several interviews that were carried out 
during field research (see Chapter 4 for research methods). 
 
 
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy and Performativity 
 
The term ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ was coined by Robert Merton, who based his 
idea on the so-called Thomas theorem. This theorem states that “if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, 
571-2). This theorem implies that once the meaning of a situation has been 
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defined, the behaviour that follows is based on and determined by that 
interpretation. Merton invokes the bankruptcy of the Last National Bank in 1932 
which was caused by rumours of the bank’s insolvency as an example. Merton 
uses this point to underline the difference between the social world and the natural 
world. In the natural world, “predictions of the return of Halley’s comet do not 
influence its orbit” (Merton, 1948, 175). Merton thus defines the self-fulfilling 
prophecy as “a false definition of the situation evoking a new behaviour, which 
makes the originally false conception come true” (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is 
doubtful whether self-fulfilling prophecies do indeed have to be based on a false 
definition of reality. It is equally possible for a definition to be a very accurate 
representation of social practice, and to still become a self-fulfilling prophecy by 
perpetuating that practice. This in turn seemingly fulfils the original prophecy, 
lending it more credibility and further perpetuating its practice. It ought to be 
clarified that the ‘definer’ or ‘theoriser’ is not neutral: pre-ordering of the 
information he is presented with has already taken place through the medium by 
means of which he receives that information. Any theoretical interpretation thus 
builds on a previous theoretical interpretation made either by oneself, or by the 
one who transmits the information. In the case of neofunctionalism, pre-ordering 
had already taken place through the formulation of the Monnet method, of which 
neofunctionalism is essentially a description. 
 Performativity is a closely related concept, albeit originating from the 
constructivist tradition. Michel Callon, one of the chief proponents of the 
performativity of economic theories, puts forward that “a discourse is indeed 
performative […], if it contributes to the construction of the reality it describes” 
(2007, 316). Discursive actions are regarded to be performative if they result in 
change taking place in the non-verbal world (cf. Austin, 1975; Butler, 1988). A 
very striking example is divorce in Islam. Divorce occurs if one of the spouses 
pronounces the words ‘I divorce you’ three times with the intention of being 
divorced. This will result in the two former spouses being subject to the Islamic 
rules concerning appropriate conduct between unmarried and unrelated members 
of opposite sexes (e.g. prohibition of touching). It is important to note that the 
performative value of this particular action depends on a mutual understanding of 
the social significance of the utterance. The involved actors have to speak the same 
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language both literally and figuratively. A performative theory is thus one in 
which “the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to 
believe and perform in the mode of belief” (Butler, 1988, 520). 
 While Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach stated that the point of 
philosophy is to change the world rather than to merely interpret it, the notion 
that theories attempting to predict the future can become performative suggests 
that all theories have the potential to change the material world. While Marxism 
intentionally dissolves the boundary between theory and ideology, other theories 
do so inadvertently. Ferraro et al. (2005) argue that theories in the social sciences 
can become self-fulfilling both when they are right and when they are wrong. The 
likelihood of this step is albeit increased by the presence of three mutually non-
exclusive mechanisms. Firstly, theories are more likely to become self-fulfilling 
when “institutional designs and organizational arrangements – structures, reward 
systems measurement practices, selection processes – reflect the explicit or implicit 
theories of their designers” (ibid., 9). If the categories of a theory are thus 
congruent with the categories used by the groups or individuals studied, the theory 
is more likely to become self-fulfilling. Although Ferraro et al. do not sufficiently 
explain the causal logic behind this claim, it can be inferred from their argument 
that actors are more likely to accept the premises of a theory if those premises 
reflect ideas they already have. Secondly, whether or not a theory had predictive 
power when it was first created, it can become self-fulfilling if its premises 
“become accepted truths and norms that govern reality” (ibid.). A crucial 
transition occurs when an observation of how people do behave becomes a 
prescription of how people ought to behave. Thirdly, theories become self-
fulfilling when “they provide a language for comprehending the world” (ibid.). 
One may add that such a language is more likely to be accepted, if it is similar or 
identical to the language used by the groups or individuals studied. 
 In 2009, Felin and Foss launched an extensive critique of Ferrero et al.’s 
(2005) arguments about self-fulfilling prophecies. They expressed particular 
concern about the idea that even false theories become performative, the 
assumption of which forms the very basis of Merton’s definition of self-fulfilling 
prophecies. They specifically argue that two boundary conditions limit the extent 
to which theories become self-fulfilling: objective reality and human nature. 
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According to Felin and Foss, “theories affect reality [only] when they are true” 
(2009, 656). If a theory contradicts objective reality, it cannot become self-
fulfilling. They exemplify this idea with reference to ‘hyperrationality’, a concept 
which has been introduced by neoclassical economics, and which suggests that 
agents are omniscient of all conditions of the environment they operate in, and 
about all possible outcomes of their actions.11 While this idea forms the foundation 
of the neoclassical economic theory of perfectly efficient markets, it is nevertheless 
self-evident that human omniscience is impossible to achieve (ibid., 657). The idea 
of hyperrationality cannot become self-fulfilling. The second boundary condition 
Felin and Foss propose relates to human nature. The essential nature of human 
beings limits the extent to which theories can become self-fulfilling. They argue 
that the malleability of human nature is not as far-reaching as is often suggested, 
and that there is a difference between “human nature itself and beliefs about it” 
(ibid.). 
 Felin and Foss’s critique can be questioned from numerous angles. Ferraro 
et al. (2009) themselves have responded to the critique, arguing that Felin and 
Foss have made no effort to actually engage with the three mechanisms that 
increase theories’ performativity, instead focusing their critique on objective 
reality and human nature. In their assumption that only true theories will impact 
behaviour, Felin and Foss clash first and foremost with Kuhn’s argument about 
paradigm shifts. According to Kuhn, a paradigmatic consensus is rarely dislodged 
merely because of the discovery of evidence to its contrary. The “political and 
rhetorical skills and power of [the] proponents and opponents” of a paradigmatic 
consensus are as important to its fate (Ferraro et al., 2009, 670). Furthermore, 
even Popper argued that although some theories are true, “we will not necessarily 
know which ones” (ibid.). Furthermore, Ferraro et al. point out that Felin and 
Foss’s example of hyperrationality as an instance of the failure of the 
performativity argument is illogical. Hyperrationality is not a behaviour, and 
therefore people will obviously not become omniscient simply because there is a 
theoretical concept that assumes this. Nevertheless, people can act as though they 
                                                          
11 This is similar to Milton Friedman’s argument about the assumed omniscience of leaves on a 
tree (1953). He argues that the leaves on a tree seem to act as if they were all-aware – whether 
this is in fact the case is irrelevant as long as the assumption is not contradicted by its 
consequences. 
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were hyperrational, thus preferring the pursuit of profit-maximisation over other 
values. It should be added that Felin and Foss’s representation of this debate is 
akin to the classical ‘chicken and egg problem’: if a theory appears to be self-
fulfilling is that because the theory has affected human behaviour, or because it is 
true? If Felin and Foss assume that all theories that affect behaviour are true, they 
will never be able to identify them as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 
 
The Performativity of European Integration Discourse 
 
Scholars of International Relations have long acknowledged that theories such as 
realism may have an impact on the practice of foreign policy (e.g. Wendt, 1995; 
Houghton, 2009). Vasquez for example notes that “as an image of the world 
employed by policy makers, power politics promotes certain kinds of behaviour 
and often leads to self-fulfilling prophecies” (Vasquez, 1998, 167). In the 
European Studies literature, the importance of integration theory in political 
practice has begun to be recognised more recently. 
White (2003) discusses the role that the American neofunctionalists 
(especially Leon Lindberg) played in shaping the policymaking of the Hallstein 
Commission during the 1960s. He argues that neofunctionalist expectations had 
a major impact on Hallstein himself and that they were in fact one of the major 
causes of the Empty Chair crisis. 
 Thomas Diez (1999) has called for the recognition of discourse as an 
important aspect of understanding European integration. He argues that language 
is central to our understanding of the world, and that the attempts to “capture the 
Union’s nature are not mere descriptions of an unknown polity, but take part in 
the construction of the polity itself” (ibid., 599). Diez provides the example of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) being referred to as the ‘Common 
Market’ in the UK, and as the ‘Gemeinschaft’ (i.e. community) in West Germany. 
A reference to one or the other could determine whether the EEC was 
conceptualised primarily as an economic necessity, or whether it was seen as a 
community of values. Neither conceptualisation is necessarily true nor false; they 
are merely different readings of the same polity. Europe has thus always been a 
contested concept calling for different interpretations – the discursive divergence 
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was a reflection of this contestation. Diez furthermore makes explicit reference to 
neofunctionalism, arguing that the technocratic type of governance that the theory 
envisioned helped to overcome the intergovernmentalism that initially 
constrained European cooperation. Neofunctionalist discourse resonates in the 
names that were given to European political institutions: commission, directive 
and regulation, rather than government and law. Diez argues that the non-
participatory nature of spillover had prevented it from resonating well within the 
discourse of democracy, which is how he explains the reassertion of the nation 
state and the abandonment of federal union since the 1990s. 
Beyond White’s and Diez’s articles, there are few references to the 
performativity of neofunctionalism (McNamara, 2010), and the impact of the 
theory on the European integration process is usually thought to be limited to the 
1950s and 60s. It is thus meaningful to discuss neofunctionalism’s impact on 
contemporary European integration in more detail. 
 
 
How Neofunctionalism Became Ideology 
 
As was pointed out earlier, the original strength of neofunctionalism lay in its 
closeness to the categories used by European policymakers themselves. Haas 
quotes Gehrels and Johnson when defining that economic integration must have 
the following characteristics: 
 
“(1) Agreement for gradual but complete elimination of tariffs, quotas and 
exchange controls on trade among the member countries; (2) abandonment 
of the right to restore trade restrictions on a unilateral basis for the duration 
of the agreement, regardless of difficulties that may arise; (3) joint action to 
deal with problems resulting from the removal of trade barriers within the 
community and to promote more efficient utilisation of the resources of the 
area; (4) some degree of harmonisation of national policies that affect price 
structures and the allocation of resources (for example, social security and 
agricultural programmes) and of monetary and fiscal policies; and (5) free, or 
at least freer, movement of capital and labour” (1955). 
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These ideas are congruent with the principles that were established in the 1957 
Treaty of Rome. Article 13 of the Treaty states that “customs duties on imports in 
force between Member States shall be progressively abolished,” and the phrase 
“elimination of customs duties” is common throughout the document, reflecting 
point (1) of the above definition (Belgium et al., 1957).  Point (2) is referred to 
several times, most significantly in Article 12 of the Treaty, which states that 
“Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new 
customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect” 
(ibid.). Point (3) is fulfilled as the Treaty establishes a “common policy in the 
sphere of transport,” and measures by which “disequilibria in [the Member 
States’] balances of payment [are] remedied” (ibid.). The Treaty also refers to 
point (4), as a European Social Fund is instituted, and as a “common agricultural 
policy” is set up. Furthermore, the Treaty lays the foundation for the 
“approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper 
functioning of the common market” (ibid.). The use of the word ‘required’ further 
reflects neofunctionalist language. Finally, one of the most important purposes of 
the Treaty is the instatement of the free movement of persons, services and capital 
across the territory of the Community (cf. Title III of the Treaty), and point (5) of 
the definition could hardly be referred to more explicitly. 
Imagination is not required to see the extreme similarities between the 
categories used by neofunctionalism and the categories used by the architects of 
the European Union. Neofunctionalism provided the intellectual backbone of 
early European integration. Two of the three factors that Ferraro et al. (2005) put 
forward are thus clearly present: firstly, there is congruence between theory 
(neofunctionalism) and institutional design (European Commission). Secondly, 
neofunctionalism has provided a language for the design of the European 
institutions, whose technical names reflect the theory’s premises. 
 The third factor that Ferraro et al. (2005) suggest, namely the extent to 
which actors are convinced of the premises of a theory, is more difficult to prove, 
as this requires interviews with policymakers who were involved in the original 
construction of the European institutions. Nevertheless, I carried out interviews 
with current employees of the European Commission (see Chapter 6 for interview 
methodology), which revealed that there is great awareness of neofunctionalist 
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theory in the ranks of the European Commission. The following excerpt from an 
interview with a now former European Commissioner illustrates not only a 
conviction of the basic accuracy of the theory, but also that conditions were 
deliberately created that would allow for the fulfilment of its predictions: 
 
HKA: So getting into these issues which are related to security policy also 
opens up the ground for getting involved with hard-core security policy, in a 
process of spillover? 
 
Interviewee: That was at least the idea, but knowing that it would take a lot of 
time. But dealing with European affairs, you always have to have long-term 
perspectives. […] At least I had it in my mind. 
 
HKA: So this prospect for future spillover was consciously meditated? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, absolutely. 
 
HKA: By you? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, by people like me. 
 
In this example, the conditions for neofunctionalism becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy are more than fulfilled. Furthermore, when one employee from DG 
Home Affairs12 was asked whether neofunctionalism provides an accurate 
representation of European integration, she replied: 
 
“I think it is pretty accurate. I told you, I think for me, the only variation is 
the pace of this integration. But the way the system moves is pretty one-
directional, if you want. […] Although, and despite, much criticism […] the 
process continues, and somehow I don’t, I can’t exactly explain why. Maybe 
it’s because it’s more of an institutional spillover. The institutions are here, 
they are pushing for new legislation, member states are unhappy with it, but 
                                                          
12 The European Commission is divided into quasi-ministries called Directorate-Generals (DGs). 
These DGs in turn are subdivided into Directorates and Units. The Unit for Migration and Asylum 
is placed within DG Home Affairs. 
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either way. In fact, you have no option with a Commission proposal than to 
act on it. So you may amend it…” (personal communication, 27 June 2013). 
 
This stresses the structural power that neofunctionalism has brought to the 
European Commission. European integration can be portrayed as inevitably 
unidirectional, with any counter-movements rendered insignificant. Ultimately 
the process of integration “is going in one direction only” (ibid.). While all 
interviewees were familiar with neofunctionalism, the dominance of 
neofunctionalist principles is further evidenced by the working principles of the 
European Commission. In his role as European Commissioner for Administrative 
Reform between 1999 and 2004, Neil Kinnock introduced a series of measures 
that were intended to prevent the DGs’ inter-institutional isolation and to decrease 
corruption. The rotation principle, also widely implemented by government 
administrations all over the EU, meant that staff would have to move between 
Units, Directorates and DGs every five years (Wille, 2013, 127-8). In turn, this 
implied a redefinition of expertise: an expert was no longer someone who knew 
the subject area he was working in especially well, but someone who was an expert 
in governance. Governing was essentially placed in the same category as 
engineering: while the engineer’s environment may change, the laws of physics 
and the principles of engineering remain the same. In the same way the methods 
of governance can be applied to potentially any issue area, independent of context. 
As a result, the staff of the European Commission often have no deep expertise in 
the area they happen to be working on, at least upon assuming a new role within 
the institution. When asked about his previous work with asylum issues, another 
key European Commission employee thus stated: 
 
“I was with a broader range of issues, let’s say, in justice and home affairs, 
but also on asylum I was keeping an eye, but I was not, I was far from being 
an expert. But yeah, this is quite classical, the standard for the Commission” 
(personal communication, 10 September 2013). 
 
This vision of technocratic governance delivers the foundation for the 
decontextualisation of human individuals and reifying policies. It ought to be 
stressed that neofunctionalism is not acknowledged to be an ideology that drives 
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a particular type of European integration forward. Nevertheless, the presence of 
its language and the prevalence of its principles of technocracy and spillover are 
evident. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While neofunctionalist theory itself is of little value for understanding the social 
purpose of European integration, its development into an ideology is of high 
significance for this dissertation’s research agenda. Since the late 1980s, 
neofunctionalist principles have re-emerged as the dominant paradigm of 
integration policy. This renaissance coincided with the rise of neoliberalism which 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
It ought to be stressed that the rise of neofunctionalism as an ideology of 
integration has several dangers. Firstly, the neofunctionalist idea of a technocratic 
governance apparatus may undermine the EU’s democratic ambitions as well as 
the democratic accountability of the nation state. Secondly, neofunctionalism’s 
utilitarian profit-rationality undermines the visionary strength of Europe as a 
civilizational project (see Köpping Athanasopoulos, 2015). Thirdly, 
neofunctionalism’s inward-looking tendencies sometimes result in a misguided 
conception of foreign and development policy that fails to address problems at 
their roots. 
There is therefore a need to find alternative conceptualisations of European 
integration capable of understanding the EU’s role within the structure of the 
global political economy and of conceptualising the role of neofunctionalism in 
European integration. The next chapter is therefore going to provide a literature 
review of critical approaches to European integration. 
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Chapter 2: Thinking Europe Differently – A Literature 
Review of Critical Approaches to European Integration 
 
The previous chapter has formulated formulating two arguments which form the 
foundation of this thesis. Firstly, neofunctionalism is an inadequate method of 
understanding European integration (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991). The theory’s 
positivist underpinnings and its failure to capture structural power prevent it from 
showing why one particular trajectory of integration was historically given 
preference over another. To explain this choice, one would have to choose a 
different research problématique which seeks to understand the ‘social purpose’ of 
European integration. In this context, ‘social purpose’ refers to why European 
integration occurs and to the way the process benefits particular groups or classes 
materially or in terms of social position while excluding others. 
Neofunctionalism’s elite focus and rudimentary conceptualisation of exogenous 
factors furthermore prevents it from taking the objects of European integration 
seriously. In the case of irregular migration management, these objects are 
irregular migrants themselves. These deficiencies highlight the importance of the 
second major argument: neofunctionalism is an ideology of integration whose 
theoretical predictions have had a significant impact on shaping the expectations 
of European policymakers.  
Given the theory’s faults, this conceptualisation of neofunctionalism may 
help to understand the social purpose of European integration, shedding light on 
the causes behind the structural position of irregular migrants, which is ultimately 
the goal of this dissertation. This chapter will provide a literature review of two 
different theoretical approaches to European integration which address many of 
neofunctionalism’s weaknesses. Furthermore, it will establish some of the key 
theoretical categories that will be employed in the remainder of the thesis. Both 
approaches that are addressed in this dissertation are rooted in the Marxist 
tradition of political economy. 
Neo-Gramscian theory helps to overcome neofunctionalism’s inward-
centeredness and provides the tools for locating neofunctionalism within the 
practice of neoliberalism. This chapter will provide a review of the most relevant 
Gramscian terms: hegemony, passive revolution, trasformismo and intellectuals. 
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Furthermore, some recent applications of Gramsci’s writings to European 
integration will be outlined, highlighting that they display an excessive focus on 
elites, which leads to understatements of the importance of the ‘subaltern’. This is 
problematic because it was very much Gramsci’s intention to lift marginalised, 
excluded and subordinate groups out of their subalternity, which calls for an 
inquiry into the structural causes of their condition. Moreover, while the subaltern 
may be marginalised, they are not powerless – as the example of migration into 
the European Union shows, the actions of irregular migrants have severely 
challenged the European institutional arrangement. 
Dependency theory, in turn, helps to understand the dynamics of 
transnational migration as well as the position of the European Union within the 
global power structures. While Gramsci’s writings have focussed on hegemony as 
practiced within national settings, dependency theory attempts to understand 
global inequality. The final part of this chapter will therefore reconcile the two 
approaches, using their references to core-periphery relations as a starting point. 
 
 
The Foundations 
 
While the traditions that will be discussed in this chapter have distinct differences, 
they have common foundations making it sometimes difficult to discern which 
author belongs to which tradition. These foundations will be briefly outlined to 
contextualise the remainder of this chapter. 
 
 
Marxism 
 
Karl Marx is the founder of the historical materialist tradition. He was in many 
ways the first critical theorist, having designated the emancipation of the working 
class as the hallmark of his work. Ontologically, the original writings of Marx (e.g. 
1981, Theses on Feuerbach) are rooted in natural materialism, which asserts that all 
phenomena are ultimately rooted in the material world. However, at the same 
time Marx criticised “the abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism 
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which excludes the historical process” (Marx, 1976, 493). For Marx, the key 
historical narrative is constituted by the way in which human beings have 
provided for their sustenance. He criticises how German philosophy had reduced 
the human condition to physiological processes, arguing instead that “the mode 
of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life” (Marx, 1977). He found that history presented itself as a series of 
different forms of oppression of one group by another. It was this oppression, and 
the efforts of the oppressed group to emancipate itself, that drove human history 
forward. Human material conditions were thus at the core of historical 
development, rather than physiological phenomena or theological enlightenment. 
This constituted a critique of ‘bourgeois’ Hegelian philosophy in particular, which 
Marx regarded as “nothing but the speculative expression of the Christian-
Germanic dogma concerning the opposition of mind and matter, God and the 
world” (Marx & Engels, 2012, 89). While materialism was adopted in the study 
of the natural worlds, human history was still viewed as though it was driven by 
an abstract spirit. 
As opposed to positivism, historical materialism is not exclusively 
empiricist, representing rather a hermeneutic approach. Marx establishes ‘classes’ 
as the primary agents of human history. Values and changing interests are key 
drivers of human affairs, particularly as the values and interests of different classes 
are often directly opposed to one another. This dialectical understanding of reality 
thus asserts that contradictions within social relations, political systems, values or 
interests cause progress and development in human history. Capitalism itself is of 
course itself full of contradictions, which is why Marx viewed “harmonious and 
balanced growth under capitalism” as “purely accidental” (Harvey, 1975, 9). One 
of the main reasons for the crisis-proneness is the notion of the commodification 
of labour. Marx pointed out that capitalism “transforms a mass of individuals […] 
into potential free labourers, whose only property is their labour power and a 
possibility of exchanging it for existing values” (Marx, 1973, 502). At the heart of 
Marx’s critique lies the fact that labour will ultimately not act like the gears and 
axles of a machine.13 In the capitalist mode of production, labour creates both 
                                                          
13 Alongside labour, Polanyi (1944) refers to two further fictitious commodities, namely land and 
money, which are not ‘produced’ for being sold on the market. 
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supply and demand, which creates overproduction on the one hand and excessive 
demand for labour (and thus higher wages and reduced rates of profit) on the 
other. Nevertheless, although he initially predicted that capitalism would soon 
meet its demise, and although vulgar readings of Marx continue to emphasise 
Marxian economic determinism, in the later stages of his life Marx became 
increasingly cautious with his claims. Particularly the Panic of 185714 and its 
failure to trigger revolution led to a more open approach towards historical 
development in Capital (Marx, 1976; Knafo, 2002; Crump, 1969), emphasising 
that “men make their own history,” although “not under circumstances they 
themselves have chosen” (Marx, 1974, 146). 
 
 
Critical Theory 
 
Another common feature that is shared between the approaches discussed in this 
chapter is their location within the critical tradition of social science (for 
methodological implications, see Chapter 4). While Marx was in many ways a 
critical theorist, the term ‘critical theory’ did not enter academic discourse until 
the early 20th century. In seeming allusion to Marx, Horkheimer writes that 
“critical theory […] has for its objective men as producers of their own historical 
way of life in its totality” (1972, 224) as well as the liberation of “human beings 
from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, 244). 
Horkheimer’s statement is strikingly similar to Marx’s eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach, which states that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the 
world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1981). Nevertheless, the 
scholars of the Frankfurt School drew not only on the Marxian proposition that 
human oppression is the result of an unjust distribution of the means of 
production; another major influence was Freudian psychoanalysis (Buzby, 2013). 
Both Marx and Freud were concerned with finding the roots of the dissatisfying 
                                                          
14 The Panic of 1857 refers to a global financial crisis in the mid-19th century that was caused by 
speculation in the American railway industry and real estate market. The bursting speculation 
bubble resulted in the insolvency of the Ohio Life Insurance Company, which in turn caused the 
bankruptcy of several of the institution’s creditors and a bank run. The panic and uncertainty 
associated with the event spread to Europe and triggered an economic crisis that lasted for 
several years.  
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and oppressive circumstances of human existence. For Freud, these circumstances 
lie buried in the development of the psyche. Emancipation therefore not only 
refers to removing the causes of material enslavement by a politico-economic 
system, but also to removing the causes of mental enslavement. 
However, as Marx had already purported, the mental and material realms 
did not form distinct categories. Furthermore, as Freud had demonstrated, subject 
and object are not intrinsically distinct (cf. Freud, 1930). This is the origin of the 
Frankfurt school’s concept of ‘totality’. Adorno viewed the individual in capitalist 
society as being forced to wear ‘character masks’ to act out her role in different 
circumstances. In capitalism, a worker may produce a particular good, but that 
good does not belong to her, nor do the tools that the good was produced with. 
The individual nevertheless has to surrender to ‘wage slavery’, as it is the only 
means to ensure survival. To endure this undesirable condition one thus wears a 
character mask, acting out the role demanded. The need to act and to wear 
character masks alienates the worker from her self which she is no longer able to 
express. Capitalist totality, which encompasses all social relations, thus turns the 
human being into “an instance of the conditions in which he lives, before he can 
determine his own existence” (Adorno, 1997, 42). The individual’s only way to 
cope with capitalist totality is through the further degeneration and regression of 
the ‘self’ as wearing character masks becomes increasingly permanent. It is of key 
importance here that capitalism is so omnipresent that there is no way to escape 
it – one is forced to participate in commodity exchange. 
 
 
Neo-Gramscian Theory 
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss selections of the writings of Antonio 
Gramsci and some of their key interpretations forming the basis of much of the 
critical literature that has hitherto been written on European integration. Gramsci 
was one of the principal figures of the Italian communist movement, which led to 
his eventual imprisonment from 1927 to 1935 by the fascist Mussolini 
government. Much of Gramsci’s work has been produced during this time in the 
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shape of the Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 1971; 1992; 1996, 2007).15 Particular 
attention will be given to three ideas which are of high relevance for this 
dissertation and which also constitute important aspects of Gramsci’s work: 
hegemony, passive revolution and intellectuals. While hegemony refers to the 
practice of leadership (Thomas, 2013), the other two terms relate to the existence 
of institutions which uphold that leadership. Each term will be discussed in turn, 
and its relevance to understanding the social purpose of European integration will 
be highlighted.  
 
 
Hegemony 
 
Hegemony is arguably Gramsci’s most well-known concept, having found its way 
into popular political discourse.16 Nevertheless, Gramsci by no means invented 
the word. According to Boothman for example, ‘hegemony’ was used in the party 
organ of the Italian socialists with reference to the early 20th century struggle over 
‘dominance’ in the Adriatic between Italy and Yugoslavia (2008, 202-3). 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the Prison Notebooks it was probably Lenin who held 
the strongest influence over Gramsci’s own theorisation of hegemony (Brandist, 
2012). Gramsci writes that Lenin “constructed the doctrine of hegemony as a 
complement to the theory of the State-as-force and as a contemporary form of the 
1848 doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’” (Gramsci, 1995, 357). This statement 
hints at the complexity of the Gramscian use of the term. Hegemony clearly refers 
to more than an order “where consent, rather than coercion, primarily 
                                                          
15 Anglophone neo-Gramscians have historically been tormented by the absence of a complete 
translation of the Prison Notebooks into English. In Hoare and Smith’s first translation of Gramsci 
(1971), which was published as Selections from the Prison Notebooks, an attempt is made to order 
Gramsci’s writings thematically rather than chronologically. The editing involved in the 
production of this volume has been highly problematic because different notes from different 
notebooks were decontextualized and combined. The notes are not labelled and it is not possible 
to easily trace to their origin. In part, this is due to the fact that the first complete edition of the 
Prison Notebooks in Italian was not published until 1975 (Gramsci, 1975). Buttigieg’s translation 
of Prison Notebooks 1-8 (Gramsci, 1992; 1996; 2007) stays true to their original order and 
contains vast amounts of explanatory notes. An English translation of Prison Notebooks 9-29 is, 
as of 2015, unavailable. These Notebooks contain 767 notes, compared to 1,294 notes in 
Notebooks 1-8. 
16 In its root meaning the word hegemony (Greek hēgemonía) stems from the Ancient Greek verb 
hēgeisthai (to lead). The term’s most accurate translation would thus be ‘leadership’. 
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[characterises] the relations between classes,” which is how Gill defines the 
concept (1989, 476). 
Thomas (2013) points to four different interpretations of hegemony, all of 
which are essentially theories of political power. Firstly, hegemony is referred to 
as consensual domination of one class over other classes. This is based on the idea 
that the disillusionment with the myth of imminent world revolution, which had 
been inspired by the early successes of the Soviet Union, lies at the heart of 
Gramsci’s writings (Femia, 1987, 5). Domination is established subtly to achieve 
the consent of all subjects to the hegemonic order, which explained the failure of 
revolutionary movements in Western Europe. This is similar to the interpretation 
of hegemony put forward by Cox (1981) and Gill (1989).17 A second reading of 
hegemony understands the term to refer to the emergence of civil society and 
politicised public. Through the articulation of their heterogeneity, society’s groups 
are unified into a collective hegemonic unit which then forms the political subject 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Critchley, 2007). A third interpretation locates the 
practice of hegemony outside the realm of the state, arguing that the latter’s power 
rests on coercion. Hegemony is regarded here as counter-movement that seeks to 
undermine the power of the state (Bobbio, 1979). A fourth interpretation views 
hegemony as a coercive struggle between states for domination. This 
interpretation is the closest to its use of the term in ancient Greece, where 
hegemony was used to refer to the dominance of particular city-states (Fontana, 
2000). Anderson (1976) and Buci-Glucksmann (1980) translate this view to 
struggles within the Communist International, while Gill (1989) and Cox (1981) 
discussed Cold War international relations, using this conceptualisation in 
combination with the consent-interpretation. Although all of these interpretations 
bear some validity, Thomas (2013) argues that they reduce hegemony to a 
synonym of already known concepts. 
                                                          
17 As the leading representative of the York School of International Relations, Robert Cox 
applied hegemony to the international level in the spirit of the Ancient Greek use of the term 
(Cox, 1981). He argued that the dominance of certain states during particular eras can be 
explained using the concept of hegemony. Cox argued that hegemony refers to consensual 
domination – the rule of a particular power is not only achieved as a result of vast military and 
economic resources, but by international structures that are consensually maintained by other 
actors involved. Cox cites the post-Cold War era of 1945-65 as the hegemonic period for the 
United States, arguing that US hegemony was backed and legitimated by international 
institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the Bretton 
Woods system. These institutions allowed US hegemony to be viewed as universally beneficial.  
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Gramsci’s own characterisation of hegemony is complex and often 
misunderstood. In the Prison Notebooks, the word is often used as an apparent 
synonym of ‘leadership’. Although it is helpful to consider this further, this 
definition does not convey the entire meaning of hegemony. Gramsci 
distinguishes between leadership and dominance. With reference to the Italian 
Risorgimento, Gramsci states the following on this issue: 
 
“A class is dominant in two ways, namely it is ‘leading’ and ‘dominant’. It 
leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes. Therefore, a class 
can (and must) ‘lead’ even before assuming power; when it is in power it 
becomes dominant, but it also continues to ‘lead’” (Gramsci, 1992, 136-7). 
 
Within this context, Gramsci then introduces the term ‘hegemony’: 
 
“There can and must be ‘political hegemony’ even before assuming 
government power, and in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony 
one must not count solely on the power and material force that is given by 
government” (ibid., 137). 
 
In a Machiavellian manner, Gramsci thus provides instructions for the successful 
practice of hegemony. The primary purpose of the term is thus not to be an 
analytical tool, but to provide a political agenda. Hegemony is clearly not to be 
equated with dominance, although it can contain coercive elements. It is rather a 
combination of dominance and leadership, with the latter implying the consent of 
the led. The most obvious example of Gramsci’s vision of hegemony would be the 
role of the proletariat in a Socialist revolution. Gramsci saw the role of the 
proletariat in consolidating and leading classes with shared interests (such as the 
peasants of Southern Italy). Although Gramsci principally employs the term 
within domestic, revolutionary contexts, he also refers to its relevance in 
“international relations,” citing for example the “hegemony exercised by France” 
during the 18th century (ibid., 151).  
According to Thomas (2013), the notion of hegemony furthermore rests on 
‘hegemonic moments’, two of which will be discussed here as the most influential. 
Firstly, hegemony should be seen as social and political leadership. Gramsci 
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inherited the concept of hegemony from Lenin and the Russian social democrats. 
In this context, hegemony referred to the potential of the working class to provide 
political leadership to the other classes in the fight against tsardom. Gramsci 
attempted to translate this idea into his own space: Italy. He argued that political 
leadership is the lens though which history can be read. In the East the working 
classes had established leadership, while the West was characterised by the lack 
of proletarian leadership. Gramsci understood that hegemony does not merely 
refer to the practice of government, but to leadership in a wider sense. In the case 
of the dominant class, hegemonic leadership structurally maintains the distance 
between the leaders and the led (and managed). In the case of the subordinate 
classes, hegemonic leadership helps increasing the self-awareness and political 
engagement of the masses. This conceptualisation of hegemony is highly relevant 
in relation to European migration management. It sheds light on the role of 
neofunctionalism in maintaining the structural power of the ruling classes. By de-
politicising migration management, the issue is delegated to ‘experts’ creating 
distance between the leaders and the led and managed. This understanding of 
hegemony may provide insight into the weakness of irregular migrants as a social 
group and their neglect in decision-making. 
The second hegemonic moment that Thomas points towards are the 
institutions and manifestations of the “hegemonic apparatus” (2013, 25). The 
notion of the hegemonic apparatus best represents Gramsci’s genuinely new and 
original perspective on hegemony. The apparatus is not constituted merely of the 
state, its parties and its other obvious political institutions. It also consists of 
newspapers, educational institutes or sports clubs, which all serve the purpose of 
consolidating the state’s influence by shaping ‘common sense’, which Gramsci 
refers to as “the most widespread conception of life and morals” and as the 
“‘folklore’ of ‘philosophy’” (Gramsci, 1992, 173). This understanding provides 
crucial insight into the role of organic intellectuals in a hegemonic project, which 
will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
It should be pointed out that the concept of a hegemonic apparatus is not 
identical to that of the “hegemonic bloc” (Gramsci, 1971, 52), which is another 
important Gramscian concept in relation to the exercise of hegemony. Indeed, the 
hegemonic bloc refers to the “historical unity” of social forces, as opposed to 
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structures (which is the case with the historical bloc). Gramsci understood social 
forces to refer to classes and mass movements, as opposed to institutions such as 
universities or parties. The hegemonic bloc has to be a “durable alliance of class 
forces” (Jessop, 1997, 55) which may have a hegemonic apparatus at their 
disposal. 
Thomas argues that the purpose the Gramscian notion of hegemony is not 
to show that the working classes are caught in an eternal loop of endless 
subordination. On the contrary, Gramsci wanted to point out that the subordinate 
classes can employ the same techniques to abolish exploitative and oppressive 
social relations. The awareness of the state’s hegemonic apparatus can lead to a 
state of “‘permanent revolution’ in the midst of capitalist domination,” because 
the apparatus can potentially be used for emancipation (Thomas, 2013, 28). 
The concept of hegemony will be referred to in later sections of this 
dissertation with reference to the potential hegemony of transnational capital (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002). In Chapter 7, the relevance of neofunctionalism for the 
consolidation of that hegemony will be demonstrated. 
 
 
Passive Revolution and Trasformismo 
 
Passive revolution is a term that Gramsci originally employed to refer to “a series 
of reforms or national wars without undergoing a political revolution of the 
radical-Jacobin type” (Gramsci, 1996, 232). Recognising the enormous changes 
that had taken places in Italy and other countries during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, Gramsci thus used the term to refer to revolutionary transformations 
without a popular revolution (Callinicos, 2010). One of the ways that passive 
revolutions can take place is through what Gramsci calls trasformismo (i.e. 
‘transformism’). Trasformismo refers to the “absorption of the active elements that 
[arise] from the allied as well as from the enemy classes,” which will “[result] in 
their decapitation and renders them impotent” (Gramsci, 1992, 137). This occurs 
because these groups lose their self-awareness and no longer formulate aims of 
their own. The ‘active elements’ Gramsci refers to (i.e. elites) can be absorbed 
through coercive measures as well as through the incorporation of their political 
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demands into the ideological catalogue of the hegemonic class. As a result of this 
process, it is hoped that potential projects challenging hegemony are weakened, 
as the populace is convinced that active revolutionary changes are unnecessary 
and can be achieved from within the current political system. 
There are different interpretations also of passive revolutions and 
trasformismo. Morton (2007) explains the rise of the Mussolini government in Italy 
by reference to the increasing influence of foreign and particularly Anglo-
American capital. This example of passive revolution stresses Gramsci’s inclusive 
conceptualisation of the state as consisting of more than merely political 
institutions. However, Thomas develops a radically different approach. In the 
light of his analysis, the term ‘passive revolution’ refers not only to the 
appropriation of the ideas of the subordinate classes by the dominant class, but 
also to the failure of the dominant class to fully implement its own agenda, 
“[highlighting] the historical failure of hegemony” (Thomas, 2013, 25). Hegemony 
should be understood as a means to empower the subaltern classes to develop their 
own, alternative conceptions of politics. Thomas refers to passive revolution as 
the “precise organizational obstacle to [hegemony’s] extensive practice” (idib., 
29). 
 It will become clear in later sections that these concepts are highly useful 
in terms of accounting for the changes that have taken place in European 
migration legislation, particularly since the early 2000s. The increasing 
convergence of European social democrats and conservatives is the most obvious 
expression of trasformismo in the contemporary European context, as this has 
brought about the inclusion of progressive forces’ intellectuals into the hegemonic 
apparatus of transatlantic capital. Indeed, the austerity policies that have 
characterised the response to the so-called ‘sovereign debt crisis’ can arguably be 
described using the term passive revolution. 
 
 
The Intellectuals 
 
One of the key social groups for successful hegemonic practice are the 
intellectuals. Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. 
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However, before the nature of this group is discussed in detail, it must first be 
located within the wider array of the ‘hegemonic apparatus’. Gramsci argues that 
the power of the dominating classes is based upon “the hegemonic apparatus of 
one social group over the rest of society” (1971, 264-5). Thomas explains that this 
hegemonic apparatus consists of a wide range of institutions, including schools, 
universities, the mass media or political parties. These institutions are used by 
classes to engage in their struggle against enemy classes and social groups (2009, 
226). This delimitation and inclusive conceptualisation of power also finds its 
expression in Gramsci’s inclusive understanding of the state, which he defines as 
the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971, 244). This understanding of 
the state as a ‘condensation of forces’ blurs and dissolves the boundary between 
state and civil society and permits for the consideration of the influence exercised 
and roles played by different social classes (cf. Jessop, 1997). 
 Any group which fulfils an essential function of economic production will 
create alongside itself a flock of intellectuals, which “give it homogeneity and an 
awareness of its function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
political fields” (Gramsci, 2005, 49). Intellectuals thus fulfil a crucial function in 
allowing a group to achieve class consciousness and in defining its hegemonic 
agenda. Intellectuals can emerge as symbionts with a particular class, forming part 
of a larger social ‘organism’ with which they are coevolving. However, a class can 
also strive to “elaborate its own organic intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2005, 52). 
Gramsci distinguished between organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. 
While organic intellectuals develop alongside a social group, traditional 
intellectuals are inherited from previous economic structures. However, rather 
than delineating the status of being an ‘intellectual’ according to antiquated 
categories, Gramsci suggests that intellectuals are defined by their instrumental 
role of intellectually elaborating a group’s functions and tasks. This further 
underlines the inclusive approach to social relations that is also expressed in the 
Gramscian understanding of class and state. Gramsci also stresses that 
intellectuals are not merely integral to the dominant class but potentially to other 
classes as well. Nevertheless, Gramsci argues that the ability to “assimilate and 
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conquer […] the traditional intellectuals” is a crucial factor in determining 
whether a social group will achieve dominance (ibid.). In addition, such a social 
group should elaborate “its own organic intellectuals” to be able to implement its 
hegemonic project (ibid.). 
 For the purpose of understanding the role of neofunctionalism in a 
European hegemonic project the category of organic intellectuals appears highly 
relevant. Scholars of European integration are simultaneously organic and 
traditional intellectuals. They are organic intellectuals because they co-evolved 
alongside the original European elite. As White (2003) demonstrates, early 
neofunctionalist scholarship was deeply intertwined with European policymakers. 
Not only did Haas and Lindberg theorise the process of regional integration, but 
their predictions shaped policymaking-decisions. Nevertheless, being located 
within the more ‘traditional’ disciplines of political science, sociology and 
international relations, early scholars of European integration also formed part of 
the cadre of traditional intellectuals. Gramsci would by no means consider these 
two groups to be mutually exclusive, having stated that “all men are intellectuals,” 
although “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 
2005, 51). The early neofunctionalists were traditional intellectuals, but 
simultaneously functioned as organic intellectuals. Nevertheless, within the 
changing hegemonic context of European integration, which will be discussed in 
the next section, the role of neofunctionalism underwent a significant 
transformation. According to Gramsci’s idea of the successful implementation of 
hegemony being in part dependent on the ability to absorb the traditional 
intellectuals, one would expect neofunctionalism to have become part of a 
particular hegemonic apparatus. It will be one of the tasks of this dissertation to 
explore whether this has indeed been the case. 
 
 
Neo-Gramscian Theory and European Integration 
 
This section will outline some relevant and recent analyses of European 
integration from a neo-Gramscian perspective. These contributions form an 
important part of addressing the social purpose of European integration, which, 
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as will be seen, rests on the neoliberal transformation of the European Union. 
Nevertheless, the current neo-Gramscian scholarship on European integration 
arguably contains an elite-bias, which will be discussed towards the end of this 
section. 
From a neo-Gramscian perspective European integration can be regarded 
as being an aspect of the hegemony of transatlantic capital, which in turn 
facilitated the implementation of a neoliberal agenda. However, much of the 
Gramscian literature on European integration focusses on the origins, practices 
and consequences of contemporary ‘neoliberal hegemony’ (e.g. Gill, 2003; 
Bonefeld, 2012; Bohle, 2006). However, this term obfuscates an important aspect 
of Gramsci’s own conceptualisation of hegemony which emphasises that 
hegemony is always practiced by social classes. There is no neoliberal class; 
however, the implementation of a neoliberal project may be part of the agenda of 
a particular class. Here I will explain what neoliberalism is from a neo-Gramscian 
perspective and by whom it is implemented. 
 Harvey describes neoliberalism as a theory that “proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade” (2005, 2). The state’s role should be 
to guarantee the functioning of the market, for example through the creation of a 
suitable institutional apparatus or through safeguarding the supply of capital. State 
institutions, such as the courts or the military, should possess the means to enforce 
the protection of private property rights and the functioning of the markets. Where 
no markets exist, the state should encourage their creation, which may have 
profound consequences for migration management, as irregular migrants too are 
exposed to increasing marketisation. It is important to note that neoliberalism 
does not advocate the disappearance or minimisation of the state, albeit reducing 
it to the regulatory institution. In fact, the neoliberal state may encompass a large 
governance apparatus. The neoliberal economic order and post-War democracy 
are arguably at odds with one another (ibid.). As Merkel (2014) points out, the 
establishment of ‘free markets’ through deregulation limits the ability of 
governments to effectively implement macroeconomic policies. Technocracy and 
dependency on intellectuals are thus inherent features of neoliberalism. 
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 Although neoliberalism may be part of a programme to achieve or sustain 
hegemony, there is no ‘neoliberal class’. A class or a durable alliance of classes 
(hegemonic bloc) thus still ought to be identified as the forces behind the 
implementation of the neoliberal agenda for European integration. While 
Gramsci’s own analysis is often confined to the boundaries of the nation state, 
European integration is by its very nature a supranational project; the agent of 
neoliberalism should be located at the transnational level. Sklair’s (2001; 2013) 
‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC) is a concept which can help us identifying 
possible candidates for this role. Sklair argues that the highly regulated Keynesian 
welfare states of the 1960s and 1970s increased the importance of transnational 
corporations attempting to escape the confinement of the state. In addition to that, 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates facilitated the 
internationalisation of production.18 At the transnational level fewer constraints 
were imposed on capital. Indeed, this view is highly compatible with the 
neofunctionalist vision of the European Union, which in fact presupposes the 
emergence of a TCC. Haas (1958) suggested that as European integration 
advances, the loyalties of national elites would synchronise towards the European 
level. This would result in the appearance of European rather than national 
capital. Van der Pijl (1984; 1998) proposes a transatlantic capitalist class as a 
concrete example of a TCC. Via institutions such as the European Cultural 
Foundation (ECF) settings were created that brought together representatives of 
important social groups from both sides of the Atlantic, acting as a catalyst for 
class formation. From the Gramscian perspective, it is not surprising that a 
cultural institution would be part of class formation, since the notion of the 
historical bloc transcends class and state apparatus (Jessop, 1997; Gramsci, 1971). 
According to van der Pijl, the ECF was an important player in the attempt to 
foster a pan-European cultural identity (1998, 122). Van der Pijl argues that 
European integration as a whole should be placed within the transatlantic context, 
which is further emphasised by the United States’ perceived need for a strong 
Western European capitalist market as a bulwark against Communist expansion. 
                                                          
18 In the Bretton Woods system (1945-71) all currencies were pegged to the US dollar, which in 
turn was convertible into gold. 
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While Sklair’s and van der Pijl’s work create the theoretical tools for 
translating Gramsci’s national class analysis towards the transnational (and hence 
European) level, van Apeldoorn (2002) explains how the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists (ERT) became the vehicle for the implementation of the emergent 
European transnational capitalist class’s neoliberal project. In the 1950s and 60s, 
the spread of Fordism to Western Europe resulted in a class compromise between 
capital and labour. Mass production requires the institution of higher salaries to 
permit market expansion, as the sponsoring of labour created more demand. Both 
sides, capital and labour, were thus benefitting, as long as the growth cycle was 
maintained. In the 1960s, the limits of this growth model were apparently reached, 
as wages were rising faster than productivity, resulting in a fall of profits. Capital 
thus began to stop benefitting from the class compromise. Furthermore, the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates permitted the internationalisation 
of production, which in turn resulted in the emergence of increasing global 
competition. The competitiveness of industrial production in the capitalist 
heartland was reduced, since production is other parts of the world was cheaper. 
Van Apeldoorn (2002) explains how this resulted in the emergence of various 
rivalling accumulation models in Western Europe, as Fordism no longer 
produced the amount of growth deemed sufficient by capital. Through the erosion 
of the Fordist class compromise capital attempted to re-establish its dominance 
over labour. 
 The globalisation of production resulted in a crisis of European industry 
that was initially met with a large variety of national responses which further 
highlighted the differences between national political economies. Nevertheless, 
these initially nationalist policies were superseded by the creation of the Single 
Market by the late 1980s, which can be interpreted as a manifestation of the 
constraints globalisation had placed on national policymaking (cf. Streeck, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the nature of the European response to this crisis was seriously 
debated. By the late 1980s the European political economy had by no means 
become monolithic, and there were several different welfare state regimes (Esping-
Andersen, 1990).19 Van Apeldoorn (2002) argues that this period was 
                                                          
19 Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between the liberal, the corporatist and the social 
democratic welfare state. The liberal welfare state has only a very elementary benefits system and 
private welfare schemes are sometimes subsidised. It was practiced in the United States, Canada, 
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characterised by competition between three European models of capitalism which 
would redefine the social purpose of European integration. The social democratic 
model was supported by trade unions, by the socialists as well as by parts of the 
Christian democratic parties. The neo-mercantilist model saw regionalisation as 
an attempt to protect European productive capital from the negative consequences 
of globalisation. Finally, the neoliberal model aimed at deregulating and 
liberalising the European market. In van Apeldoorn’s view, transnational class 
struggle was most clearly manifested in the struggle between the neo-mercantilist 
model and the neoliberal model. Van Apeldoorn distinguishes between 
transnational capital with a European affiliation (e.g. European industrial firms) 
and transnational capital with a global affiliation (e.g. financial capital and 
German industrial capital). The ‘Europeanist’ faction strongly identified with the 
neo-mercantilist model, whereas the globalist faction identified with the neoliberal 
faction. The fact that the neoliberal model eventually won supports the hypothesis 
that neoliberalism in Europe is indeed supported by a hegemonic bloc under the 
leadership of a transnational capitalist class with global affiliations. Van 
Apeldoorn’s finding that the ERT’s proposals for the architecture of the European 
monetary union were translated into the Maastricht Treaty offers further evidence 
of this claim. 
 Various other authors have further attempted to apply neo-Gramscian 
theory to the European integration process. Bohle (2005) attempts to explain the 
eastward expansion of the European Union in 2004 using a neo-Gramscian 
framework. She argues that the purpose of the enlargement process, decided upon 
in 1993, was to guarantee that central and eastern European states would develop 
the neoliberal model of capitalism. As opposed to previous enlargement rounds, 
the candidate countries were required to liberalise their markets before they 
actually entered the EU. The liberalisation agenda in the new member states was 
in many ways more radical than in the old member states. Furthermore, the new 
member states’ citizens would be exempted from the right to work anywhere in 
                                                          
Australia and to some extent the UK. The corporatist welfare state privileges particular 
(industrial) social groups and classes. It provides welfare, but its bias limits the redistribute effects 
of that welfare. This model was practised in West Germany, France and Italy. The social 
democratic regime in turn aimed at providing universal welfare and was practised by 
Scandinavian countries. In addition to these regimes, some authors have proposed the 
Mediterranean welfare regime, which is based on welfare provided by the family (Hemerijk, 
2002). 
82 
 
the EU for at least seven years, making them essentially second class EU citizens. 
Bohle explains this significant difference from previous rounds of enlargement by 
claiming that it was the result of the emergence of a transnational historical bloc. 
Foreign investors were seeking ways to invest directly into Central and Eastern 
Europe as opposed to using subcontractors. Furthermore, enlargement was an 
attempt to create a pan-European division of labour wherein the new member 
states would be responsible for the lower end of the production process. The EU 
steel industry for example was dominated by a few highly competitive steel 
corporations, who marvelled at the prospect of increasing steel demand in the new 
member states, and at the prospect of relocating production to regions with lower 
labour costs. Eastern enlargement was thus a form of passive revolution with the 
purpose of including Central and Eastern Europe into the transnational historic 
bloc.  
Ian Bruff (2014) attempts to understand the eurozone crisis through the 
work of Nicos Poulantzas, who was in turn heavily influenced by Gramsci. Bruff 
particularly refers to Poulantzas’ idea of authoritarian statism. Poulantzas (2014) 
pointed out that authoritarianism is not only the government’s use of force, for 
example during a demonstration, but also the policy of the reconfiguration of the 
state by means of attempting to isolate policy areas from political contestation. 
Due to the questioning of their ability to effectively address reality, neoliberal 
policies seized to be backed up by wide-spread consent. As a result, coercive forms 
of neoliberalism became more visible. Indeed, the constitutional and legal 
transformations that we are witnessing in many EU member states are justified as 
being necessary to reanimate the European market economy. They also serve the 
purpose of redefining the role and function of the state. The population is thus told 
that the state is unable to prevent rising social inequality and the decline of social 
welfare because it is materially unable to do so – hence the institution of 
constitutional, permanent austerity by means of ‘debt brakes’.20 Furthermore, the 
state redefines itself as increasingly non-democratic by constitutionally limiting its 
scope of action. This represents a move away from seeking consent, as subaltern 
groups are excluded from political processes “through the constitutionally and 
                                                          
20 The Fiscal Compact, which was ratified by all eurozone members and some of the remaining 
EU member states, foresees the introduction of upper limits to annual deficits, preferably at 
constitutional level. 
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legally engineered self-disempowerment of nominally democratic institutions” 
(Bruff, 2014, 116). This development represents a potential contestation of the 
hegemonic leadership of transnational capital, as there is a clear conflict of 
interests between different social groups. Therefore Bruff views the rise of 
authoritarian neoliberalism as a window of opportunity for counter-hegemonic 
projects. However, between the two world wars, Gramsci realised that even a deep 
crisis of capitalism has ambiguous implications. It is one of the problems of the 
contemporary left that radical politics is practiced much more effectively by right-
wing groups. Instances of trasformismo are numerous for right-wing projects, while 
they are scarce and extremely disputed when proposed by left-wing actors (e.g. 
financial transaction tax). 
Laura Horn (2011) points out that much of the neo-Gramscian literature 
that has hitherto been written on European integration exhibits an elite focus that 
is contrary to the spirit of Gramsci, an argument which can arguably also be 
applied to Bohle’s and van Apeldoorn’s analyses. If neo-Gramscian scholarship is 
ultimately about overcoming the social injustice that the practices of an oppressive 
hegemonic bloc imply, its emphasis must be on identifying the transformative and 
emancipatory potential for subaltern groups. 
 
 
Dependency Theory 
 
Dependency theory provides an account of global underdevelopment.21 
Dependency theory’s conceptualisation of increasing integration of the global core 
through regional, supranational institutions and free trade agreements provide 
ample material for using the approach to understand European integration, and 
aspects of dependency theory have been used by critical EU scholars (e.g. Becker 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, dependency theory has been employed to understand 
global migratory movements, which is why a part of this section will be dedicated 
to a review of this literature. Furthermore, it will be discussed to what extent 
dependency theory and neo-Gramscian theory are mutually compatible (cf. 
                                                          
21 It also provides the foundation for world-systems analysis, which is however not referred to 
here as its structural determinism is incompatible with the open-ended development of 
capitalism. 
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Lipietz, 1989; Ryner, 2002). Both approaches emphasises core-periphery 
relations, whether on the national, regional or international levels, and thus 
provide fruitful starting point for a conversation between the two theories. 
 
 
The Problem of Underdevelopment 
 
The foundation of dependency theory was developed by the former Director of 
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, Paul Prebisch (Ferraro, 2008). 
Prebisch became aware that growth in the advanced economies of the world 
economy was not matched by growth in poorer countries. While the neoclassical 
theory of economics expected the ‘Pareto-optimal’ growth of the global economy, 
according to which all global regions benefit from the economic development of 
the most developed regions, some areas’ proportional share in global trade had 
begun to decline (Harvey, 1975). Furthermore, it seemed as though the activities 
of the developed countries were causing problems for the poorer countries. 
Prepisch thought that this condition was the result of the poorer countries’ export 
strategy: while the poorer countries supplied primary resources, the richer 
countries imported these resources and added value to them by manufacturing 
them into usable goods. The poorer countries then bought these goods, but 
because they merely supplied the relatively cheaper primary resources, they would 
never earn more through their exports to pay for these imports. According to the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the terms of trade further decline as there is a tendency 
for the relative price of manufactured products to increase vis-à-vis primary good 
(Singer, 1950). The solution was obvious: by implementing import substitution 
industrialisation strategies, the poorer countries would no longer have to spend 
their foreign exchange reserves on manufactured goods. Nevertheless, there were 
some practical obstacles to such an endeavour. Firstly, the poorer countries’ 
national markets were not sufficiently big to support economies of scale. Secondly, 
there was a lack of political will to implement the transition to becoming an 
economy that is not solely dependent on the export of primary goods. Thirdly, 
poorer countries often possessed little control over their raw materials – they often 
did not have the means of accessing them or the production sites were controlled 
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by foreign industrial companies based in former colonial powers. The 
maintenance of the state of underdevelopment thus appeared to be structurally 
embedded. Dependency theory began to provide an answer to a question which 
the neoclassical theory of economics had nearly nothing to say on, apart from the 
idea that poorer countries had not yet developed sufficiently sophisticated 
economic practices (Ferraro, 2008). 
 Dos Santos describes dependency as a “historical condition which shaped 
a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to 
the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate 
economies” (1971, 231). Subordination is thus structurally embedded in the global 
economic system. Despite their fragmentation into different groups (e.g. Marxists, 
world-systems theorists, etc.), all dependency scholars agree that the world is 
divided into at least two different camps, which are variously referred to as the 
core and the periphery, the dominant and the subordinate, or the metropolitan 
region and the satellites. While the core is composed of the wealthy states of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
periphery consists of those parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America that have a 
low GDP per capita and a large dependency on the export of a single commodity. 
The countries that exhibit characteristics of both groups are often referred to as 
the semi-periphery. Peripheral elites often benefit from this constellation which is 
one of the most important reasons for its continuity. Dependency theorists also 
agree that external forces are of critical importance to the economic development 
of the periphery (Sunkel, 1969). These external forces may consist of transnational 
corporations, foreign aid and other instruments. The interaction between the core 
and the periphery does not balance out, but rather increases the gap between the 
two groups. 
 The social structures and dynamics of global capitalism are regarded as the 
primary forces behind dependency, and dependency theory can in many ways be 
regarded as an application of the Marxist understanding of the domestic dynamic 
of capitalism to the international system (Frank, 1972). It is, however, not a theory 
of imperialism as laid out for example by Lenin. While imperialism is about the 
expansion of a state’s global influence, dependency attempts to provide an 
explanation for underdevelopment. It is thus a theory of the consequences of a 
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dimension of imperialism. Capitalism has instituted a global division of labour 
where dependent countries provide a market for obsolete technologies, while 
supplying raw materials, agricultural products and cheap labour. The theory thus 
sheds some light on migratory movements from the periphery to the core, as 
labour is treated as though it was a commodity like any other (cf. Polanyi, 1944). 
While some non-Marxist dependency theorists question whether capitalism is 
indeed the driving force behind global inequality, Ferraro (2008) nevertheless 
argues that they all share the following five propositions. Firstly, undevelopment 
ought not to be equated with underdevelopment. Undevelopment simply refers to 
a situation where resources are not being used, where land remains uncultivated. 
Underdevelopment on the other hand refers to resources being allocated 
unequally, benefitting only the dominant states. Secondly, underdeveloped 
countries do not lag behind nor are they catching up; they were included in the 
economic system against their will as the producers of raw materials. Thirdly, the 
manner in which underdeveloped countries use their resources is one of the major 
reasons of underdevelopment. Instead of using their agricultural products for 
domestic consumption, they export them. This, it is claimed, is the cause of 
numerous famines. Fourthly, like realists, dependency scholars view states as the 
primary actors of the international system, possessing nationally defined interests. 
The precise nature of those interests on the other hand is left vague, implying that 
the meaning of the term ‘development’ is equally uncertain. Fifthly, dependency 
is maintained not only by the structural power of the global core, but by elites in 
the dependent states whose interests coincide with those of the core 
(Lumpenbourgeoisie). This emphasises the voluntary nature of the dependency 
relationship. 
 One of the major critiques of Frank’s and Dos Santos’ versions of 
dependency theory has highlighted that they are unable to account for the unequal 
position of dependent and peripheral countries in the global economy (Cardoso, 
1973). Ferdando Henrique Cardoso, who served as the 34th President of Brazil 
between 1995 and 2003, significantly addressed this critique and developed a 
typology to account for peripheral countries’ differing conditions which had 
hitherto been ignored by dependency scholars. Cardoso distinguishes between 
three continuums where countries can be located: autonomy-dependency, centre-
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periphery and development-underdevelopment. According to Cardoso, 
dependency refers to the internal and external relations of the conditions of 
national economic systems. Periphery, in turn, refers to the position of 
underdeveloped economies in the global polico-economic systems, irrespective of 
their specific social conditions. Underdevelopment denotes the level of 
development of the national productive system. These scales make development 
and autonomy independent from one another, and a country may for instance be 
developed and peripheral at the same time. The European Union and the United 
States of America may be considered autonomous-developed centres (although 
Panitch and Gindin (2012) attribute only relative autonomy to the EU). Brazil and 
Argentina belong to the dependent-developed periphery. China is an example of 
the autonomous-underdeveloped semi-periphery, while sub-Saharan Africa is part 
of the dependent-underdeveloped periphery. In line with his political ambitions, 
Cardoso suggested that the internal conditions of a state determine its position in 
the global economy, and that domestic inequality will always translate itself into 
international inequality. For achieving development, seen as the ultimate political 
purpose, it is thus essential for a state to develop autonomous decision-making 
powers. Nevertheless, despite the clear improvements of Cardoso’s approach, it 
arguably underestimates the racial divides in the periphery, falling into the trap of 
class-reductionism (Grosfoguel, 2000). Furthermore, Cardoso arguably 
overestimates the autonomy of peripheral states in his recommendations. 
 
 
Underdevelopment and Transnational Migration 
 
Massey et al. (1993) trace the origins of international migration to seven factors 
which are caused by the global, structural imbalance described by dependency 
scholars. Firstly, the consolidation of land in peripheral areas by capitalist farmers 
leads to the destruction of traditional, inheritance-based agricultural property 
relations. Furthermore, the mechanisation of agriculture reduces the need for 
manual labour. The reduced cost of agricultural products drives traditional 
farmers out of business, and ultimately uproots the local population creating 
migratory movements. Secondly, the extraction and production of raw materials 
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in peripheral regions requires manual labour that is drawn from populations that 
were previously engaged in traditional farming-practices, further producing a 
mobile labour force. Thirdly, companies from the core economies set up factories 
in peripheral regions to benefit from lower unit labour costs. The jobs thus creates 
primarily attract female workers and destroy the traditional production relations. 
Low pay limits the time a worker spends at a factory, causing the workforce to 
move on to look for other job opportunities. The predominantly female workers 
employed at these factories are socialised into industrial work habits and a 
consumption-based environment, creating ideological links with the core. All of 
these factors contribute to the creation of an uprooted workforce increasing 
transnational migration. 
The three factors discussed so far concern migration within a particular 
region of the global economy: the periphery. Indeed, the vast majority of 
international migration takes place within the same region. The following four 
points, however, relate to migration between the core and the periphery, which is 
currently involving the European Union on a large scale. Firstly, Massey et al. 
(1993) put forward that in order to facilitate the use of peripheral resources, 
material links between the core and the periphery are eventually set up. Better 
transportation routes between global regions will reduce the cost to travel between 
these regions, increasing migration. There is a strong correlation between the 
global movement of goods and capital and the global movement of people, 
although capital tends to flow from the core to the periphery, while people tend to 
move from the periphery to the core (ibid.). Secondly, the economic penetration 
of the periphery by core transnational corporations builds and reinforces 
ideological links established during the period of colonial empires. Media 
broadcasts further reinforce particular positive images of the core, embedding 
migration paths. Thirdly, the world economy is focussed on a relatively small 
number of megacities which exhibit a concentration of finance and high-tech 
production. Nevertheless, the sheer size of these cities fosters demand for informal 
and low-paid jobs which in turn makes them attractive destinations for migrant 
workers. Finally, political instability caused by core military interventions in the 
periphery to protect investments there creates refugee flows (ibid.). In conclusion, 
migration is depicted as having very little to do with wage and unemployment 
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differentials. Instead, it is seen to be the result of the structural inequality of the 
global economy. 
 
 
Core-Periphery Relations in Gramsci’s Writings 
 
Whereas dependency theory tends towards state-centrism, Gramsci views class as 
the principal unit of analysis. Although Gramsci continuously makes reference to 
distinct national groups discussing particular national situations in the Prison 
Notebooks, he does not develop a theory of international relations.22 Dependency 
theory, on the other hand, attempts just that. If neo-Gramscian theory and 
elements of dependency theory are meant to provide the theoretical foundation 
for understanding the social purpose of European integration, their mutual 
compatibility ought to be explored. 
Gramsci explicitly uses the term ‘periphery’ in a variety of contexts. In the 
Prison Notebooks, he refers to “peripheral forces” (Gramsci, 1971, 417) with 
reference to the “most marginal” of subaltern classes (ibid., 430). He mentions the 
“peripheries of national life,” albeit without further detailing the social role these 
peripheries play (ibid., 654). However, in earlier writings, Gramsci places Italy, 
Poland, Spain and Portugal into the category of “typical peripheral states” 
(Gramsci, 1978, 408), where “state forces are less efficient” and where “a broad 
stratum of intermediate classes stretches between the proletariat and capitalism” 
(ibid., 410; cf. Schwarzmantel, 2015). It is noteworthy that he discusses the 
international periphery primarily in terms of the domestic situation of the 
countries involved, rather than in terms of their role in the global political 
economy, as in dependency theory. Shilliam (2004) argues that this is because 
Gramsci believed that the crisis of capitalism takes “different forms, in the one 
hand in the countries of the capitalist periphery, and on the other in the advanced 
capitalist countries” (Gramsci, 1978, 410). He therefore considered it preferable 
to understand hegemony within the national context, thus formulating national 
emancipatory agendas (Shilliam, 2004, 72). Furthermore, Gramsci’s focus on the 
                                                          
22 E.g. Q1, §43 on Italian North-South relations or Q1, §45 on national differences in the 1848 
revolutions; cf. Gramsci’s essay “Some Aspects of the Southern Question” (Gramsci, 2000) 
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national level may be the result of his refusal to embrace determinist and 
reductionist tendencies that are characteristic of grand, global analyses like 
dependency theory. 
One of the most important features of Gramsci’s writings concerns the 
relationship between Northern and Southern Italy. In 1926, Gramsci drafted an 
essay called ‘Some Aspects of the Southern Question’, in which he outlines the 
conditions necessary to allow the proletariat to achieve leadership of allied classes. 
He also describes the portrayal of Southern Italians by bourgeois intellectuals: 
 
“The South is the ball and chain which prevents the social development 
of Italy from progressing more rapidly; the Southerners are biologically 
inferior beings, semi-barbarians or total barbarians, by natural destiny; 
if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the capitalist system 
or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made 
the Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric – only tempering 
this harsh fate with the purely individual explosion of a few great 
geniuses, like isolated palm-trees in an arid and barren desert.” 
(Gramsci, 2000, 173). 
 
It is perhaps a historical coincidence that Gramsci’s statement is mirrored by 
contemporary portrayals of irregular migrants (as well as Southern Europeans) in 
the tabloid press, with intellectuals such as Thilo Sarrazin (2010) providing the 
“‘science’ […] to crush the wretched and exploited” (Gramsci, 2000, 174). 
Nevertheless, Gramsci’s recognition of the quasi-colonial relationship between 
Northern and Southern Italy (cf. ibid., 171) provides the foundation for a 
conversation between neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory. In the 
Prison Notebooks, he calls the South a “semi-colonial market” which is controlled 
using a “police system” as well as through “the incorporation on a ‘personal basis’ 
of the most active Southern elements into the ruling classes through special 
‘judicial’, white collar privileges” (Gramsci, 1992, 131). The similarity to the 
alliance between peripheral elites and core interests that Ferraro (2008) refers to is 
striking. 
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 Although dependency theory exhibits determinist tendencies by ‘locking’ 
peripheral states into a perpetually under-developed situation, dependency theory 
has also inspired political action by revealing the root causes of 
underdevelopment. Since Gramsci shares this theory’s conceptualisation of core-
periphery relations, dependency theory might be a useful starting point for 
applying neo-Gramscian theory to the international level, particularly if the 
concept of transnational classes becomes involved. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Neo-Gramscian theory is a widely employed, but also misinterpreted, social 
theory. Particularly the term hegemony has proven popular, not least with 
political scientists and scholars of international relations, albeit being often 
reduced to meanings implying ‘dominance’ or ‘rule by consent’. In English-
speaking academia this tendency is reinforced by the hitherto incomplete 
translation of the Prison Notebooks. Hoare and Smith’s interpretation (Gramsci, 
1971) has provided the foundation for much of what has been written using 
Gramscian theory in the English language, although this interpretation is heavily 
edited, being comprised of a mere fraction of Gramsci’s most notable work. This 
chapter has been an attempt to reconstruct some of Gramsci’s most important 
concepts in order to guide an analysis of the social purpose of European 
integration, as expressed by European migration management as well as its 
experience. Hegemony is essential for understanding neoliberalism, which is 
currently the most important ideology shaping European integration. 
Trasformismo in turn allows for an exploration of the alliance of neoliberalism and 
neo-nationalism. The concept of organic intellectuals captures the role of 
neofunctionalism in the practice of neoliberalism in the EU. Nevertheless, to truly 
overcome neofunctionalism’s inward-looking blinkers, dependency theory was 
introduced to highlight the role of the EU in the global power structures. The 
combination of both approaches promises to produce a meaningful outlook of the 
social purpose of contemporary European integration. 
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 The list of neo-Gramscian interpretations of the EU that were referred to 
in this chapter is by no means exhaustive, and other texts could have been 
reviewed (e.g. Gill, 2001; Bohle, 2005). The reviewed texts were chosen to reflect 
the recent recovery of Gramsci’s original theoretical elaborations. They 
nevertheless suffer several shortcomings. Firstly, none of these texts extensively 
addresses European migration management, despite the importance of this field 
for the success or failure of the EU as a whole (see Introduction and Chapter 4 for 
a discussion of migration management as a critical case study). Secondly, these 
texts do not address the role of neofunctionalism in the neoliberal transformation 
of the European Union. Thirdly, although these texts engage very seriously with 
Gramsci’s writings, they are nevertheless somewhat elite-focused – a point which 
has also been stressed by Horn (2011). This elite-focus may be the result of an 
underestimation of the importance of subaltern groups in the structure of the 
political economy, or it may be an instance of the failure to reproduce Gramsci’s 
emancipatory goals, which can only be implemented through the political action 
of the subaltern. The elite-focus is finally reinforced by a lacking engagement with 
the Gramscian understanding of subalternity. The next chapter will address 
Gramsci’s treatment of the subaltern, highlighting also the role of subalternity in 
neofunctionalism. 
  
93 
 
Chapter 3: The Margins of History – Rediscovering the 
Subaltern 
 
The review of neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory that was carried out 
in the previous chapter has revealed an analytical privileging towards elites and 
an underestimation of the role and importance of the subaltern. This is not 
surprising, given that elites largely dominate decision-making in the European 
political economy. However, given the emancipatory aspirations of critical 
theory, it is meaningful to explore the state of subalternity, and to highlight the 
subaltern’s transformative potential. 
This chapter will continue to lay the theoretical foundation for the 
empirical chapters that are to follow. It attempts to develop the concept of 
subalternity, applying it to the study of the political economy of European 
integration. It will be shown that a complete reading of Gramsci’s original writings 
casts a different light on the Gramscian understanding of the term. Without 
denying the social position, Gramsci employed the term ‘subalternity’ without 
reference to a particular class to highlight subaltern groups’ complex social role 
and transformative potential. His chief concern was revolution, and no analysis 
of a particular group was done for its own sake, but always with the idea in mind 
that the capitalist system is inherently unjust and limiting in the realisation of 
human potential. Secondly, as this dissertation forms a critique of neofunctionalist 
European integration, it will be discussed what role subaltern groups play in the 
neofunctionalist narrative. As Chapter 1 has shown, irregular migrants are 
sometimes included in the broad category of ‘exogenous factors’ in European 
migration management. The relationship between exogenous factors and 
subalternity will thus be investigated, highlighting that neofunctionalism itself is 
implicated in the production of exogenous groups. In the final section of this 
chapter, three mechanisms will be discussed by which neofunctionalist integration 
generates and reinforces subalternity: reification, commodification and 
biopolitics. These concepts will subsequently be returned to in the following 
chapters. 
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Subalternity – At the Margins of History 
 
Subalternity is one of the most widely used Gramscian terms in academic 
discourse. Perhaps due to its etymology, the term is often lexically equated with 
the word ‘inferior’.23 Even authors who attempt to illuminate the detrimental 
position of a societal group for its own benefit employ ‘subaltern’ in this meaning 
(e.g. Odem, 2008; de Haas, 2006).24 In this way, the term subaltern not only loses 
the complexity that was attributed to it by Gramsci, but its use reinforces the 
disempowerment of subaltern classes. This first section of this chapter will review 
key texts that have hitherto been written on the Gramscian conceptualisation of 
subalternity. It subsequently turns to the original texts themselves in an attempt to 
construct a representation of subalternity that is true to Gramsci’s intentions. 
 
 
Caricatures of ‘Subalternity’ 
 
According to Smith the word subalternity is often represented as “synonymous 
with either the peasantry or the proletariat” (Smith, 2010, 44). This caricatured 
view, further supported by Arnold (1984), has its origins in a decontextualized 
analysis of the Prison Notebooks, where Gramsci describes the weaknesses of the 
subaltern (Southern Italian) peasantry, arguing that it lacks “solid organisation” 
and that it is internally divided between landowners and labourers (Gramsci, 
1971, 75-6). Arnold refers to “subaltern ideology,” as lacking the collective 
consciousness of a distinct class. He cites Gramsci discussing the common sense 
(senso commune) of subaltern groups, elaborating that “[subalternity’s] most 
fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one 
                                                          
23 In the most basic way, the term subaltern is composed of the Latin roots sub and alternus, sub 
meaning ‘under’, and alternus meaning ‘every other one’. Alternus is however also related to the 
verb altare, ‘to become otherwise’, which in turn stems from the Proto-Indo-European root *al-, 
beyond. Apart from inferior, another interpretation of the word may thus be ‘change from below’. 
24 Odem (2008) for instance discusses the ‘subalternity’ of Mexican and other Latin American 
immigrants to the US. She states that “Mexicans were positioned as subaltern immigrants – they 
were accepted as cheap, temporary workers, but not desired as permanent citizens” (ibid., 361). 
She thus positions them as ‘inferior citizens’. De Haas similarly refers to “traditionally subaltern 
ethnic groups” in Morocco as “subordinate,” describing their migration as the path towards 
“emancipation” and “liberation” (de Haas, 2006, 571-4). He thus discursively establishes two 
opposite groups: the subaltern and the emancipated. While the former is powerless, the latter is 
empowered. 
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individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the 
social and actual position of the masses whose philosophy it is” (Gramsci, 1971, 
325-6). Peasants are slow to accept new ideas, often constructing “more or less 
heterogeneous and bizarre combinations” out of them (ibid., 338). They will 
furthermore “[participate] in their own subordination by subscribing to hegemonic 
values, by accepting, admiring and even seeking to emulate many of the attributes 
of the superordinate classes” (Arnold, 1984, 160). In many ways this social 
caricature is similar to Marx’s concept of the lumpenproletariat, an uneducated and 
reactionary sub-proletarian group without a coherent class consciousness 
(Bussard, 1987). Arnold realises himself that the consequence of this 
conceptualisation of the subaltern is that they are unable to play a substantive part 
in the actions that are needed to overthrow capitalism (1984, 174). It is on the 
basis of this particular representation of subalternity that Spivak concludes in her 
classic work of postcolonial studies that ‘the subaltern cannot speak’ (1988). 
Smith (2010) deconstructs Arnold’s equation of this particular conception 
of subalternity with the Southern Italian peasantry, pointing out that the exclusive 
association of the subaltern with the lumpenproletariat is incorrect. He points 
towards Gramsci’s discussion of the way in which bourgeois journalism discussed 
the messianic, Christian socialist movement of Davide Lazzaretti.25 Therein 
Gramsci argues that “for the social elite, the members of subaltern groups always 
have something of a barbaric or pathological nature about them” (Gramsci, 1996). 
While this reads almost like Gramsci’s critique of Arnold’s portrayal of 
subalternity, Smith uses it to argue for a historical contextualisation of 
subalternity, calling for a neo-Gramscian research agenda aimed at understanding 
the processes by which subalternity is produced and reproduced (2010, 45). 
 
 
Recovering Subalternity 
 
In the same way that Thomas clarified the Gramscian understanding of hegemony 
(2013), Gramsci’s use of subalternity ought to the re-evaluated in the light of 
                                                          
25 Lazzeretti founded a religious, egalitarian commune during the period of the Risorgimento. 
He saw himself as a prophet and as the ‘Great Monarch’ whose coming was foretold in Catholic 
folklore and who was meant to restore the Church. In 1878 Lazzaretti was shot by carabinieri. 
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Gramsci’s emancipatory ambitions. Gramsci’s aim was by no means to reinforce 
the subordinate social position of subaltern groups, but to highlight the structural 
causes of their subordination, without neglecting their transformative potential. 
According to Green (2000), Gramsci’s engagement with the subaltern served three 
primary purposes: firstly, Gramsci wanted to create a methodology for the 
historical analysis of subalternity. Secondly, he wanted to write a history of 
subaltern classes. Finally, and most importantly, Gramsci wanted to use the first 
two points as the basis for the development of an agenda for their liberation and 
subordination. This section aims at recovering this research agenda. 
Gramsci’s use of the word subalternity varies immensely throughout the 
Prison Notebooks. Indeed, Hoare and Smith’s point, that it is “difficult to discern 
any systematic difference in Gramsci’s usage between […] subaltern and 
subordinate” (Gramsci, 1971), ought to be agreed with. Gramsci refers to both 
terms interchangeably (e.g. in Q4, §38). Chronologically, Gramsci’s first use of 
the term referred to “subaltern officers in the army” (ibid., 148). In a similar usage, 
Gramsci argues that Engels was “in a subaltern position in relation to Marx” in 
terms of his theoretical skills (Gramsci, 1996, 139). Later, Gramsci uses the term 
to refer to groups (or classes) with a lower or subordinate social status, and 
Gramsci also refers to the Church as a ‘subaltern force’ (Green, 2000, 2). In 
Notebooks 3 and 4 other groups are similarly assigned to the category of the 
subaltern: the bourgeoisie before the French Revolution, trade unions, elementary 
school and secondary school teachers, priests or Italian emigrants (Gramsci, 
1996). Gramsci refers to himself as a member of a subaltern group (ibid., 257). In 
1934 he dedicates a special thematic notebook to subalternity that is entitled On 
the Margins of History (Notebook 25); in this notebook, slaves, peasants, religious 
groups, women, different races as well as the proletariat are referred to as subaltern 
groups. On the basis of these findings, I draw the conclusion that Gramsci refers 
to all non-dominant social groups as subaltern. Gramsci’s variegated employment of 
the word ‘subalternity’ is in direct contradiction to Spivak’s, who put forward in 
a 1992 interview that “Gramsci was obliged to censor himself in prison,” and that 
‘subaltern’ is a code-word for ‘proletariat’. It should be noted that Gramsci’s 
analysis of the subaltern is most likely incomplete – his incarceration prevented 
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him from accessing much of the literature required to work this concept through 
(Green, 2000). 
Green (2000) puts forward that Gramsci’s idea of the subaltern is 
intricately linked to his conceptualisation of the state. While Gramsci’s early 
references to the state referred primarily to political power in the shape of the 
government and its bureaucratic institutions, he came to extend this definition, 
developing the view that political society and civil society cannot be regarded as 
divorced from one another. The ‘integral state’ thus came to refer to the state-
society complex where public as well as private institutions serve the purpose of 
reproducing the values of the dominant class. He stresses in particular the role of 
intellectuals in the reproduction of these values. The incorporation of these 
institutions and elements into the ruling apparatus of the dominant class is an 
important step towards achieving hegemony rather than dictatorship. Hegemony, 
in turn, is needed to guarantee the consent of subaltern groups to the domination 
of the ruling class. This is of crucial importance because it empowers subaltern 
groups: if their consent is needed for the establishment of sustainable domination, 
the subaltern have the potential to overthrow the dominant classes’ hegemony in 
both civil society and political society. 
To understand the history of the subaltern, Gramsci developed a particular 
methodology which is based on the conceptualisation of subaltern history as 
undergoing a six-stage process. This methodology is of course not transhistorical, 
and in Notebook 3 Gramsci makes clear that theoretical ideas must remain 
flexible in cases of empirical contradiction: 
  
“Reality is teeming with the most bizarre coincidences, and it is the 
theoretician’s task to find in this bizarreness new evidence for his theory, to 
‘translate’ the elements of historical life into theoretical language, but not vice 
versa, making reality conform to an abstract scheme. Reality will never 
conform to an abstract scheme” (Gramsci, 1997, 52; see Chapter 4 on Critical 
Grounded Theory). 
 
Gramsci never attempts to understand the subaltern as a naturally-given, universal 
concept, but always backs up his theorisation with concrete examples to show 
how his theories “relate to people’s lived experiences” (Green, 2000, 9). The first 
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stage of subaltern development is regarded as a change in the economic sphere, 
which leads to the subordination of a particular group. Secondly, the subaltern 
group either conforms to the new social relations, or it attempts to change them 
by participating in political life. Thirdly, the dominant group creates institutions 
that are meant to control the subaltern classes. Fourthly, the subaltern group, upon 
realising that the current institutions do not represent its interests, forms its own 
institutions. Fifthly, the subaltern group forms a political organisation, such as a 
party, out of its existing institutions and attempts to participate in the political life 
of the state. Finally, the subaltern group realises that the politico-economic 
structures will always work against its interests and hence develops a different 
structure alongside a strategy to replace the old one (Gramsci, 1996, 91). 
Therefore, one can distinguish between different phases of subalternity. The 
Italian Communist Party that Gramsci co-founded thus represented the fifth phase 
of subaltern development, which completely negates Arnold’s depiction of the 
subaltern being necessarily political immature and ideologically primitive. 
Gramsci realises that subaltern groups in the early stages of development are very 
difficult to study, as they often have no recorded history. Often what is written on 
them was written through the lens of the dominant classes. In these narratives, the 
subaltern are usually depicted as subordinate, or perhaps as victims, which may 
reinforce their position of inferiority. Nevertheless, contemporary subaltern 
groups arguably leave far more traces of their activities, and Gramsci’s argument 
no longer applies as strongly as it once did. 
Gramsci’s ultimate purpose is however not to develop a theory of 
subalternity for its own sake. As he works in the spirit of historical materialism, 
Gramsci’s goal is to increase the self-awareness of subaltern classes to eventually 
rise to replace capitalism. Gramsci views historical analysis as the foundation of 
theory, which is in turn the foundation for societal change; he, therefore, views 
his ideas as a ‘philosophy of praxis’. After narrating the history of Italian subaltern 
classes, such as the peasantry, Gramsci thus emphasises that the development of 
socialism (or Communism as he would have said) depends firstly on the subaltern 
rise to self-awareness. Following that step, an alliance of the subaltern classes is 
needed (Gramsci, 1971, 349). He viewed the proletariat as the class with the 
largest potential for a hegemonic position within such an alliance, which may be 
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the origin of Spivak’s understanding of the subaltern as being synonymous with 
the proletariat (Spivak, 1988). Gramsci’s conceptualisation of subalternity thus 
clearly implies an emancipatory agenda. At the end of the emancipatory 
movement stands the creation of an “ethical state,” which “tends to put an end to 
the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally 
unitary social organism” (Gramsci, 1971, 259). Subalternity is therefore not a 
naturally given condition; in Gramsci’s vision of the ‘ethical state’, subalternity 
seizes to exist as no group exerts dominance over another. 
This has various implications for the study of the subaltern in the shape of 
irregular migrants in the EU. Migrants are a social group which is not necessarily 
always in a subaltern position. While Gramsci refers to early Italian emigrants as 
having become part of the dominant groups of the societies they joined, labour 
emigrants had “become incorporated in foreign nationalities in a subaltern role” 
(Gramsci, 1996, 104). Irregular migrants in the European Union may be 
considered to be a group that is in the first and second stages of subaltern 
development. They have no political rights, and thus no possibility to become 
involved in the political system. They lack political representation, except perhaps 
through refugee councils and other migrant NGOs; there is no particular political 
party that represents their interests. In many, if not most, instances, migrants do 
not speak the language of the destination country, which further excludes them 
from participation in civil society. They are fragmented, and the state reinforces 
this fragmentation by sorting them into different categories such as illegal 
immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, people benefitting from international or 
subsidiary protection, economic migrants, clandestinos or migrant workers. They 
are usually materially deprived, which forces them to earn money through low-
paid, illegal and sometimes degrading activities. They often have no documents, 
sometimes no citizenship, and they have no or limited access to the educational 
and healthcare facilities of the state. Much of what is written about them is written 
from the perspective of the hegemonic apparatus of the integral state itself. The 
criminalisation of irregular migrants on the one hand, and their victimisation on 
the other, both contribute to their further marginalisation and to the consolidation 
of their subaltern status. Therefore even the numerous reports of NGOs and other 
organisations ought to be viewed through a critical lens. 
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Neofunctionalism’s Subaltern: ‘Exogenous Factors’ 
 
Although neofunctionalism is uninterested in the subaltern, it has its own means 
of labelling subaltern groups it considers relevant to the trajectory of European 
integration. This is best understood through Schmitter’s ‘exogenous factors’ that 
previously featured in this thesis in relation to the ‘hypothesis of increasing mutual 
determination’ (Schmitter, 1971). The term constitutes a largely undefined, 
positivist black box that is employed to variously refer to the “external 
environment,” the “international system,” and “disintegrative force[s]” 
(Niemann, 2006, 22). In this section, the use of the term “exogenous factors” in 
the neofunctionalist literature will be surveyed to delineate the concept as clearly 
as possible. It will then be shown how neofunctionalist migration policy has 
contributed to the construction of Fortress Europe, as the presence of exogenous 
factors is considered undesirable to the progress of European integration. 
Furthermore, neoliberal neofunctionalism contributes to the construction of 
exogenous factors in the shape of subaltern migrants through its technocratic 
trajectory of European integration and its marginalisation of alternative visions. 
These conclusions can then be used to contextualise migrants’ experience of 
European integration. 
One of the major critiques that have historically been launched at 
neofunctionalism is its tendency to regard European integration in isolation from 
the environment outside its participant states (e.g. George, 1991). The theory’s 
attempt to deal with this environment has resulted in the formulation of the very 
vague category of ‘exogenous factors’.26 Often, this term is used interchangeably 
with ‘external actors’, ‘external variables’, the ‘global context’ or the ‘external 
environment’, presumably in an attempt to be less repetitive (Niemann, 2006; 
Schmitter, 1971). This imprecise terminology itself reflects the lack of clarity that 
the concept possesses. While the word ‘actors’ denotes acting individuals or 
groups (agents), ‘context’ and ‘environment’ refer to particular situations that are 
outside individual control (structures). To clarify what is meant, it is necessary to 
                                                          
26 The word ‘exogenous’ is of Greek origin. The Greek exo means ‘outside’, and genes refers to 
being ‘born of’ something, or being ‘produced by’ something. Exogenous thus means ‘being 
produced by the outside’. Factor in turn stems from Latin factor, which refers to ‘doer’ or ‘maker’ 
(cf. to facilitate). Etymologically very closely related is the noun ‘fact’, which entered the English 
language in the 1530s to refer to an ‘evil deed’. 
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assess how different authors have used the concept, and to which situations it 
refers in the wide array of neofunctionalist literature. 
 Joseph Nye refers to “dramatic changes in leadership as an exogenous 
variable” (1970, 803). He furthermore refers to exogenous factors when he 
attempts to determine under what circumstances actors begin to see the 
integration process as having adverse effects on them, and to evaluate how these 
actors will be able to negatively impact the integration process (ibid., 811). The 
‘background conditions’ that provide the soil for regional integration attempts are 
regarded as “largely determined by exogenous factors” (ibid., 812). Later on, 
external actors as well as the structural and perceptual conditions in which 
regional integration takes place, are labelled ‘exogenous factors’ (ibid., 827). Nye’s 
use of the term thus reflects the imprecision that was pointed out earlier. Cobham 
(1989) uses the term to refer to the conditions that allowed for the temporary 
success of the European Monetary System in the 1980s. He labels “dollar 
weakness” as well as “inflation” as exogenous factors (ibid., 210). In an attempt 
to show how neofunctionalism can be subsumed under the broader category of 
interdependency theory, Hix is somewhat more precise in his definition, listing 
“economic growth and multinational economic interdependence, international 
defence and security interdependence [and] the continued salience of 
nationalism” as exogenous factors (1994, 5). However, apart from these general 
phenomena he also refers to the “unpredictable actions of national leaders,” thus 
making clear that individuals within the EU itself can also form exogenous factors, 
as they fall outside the framework of the theory (ibid.). Nevertheless, explicit 
references to individual actors are rare, and if exogenous factors are mentioned at 
all, broad structural phenomena are referred to and analysis is kept shallow. It is 
to be expected of a reductionist and positivist theory that references to variables 
outside its framework of analysis are rare or absent. Indeed, as the hypothesis of 
increasing mutual determination shows, exogenous factors are a very undesirable 
factor for neofunctionalist analysis. In fact, Schmitter admits that if the influence 
of exogenous factors is high, neofunctionalism will at best be a very poor predictor 
of integrative dynamics (1971, 244). Exogenous factors will not necessarily slow 
integration down, but as the externalisation hypothesis shows, their presence will 
increase the likelihood that “disintegrative strategies are adopted” (ibid.). The 
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presence of exogenous factors may thus be considered as the great 
neofunctionalist undesirable. 
 According to the neofunctionalist vision the presence of exogenous factors 
is detrimental to the progress of European integration. Thus one of the main 
reasons for the construction of Fortress Europe can be identified. It was shown in 
Chapter 1 that the arrival of asylum seekers into the EU has had a significant 
impact on the development of the European asylum institutions. Therefore 
asylum seekers, and migrants as a wider group, clearly form exogenous factors. It 
is assumed that the economic stability that European integration requires to 
proceed would potentially be jeopardised by the large-scale arrival of unwanted 
migrants, which is why the presence of these exogenous factors ought to be 
prevented. It is furthermore supposed that the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice must be protected from such potentially disturbing influences (Ries, 2010). 
While the neofunctionalist literature, with its tendency to ‘phenomenalise’, would 
regard ‘migration’ itself as an exogenous factor, it is noteworthy that migration is 
very much unlike inflation, currency exchange rates, economic growth or 
nationalism. After all the term ‘migration’ refers to movement of large groups of 
people across the earth. Therefore it is not an abstract phenomenon like 
interdependence that forms an exogenous factor here; the exogenous factors are 
real human beings of flesh and blood. In turn, the arrival of these human beings 
in the EU has potentially adverse effects to the success of European integration.  
Yet, as I argue here, neofunctionalism marginalises and weakens migrants; 
if migrants instead were to be conceived of as a subaltern group, this would 
reframe this group as possessing transformative powers. Indeed, the measures that 
the integral state has taken to keep the influx of migrants into the EU as low as 
possible potentially underlines the transformative power that this subaltern group 
actually possesses to change the trajectory of European integration. 
 It is ironic that neofunctionalist European integration, in its attempt to 
banish exogenous factors from the EU, has itself produced such exogenous 
factors. Neoliberalism favours a European system that concentrates capital within 
the financial and industrial institutions of the ruling classes. Technocracy and the 
existing migration legislation of the European Commission create distance 
between government and migrants. The more alienated a group is, the less 
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“predictable” it becomes, and the stronger is its impact as an exogenous factor 
(Hix, 1994, 5). As a result, exogenous factors actually become more of a threat to 
the neofunctionalist vision of European integration. The attempt to normalise 
neofunctionalism in public discourse by portraying the particular trajectory that 
European integration has taken as inevitable and irreversible furthermore 
marginalises alternative visions for Europe. This depoliticisation contributes 
towards rendering large parts of the population politically fatigued. Irregular 
migrants, with their lack of familiarity with the European institutions, will be 
especially affected by this incapacitation. However, the ideological incoherence 
that is thus generated also increases the unpredictability of these subaltern groups, 
highlighting the threat that they pose to the neofunctionalist European integration 
process. 
 
 
Producing Subalternity 
 
When neofunctionalism is put into practice, its ontology can produce and 
perpetuate subalternity by means of several mechanisms, three of which will be 
discussed here in some detail. Firstly, commodification refers to the process 
whereby objects are turned into and treated as though they were commodities. 
Marx points out that the commodification of human beings (and thus also of 
migrants) is one of the underlying fallacies of capitalism (Marx, 1964), which is 
highlighted by Polanyi’s notion of fictitious commodities (1944). Reification is the 
tendency for social relations within capitalism to resemble relations between 
things (Lucács, 1968). Biopolitics, finally, refers to the political management of 
the human body (Foucault, 1979). The relevance of the three concepts will be 
elaborated on, and their relationship with neofunctionalism will be explained. 
 
 
Commodification 
 
Karl Marx identified that within the capitalist system labour is treated as though 
it were a commodity like any other (cf. Jessop, 2000). When demand for it rises, 
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and unemployment decreases, wages increase. When demand falls and 
unemployment increases, wages are expected to decrease. Labour is subject to the 
dynamics of the supposedly self-regulating market in the typical supply and 
demand fashion. In Marx’s own words, “labour produces not only commodities: 
it produces itself and the worker as a commodity – and this in the same general 
proportion in which it produces commodities” (Marx, 1964, 107). Tolman defines 
labour here as a complex of three related parts: the worker, his labour power, and 
the product he makes. The product is clearly a commodity, as is labour power, for 
this is what the capitalist purchases through wages. However, Marx furthermore 
argues that through employing labour power in exchange for wages, the worker 
commodifies himself. Marx describes the state whereby relations between human 
beings resemble relations with commodities as commodity fetishism (Geras, 
1990). Given this premise, Jessop further argues that the essential contradiction of 
capitalism and any class-based mode of production is that the “increasing 
socialisation of productive forces” is accompanied by “private control of the 
means of production” (2000, 64). This estrangement of the worker from the object 
of his work results in alienation on three levels. Firstly, the worker is alienated from 
the object he produces. Although he has made it, it belongs to the capitalist. 
Secondly, labour is alienated from its product, which is labour power. This is 
similarly because the capitalist has purchased this labour power, turning it into 
her property. Tolman argues that the third aspect, alienation from self, occurs 
because the production of the worker as a commodity is so utterly contrary to 
human nature that it leads to self-alienation. 
In The Great Transformation the political economist Karl Polanyi elaborates 
on Marx’s theory of commodification (1944). He defines commodities as objects 
used for sale on the market, whose prices in turn are determined by the difference 
between the cost of production and the prices of the goods produced. Labour, land 
and money are commonly regarded and traded as commodities, which Polanyi 
regards as a fundamental fallacy. He points out that “the alleged commodity ‘labor 
power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, 
without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this 
peculiar commodity” (ibid., 73). Alongside land and money, which are similarly 
not produced, labour is a fictitious commodity, the belief in which forms one of the 
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organising principles of the market. With the greater sophistication of technology 
and machinery, industry became increasingly interdependent, requiring the 
safeguarding of all its elements. Polanyi regards this development to be the origin 
of the commodity fiction. 
 Neofunctionalist integration theory was involved in the gradual 
construction of the single European labour and capital market through the 
application of the Monnet method. The commodification of labour was thus 
reinforced through the introduction of labour mobility which was an essential 
aspect of the Treaty of Rome. Particularly with the enlargement of the European 
Union to Central and Eastern Europe, Western European labour became 
increasingly subject to wage pressure. The transnationalisation of the labour 
market, as well as the relocation of production to the new member states further 
embedded labour commodification. European immigration creates a labour 
supply from outside the framework of the state apparatus, offering only limited 
labour market protection. The commodification of this new labour source is an 
important aspect of understanding the political economy of European migration 
management. Irregular migrants are particularly affected by the estrangement 
from self that is inherent to the process of commodification. The loss of identity 
that accompanies irregular migration and its reduction to ‘otherness’ make this 
group particularly vulnerable to the acquisition of an identity that is based around 
its use-value as labour power. It could be assumed that this may assist irregular 
migrants in overcoming their state of subalternity by merging with the labour 
class. However, many irregular migrants (e.g. clandestinos or asylum seekers 
without a work permit) form a subcategory of labour which places it outside 
labour’s institutional apparatus. Furthermore, the existence of a large irregular 
labour market that is often fed by irregular migrants undermines opportunities for 
this group to associate with organised labour. If asylum seekers were excluded 
from minimum wage arrangements, the link between irregular migrants and 
labour institutions like trade unions would be further weakened, entrenching these 
migrants in the early stages of subalternity. 
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Reification 
 
Although reification is related to commodification, the concept places greater 
emphasis on the totality of the capitalist relations of production, furthermore 
having different analytical applications. György Lukács describes reification (i.e. 
becoming a ‘thing’) as the tendency of social relations under the capitalist mode 
of production to assume the character of relations between lifeless ‘things’ (1968). 
During commodity exchange, reification takes place on three levels: (1) the objects 
of exchange are valuable only in terms of their potentially utilizable qualities; (2) 
the exchange partner is viewed merely as the ‘object’ of a profitable exchange; (3) 
one’s own qualities and attributes are reduced to their potential economic 
usefulness. All three elements of the trinity of self, other and commodity are thus 
turned into ‘things’. The commodity is stripped bare of the love that was invested 
in its manufacture. The other is seen only in terms of his potential to facilitate an 
exchange. The self is deprived of its intrinsic value. Lukács posits that the practice 
of reification has such a powerful impact on the human being that the mindset it 
requires becomes ‘second nature’. It is transferred from the realm of exchange 
towards all other areas of life; thus all social interaction becomes reified, assuming 
the character of exchange relations. 
Axel Honneth (2005) points towards three potential reasons for why 
reification is problematic. Firstly, reification could be regarded as a corrupted 
form of human practice because it represents an epistemological error. The wrong 
category is chosen for interacting with other human beings, which are not things 
but persons. Honneth refutes this argument by pointing to the depth to which 
reification has impacted human behaviour under capitalism. An epistemological 
error can be corrected, but reification cannot simply be exorcised by pointing out 
that an incorrect category has been engaged for navigating through social 
interactions. Secondly, reification could be said to form a type of practice that is 
morally corrupt (Nussbaum, 2002). Honneth admits that Lukács maintains a 
normative character during his extrapolations on reification, arguing nevertheless 
that Lukács’s intention was not to point out reification’s immorality. It would 
require intent to make ethical considerations relevant to reification. The 
instinctiveness of reified social practice demonstrates that subjective intent is 
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absent. Honneth thus points to the third, and in his opinion correct interpretation. 
Reification represents neither epistemological nor moral erroneousness, but ought 
to be thought of as a fallacious form of practice in its totality. The lethargic, merely 
observing behaviour of reification is portrayed to be in violation of an original, 
empathetic, “better form of human practice” (Honneth, 2005, 25). 
 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it is possible to define Honneth’s 
hypothetical ‘better form of human practice’ without reference to moral concepts. 
During his attempt to develop such a definition, Honneth points to places in 
Lukács’s text where the latter speaks of the subject as an empathetic and 
cooperative being, which appreciates other people for their unique qualities. 
Honneth is unable to reconstruct the original, uncorrupted form of human practice 
without referring back to morality. His emphasis on empathy is a striking example 
of the use of moral language, as empathy is the principle characteristic required 
for the practice of the Golden Rule which finds its expressions in all cultures.27 
Furthermore, the argument that reification contains no moral dimension because 
of the absence of subjective intent ignores that a phenomenon can certainly be 
morally critiqued on when it produces immoral or amoral behaviour. Reification 
produces both. While it is not inherently immoral, it is amoral and therefore 
unethical. Nevertheless, Honneth correctly points out that Lukács’s assumption 
that reification is solely the result of the expansion of exchange relations to all 
aspects of life is problematic (2005, 28). While this development is certainly one 
of the most important causes of the tendency towards reification, it is not an 
inevitable nor unique cause. Technocratic governance as manifest in 
neofunctionalist European integration has contributed significantly to the 
reification of social relations. This applies in particular within the realm of 
migration management, where ‘migrant flows’ are managed and computed with 
no reference to the individual human beings of which these flows consist. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 The Golden Rule is an ethical principle based on the idea that a person should treat others like 
she would want to be treated herself. Alternatively it can be formulated negatively, that a person 
should not treat others in ways she would not want to be treated herself. 
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Biopolitics 
 
While reification in the context of migration management refers to the treatment 
of human beings as though they were things, biopolitics refers to the political 
control of the human body – it thus contains an element of reification. Foucault 
understood biopolitics to concern what “brought life and its mechanisms into the 
realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of 
transformation of human life” (1979, 143). For Foucault, the management of 
human biological existence was an essential aspect of the consolidation of 
capitalism, as the human body is the vehicle through which labour is performed 
(Lemke, 2005). The advent of modernity coincided with the advent of biopolitics, 
and an intricate link is portrayed between the protection of life and the Nazi death 
camps. The establishment of secular human rights protects life only insofar as it is 
considered to be human. Life deprived of its humanity can thus be said to fall into 
an animal state. To highlight the severity and violence associated with biopolitics, 
it is useful to consider the process of secularisation which is closely related to the 
modern practice of biopolitics, whereby political life was ‘disenchanted’ of the 
spiritual. The Genesis account of creation describes how both animals and Adam, 
the prototypical human being, were endowed with nefeš ḥayah, the life spirit. As 
Adam was created in the image of the Creator, he was also given ruaḥ, the 
immortal soul. During secularisation, disenchantment and the embedding of 
human rights, ruaḥ has been replaced by the abstract notion of human dignity, 
which is however no longer intrinsic to every human being, but limited to 
particular geographical spaces. Modernity has reduced the human being to nefeš 
ḥayah, the biological life shared with animals. The extraction of the immortal soul 
is followed by the reification of the self; “‘humanity’ is killing both of them – and 
perhaps committing suicide into the bargain” (Lefebvre, 1991, 71). This is highly 
relevant for understanding the motivations for migration, as spiritual 
disenchantment leaves physical desires victorious, not because the spirit is 
vanquished, but because it is no longer believed to exist (cf. Galatians 6, 8). What 
remains is only the pursuit of bodily, material desires. Indeed, the search for 
physical and material security is the primary causes for millions of migrants to 
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settle in Europe, who in their subaltern state imitate the values of the dominant 
class. 
 Although biopolitics is clearly of great relevance to the study of migration 
management, the compatibility of this concept with Marxist and neo-Gramscian 
analysis has been put into question. Olssen (2004) for example argues that 
although the Foucauldian account of history bears striking similarities with 
Marxism, the differences between the two approaches are fundamental. While 
both regard social relations and practices as transitory, Foucault rejects Marx’s 
historical determinism and the understanding of history and society as a unified 
totality. Furthermore, at different times, Foucault was very critical of the Marxian 
reduction of the state to the task of managing productive relations, the 
overemphasis on class, or the lacking interest in the materiality of the body 
(Jessop, 2007, 141). Nevertheless, Foucault also discussed capitalism’s 
exploitation of the human body and time, transforming them into labour power 
and labour time. This led some authors to argue that Foucault had moved towards 
a tactical alliance with Marxism, as the “convergence of the analyses and concepts 
taken from Marx [became] more and more significant” (Balibar, 1992, 53). Nikos 
Poulantzas, who was a contemporary of Foucault, criticised the latter’s notion of 
biopolitics on the grounds that it “ignores the state’s real foundations in capitalist 
relations of production and class struggle” (Jessop, 2007, 145). Jessop however 
points out that later lectures at “the Collège de France did consider how these 
practices [of biopolitics] came to serve capital and the modern state” (ibid., 146). 
This highlights that Marxism and Foucault are in fact not altogether incompatible, 
but that particular aspects of Foucault’s work, such as biopolitics, can in indeed 
be incorporated into Marxist theory. 
 Biopolitics is inevitably an aspect of any technocratic vision of governance 
such as neofunctionalism. As the body is the agent of human action, the 
maintenance of power structures necessarily requires the management of the 
human body. This applies in particular to capitalist relations of production, where 
the human body possesses the labour power that is required for production and 
ultimately capital accumulation. Technocracy, with its amoral target of finding 
the optimal method for the fulfilment of human needs, tends towards negating the 
idea that the human body is inviolable if a violation is important for the physical 
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and physiological safety of the majority. In the context of European migration 
management, biopolitics finds its most vivid manifestations in the treatment of 
irregular migrants when they first enter the European Union, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a review of the use of the term ‘subalternity’, 
contextualising its meaning using Gramsci’s writings. The interpretation that 
subalternity is merely a synonym for inferiority, and that the term is used to refer 
to the Italian peasantry, has been shown to be inconsistent with Gramsci’s 
emancipatory research agenda. Gramsci’s conception of the different stages of 
subalternity provides an insightful framework for understanding subaltern 
development, and for revealing the obstacles that stand in its way. Furthermore, 
it was demonstrated how neofunctionalism refers to the subaltern in its own 
theoretical framework. So-called ‘exogenous factors’, including subaltern groups, 
have played a significant role in the history of European integration. 
Three ways by which neofunctionalist integration reinforces subalternity 
have been outlined to be referred to in later chapters: commodification, reification 
and biopolitics. While these three phenomena are distinct, they are nevertheless 
related and produce one another. Commodification produces reification, because 
it treats the worker as though he was a part of a company’s inventory. However, 
commodification is also dependent on a reified notion of human life. Biopolitics 
in turn produces reification, because it reduces a human being to his body. 
However, like commodification its practice depends upon a reified view of human 
life. All three phenomena consolidate the subaltern condition. It is high time for 
critical European integration scholarship to rediscover the subaltern, if its purpose 
is to change the course of the European Union. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Design 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to translate the ontological, epistemological and 
theoretical extrapolations of the previous two chapters into an articulation of a 
clear methodology. Neofunctionalism as the most important theoretical 
conceptualisation of European integration in general and European migration 
management in particular is unsatisfactory – in fact, neofunctionalism is arguably 
not merely a positivistic theory but a political ideology. Given the critical 
underpinnings of this dissertation calling as such for the contextualisation of 
ideological practices in capitalism, one must therefore ask the question: what is 
the social purpose of neofunctionalist European integration? This fundamental 
question can be approached by investigating migrants’ experience of European 
integration, which will permit for an inference from the concrete to the abstract in 
the manner proposed by Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Nevertheless, from very early on Grounded Theory has been riddled with 
controversy concerning the extent to which it permits previously held beliefs to 
impact theory development (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, recently, 
Grounded Theory has in part moved away from the positivist underpinnings it 
originally had. Critical Grounded Theory’s (CGT) embrace of critical realism 
makes it the appropriate methodological framework for a research practice that is 
strongly informed by existing ontology, epistemology and mid-range theory 
(Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). The justification of this approach will form the first part 
of this chapter, which will also clarify why it was necessary to discuss previously 
held assumptions. 
 The second part of this chapter will deliberate the way that the research 
problem at hand can be tackled in practice. For this purpose, it ought to be clearly 
stated why migration is a potential critical case study for understanding the social 
purpose of European integration, which is in part inspired by neofunctionalism. 
This section will draw primarily on the work of Bent Flyvbjerg on case study 
research (2006). Thereupon this dissertation’s research design will be outlined in 
accordance with the two phases of field research that delivered the empirical basis 
of this dissertation. For both the exploratory and the main fieldwork, the sampling 
procedure and the interview procedure will be outlined and justified. Particularly 
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during the main fieldwork, there were significant deviations from the original 
research design. This was due to practical difficulties in the field, particularly with 
respect to the recruitment process. The majority of participants were recruited in 
site. A focus will also be placed on the ethical issues that arose out of research 
with irregular migrants. 
 
 
Critical Grounded Theory 
 
This section will outline Critical Grounded Theory as an appropriate 
methodology for the operationalisation of this dissertation’s research agenda. It 
allows for theory-building that is founded upon data derived from field work and 
interviews, thus linking the macro with the micro-level and the abstract with the 
concrete. Its critical realist ontology in turn negates naïve claims about research 
neutrality and permits a conceptualisation of the role of previously held theories 
in the research process. To clarify what exactly is meant by CGT, its intellectual 
lineage will now be traced back to grounded theory itself as well as to critical 
realism and critical theory. 
 
 
The Origins of Critical Grounded Theory 
 
The grounded theory method (GTM) was developed as a qualitative research 
method for theory-building that was meant to make the methods of qualitative 
investigation visible and replicable (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) were dissatisfied by the inferior status that was attributed to qualitative 
research, thus wanting to supply a method that would qualitatively produce results 
that are just as strong and reliable as those produced by mass surveys. Bryant and 
Charmaz thus argue that one of the key strengths of GTM is that it “offers a 
foundation for rendering the processes and procedures of qualitative investigation 
visible, comprehensible, and replicable” (2007, 33). GTM systematises the process 
of theory generation, which takes place primarily through ‘coding’. This rests 
upon the premise that theories can be inductively derived from a textual dataset. 
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Coding takes place by assigning categories to a piece of text, such as an interview 
transcript or a field memo (cf. open coding). Here, it is claimed that it is very 
important at this stage of the theorisation process not to allow previously held 
assumptions to influence the coding process. Glaser and Strauss condemn the 
notion of ‘forcing’ one’s ideas onto the data, arguing that no literature review 
should be conducted before field research (1967). Using the technique of 
theoretical sampling, codes are “corrected, trimmed, and continually fitted to the 
data,” and instances are located that allow for theory-construction (Breckenridge 
& Jones, 2009). At all stages the researcher ought to write memos to demonstrate 
why particular categories were chosen over others, and for what reasons links 
were established. Memos and codes are sorted and placed in relation to the overall 
phenomenon studied – this is how a grounded theory develops. It seeks to show 
how a category stands in relation to the phenomenon the researcher is interested 
in (Randall & Mello, 2012, 872). It is worth mentioning that the logical process 
involved in coding is induction. While the grounded theory thus developed has an 
arguably perfect fit with the data it is based upon, it is rather unlikely to apply to 
other cases. This is because it is at best problematic to arrive at general conclusions 
from a limited number of cases, which is however inherent to inductive logic. 
Furthermore, it is quite clear that while the coding process may be replicable, 
researchers operating independently from one another may reach quite different 
results. 
Nevertheless, GTM, as it was originally developed, rests firmly within the 
positivist approach to social science. The title of the founding text The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory is representative of the belief in an objective reality waiting to be 
‘discovered’ (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). GTM’s naïve 
realism is especially manifest in its assumption that theory can be reconstructed 
from only the data without requiring inference by the theorist. As was discussed 
in Chapter 1, the seemingly algorithmic automaticity that is meant to characterise 
the positivist theorisation process is deeply problematic. As in natural scientific 
theories, positivist grounded theories are meant to enable the prediction of the 
behaviour of a system without necessarily understanding its purpose (cf. Hollis & 
Smith, 1991). This arguably misses the point, being a task that may equally be 
carried out by a computer that has no sense of meaning. 
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As has already been implied, the theorists’ own ontological, 
epistemological and mid-range theoretical assumptions are likely to have a strong 
impact on the production of grounded theory. This is the result of the coding 
process – there is no method to guarantee that two researchers will independently 
come up with the same categories. As a result new generations of grounded 
theorists have opened up to constructivism (e.g. Clarke & Friese, 2007). However, 
it ought to be stated that the inherent subjectivity of the GTM was already alluded 
to in its earliest formulations. Anselm Strauss’ background in symbolic 
interactionism and ethnographic field research meant that he was aware of the 
fact that researchers’ beliefs and assumptions necessarily have an impact on the 
theorisation process. In an early essay titled Mirrors and Masks, Strauss emphasises 
that “classifications are not in the object; an object gets classified from some 
perspective” (1959/1969, 48). In Glaser and Strauss’ study of dying patients, the 
authors were acutely aware of the extent to which the interviewees’ previous 
experience influenced their narratives (1967). Seemingly against all intuition, the 
authors themselves pretended to be immune to the phenomenon of theoretically 
informed story-reconstruction (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). 
As the previous paragraph illustrates, the foundations for Strauss’ 
reorientation of GTM towards social constructivism were already laid in his 
previous work. His divergence from Glaser finally took place via his collaboration 
with Juliet Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Therein the two authors develop the 
coding procedure into a direction that clearly allows for greater subjectivity. In 
addition to open coding, which is maintained, Strauss and Corbin introduce axial 
and selective coding. Axial coding is meant to establish links between coding 
categories that were established using open coding “by utilizing a coding 
paradigm involving conditions, context, action/interactional strategies and 
consequences” (ibid., 96). Selective coding then seeks to develop a core category 
that includes all previously developed categories. No method is in place that 
guarantees that researchers operating independently from one another will carry 
out these procedures in an identical manner, making clear that any grounded 
theory thus arrived at is the product of the researchers’ own perspective and 
preferences. Strauss’s move thus opened grounded theory up to constructivism (cf. 
Charmaz, 2006). Noteworthy in this regard is also the work of Robert Thornberg, 
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who argues that the original GTM’s “naïve empiricism fails to recognize the 
embeddedness of the researcher within an historical, ideological and socio-
cultural context” (2012, 246). He thus emphasises that it is desirable to carry out 
a literature review before carrying out research, as it “implies a loss of knowledge” 
to ignore established theories (ibid., 245). The Straussian move also permitted 
postmodernist streams of thought to embrace GTM (Clarke, 2008). Lyotard 
defines postmodernity as “incredulity towards metanarratives” (1979, xxiv). The 
ontological relativism that is inherent to postmodernism led Clarke to reject 
comprehensive social theories and to embrace ‘situational analysis’ (Belfrage & 
Hauf, 2015). With an implicit reference to Strauss, Clarke argues that her social 
research is “based in the pragmatist soil that has historically nurtured symbolic 
interactionism and grounded theory” (Clarke, 2003). 
Nevertheless, if GTM is meant to be employed for the generation of critical 
theory, both constructivism and postmodernism are evidently ill-suited. The 
ontological nihilism expressed by postmodernism and the “theoretical 
agnosticism” (Thornberg, 2012, 250) inherent to constructivism make both 
schools incompatible with critical theory’s commitment to human emancipation. 
The beliefs that the subordination of particular groups of human beings ought to 
be overcome and that social science ought to contribute to this are expressions 
neither of relativism nor of agnosticism. Despite this incompatibility, the 
Straussian turn and its descendants have enabled the development of Critical 
Grounded Theory (CGT) by allowing for the methodological possibility of 
critically reworking GTM. 
As Belfrage and Hauf point out, the infusion of grounded theory with 
critical realism constitutes one of the first steps towards the generation of CGT.28 
As opposed to constructivism, as put forward by Charmaz (2006) and Thornberg 
(2006), critical realism asserts that there is an independent, objective reality, and 
that it is one of the goals of science and social research to approximate that reality. 
Hence not all truths are equally valid (Bhaskar, 1986). Both constructivists and 
                                                          
28 As Bhaskar and Callinicos (2007) and Jessop (2001) argue, historical materialism and critical 
realism are compatible. Critical realism has for example an emancipatory purpose that is shared 
with Marxism. Nevertheless, it may seem contradictory that historical materialism acknowledges 
the existence ‘laws’ while at the same time being critical realist. However, historical materialist 
‘laws’ are doubly tendential; they are both specific to capitalism itself as well as to specific power 
relations and institutional configurations (Jessop & Sum, 2006). 
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critical realists regard theoretical explanations as “provisional” (ibid., 253) and 
“tentative” (Oliver, 2012, 375). However, it is crucial to understand that while 
constructivists view our understanding of reality to be discursively created, critical 
realists believe it to be an interpretation of an underlying mind-independent truth 
(Mir & Watson, 2001, 1169). Bhaskar (1986) differentiates between three different 
domains: the empirical domain, the actual domain and the real domain. The 
empirical domain refers to what we experience; the actual domain refers to what 
happens, whether we experience it or not, and the real domain refers to the 
generative structures behind what happens. For critical realists, the purpose of 
research is to investigate the real domain, which can be done by inferring from the 
experiences of other people. Critical realism nevertheless concedes that our 
perception of reality is inevitably theoretically informed. It relies upon the 
reasoning-principle of retroduction which is a “mode of inference in which events 
are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them” (Sayer, 1992, 107). While most theories and hypotheses are 
arrived at through inductive reasoning, and while our pre-conceptions of the field 
are probably arrived at through deductive reasoning, retroduction challenges 
existing conclusions by inquiring into the conditions/generative mechanisms that 
make a particular phenomenon possible (Easton, 2010, 123; Belfrage & Hauf, 
2015; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Inductively produced existing theories therefore 
do provide guidelines for initial qualitative or quantitative research, but rather 
than being tested for their validity they are exposed to the reality of the field. In 
the specific retroductive reasoning process however the researcher will then 
consider alternative explanations for explaining the phenomena at hand. This 
ensures the maintenance of a constant conversation between the abstract and the 
concrete which can bring about: the emergence of new conceptualisations; the 
refinement of previous concepts; the alteration of current explanations; and, to the 
reconstruction of existing theories (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). These principles and 
assumptions are translated into a wide range of methodological considerations 
which will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
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Figure 3: The retroductive research process of CGT (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015) 
While critical realism provides the epistemological and ontological 
foundation of CGT, critical theory informs the latter’s overall research agenda. 
CGT accepts that all theory in the social sciences serves some purpose, embracing 
the normative status and emancipatory purpose of critical theory (cf. Cox, 1981). 
In this context, possessing an emancipatory research agenda implies being an 
active part of societal transformation, for example by pointing out and increasing 
the awareness of the structural causes behind social problems and injustices. This 
move is in line with critical realism as outlined above (Collier, 1994, 182). As “our 
knowledge of the world is never theoretically innocent” (Jessop & Sum, 2006, 
305), a researcher neither enters the field nor evaluates data without being 
influenced by pre-existing theoretical assumptions. Similarly, theories in the social 
sciences always embody a social agenda. Critical theory’s morally rooted agenda 
stands in contrast to positivism, which aims at prediction and problem-solving. 
While positivist theories attempt to merely explain social phenomena, critical 
theories strive to explain and understand them (Bieler & Morton, 2001; also see 
Chapter 1 on positivism and the relationship between explaining and 
understanding). Critical theory and its related mid-range theories furthermore 
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have a strong impact on research design. If the purpose of this dissertation is to 
challenge neoliberal European integration and to alter irregular migrants’ 
subaltern condition, the bulk of the fieldwork should be carried out with the 
migrants themselves (Comstock, 1982, 373-9). Interviews with irregular 
migrations themselves become an intervention if a relationship is established in 
the interview between European integration and their everyday lives. 
Furthermore, neoliberalism can be challenged most effectively if the social 
exclusion and inequality it produces are understood. CGT’s rooting in critical 
theory makes it a suitable methodology for establishing the relationship between 
neoliberal capitalism and its concrete social consequences. However, this cannot 
be done without a comprehensive theory of society and fieldwork. Critical 
grounded theory permits for the coexistence and mutual enrichment of the 
abstract and the concrete (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). 
 
 
Critical Grounded Theory in Practice 
 
Critical grounded theory and the principle of retroduction stipulate a particular 
research process. Nevertheless, CGT is not a dogmatic methodology and 
represents a middle-ground between positivism and radical constructivism. As 
such, it can be expected that researchers relying on CGT may be using methods 
traditionally associated with both poles.29 This section is meant to discuss this 
process, which will serve to lay the groundwork for the chosen research design. 
Furthermore, as I will explain, the use of CGT makes for a structure of my 
dissertation placing this methodology chapter after the literature review. It will be 
highlighted that in this particular case, the use of CGT calls for this format. 
In GTM, initial research interests often emerge out of previous personal 
experiences. In the Appendix to Awareness of Dying (1965), which constitutes 
Glaser and Strauss’ first example of the GTM in practice, it states that Strauss’ 
struggle with the illness and death of his mother was an important influence in 
this work. The formulation of interests out of personal experiences, intuitions and 
                                                          
29 Quantitative analysis is usually associated with positivism, while qualitative research strategies 
are usually associated with constructivism. Nevertheless, no method belongs exclusively to one 
or the other camp, as traditional GTM demonstrates, which is both positivist and qualitative.  
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emotions is thus something that the GTM holds in common with CGT. 
Nevertheless, the critical underpinnings of CGT also encourage research agendas 
to arise out of subjectively defined social problems. This may thus in practice also 
be the case with GTM, but it is rarely acknowledged. Furthermore, as opposed to 
the grounded theory method, CGT encourages research into the area of interest 
before embarking upon fieldwork. Reviewing newspaper articles, policy briefs, 
official documents, legislative texts, video documentaries or podcasts is important 
for information gathering and for the acquisition of a deeper understanding of the 
problem at hand. As the next step, the academic literature available on the subject 
should be consulted. The approximations of reality derived from that literature 
can then be developed into initial theoretical conceptualisations which will 
thereupon be confronted with the reality of the field. It is crucial to emphasise that 
the way that this confrontation takes place is shaped by these conceptualisations, 
although they are not forced onto the findings. As discussed above, there are 
valuable insights to be gained from both the inductive and deductive moments in 
the research process. This does not only imply that a literature review ought to be 
carried out before field research takes place, but that this literature review should 
precede discussions of research design in an academic text. 
While the researcher’s refinement of her research question(s) through the 
consideration of proto-theories will privilege the choice of particular research 
methods, the retroductive principles of CGT call for research design to be left open 
to adaptations and alterations during the research process. Unlike CGT, a rigid 
research methodology has the purpose of eliminating the possibility that 
differences in procedure are responsible for the generation of differing outcomes. 
The ‘systematicity’ of such methods and the attempt to control for particular 
variables aims at the discovery of universal laws which is not the ambition of 
CGT. While a coherent research design is an important pre-requisite of good field 
research, it should be adjustable to the requirements arising. 
 Key differences between GTM and CGT become apparent through a 
discussion of interviews. This interview is often viewed as a conversation whose 
purpose is to gather information (e.g. Berg & Lune, 2011). This applies 
particularly if an interview is audio recorded, transcribed and thus turned into the 
textual data that is the ‘end product’ of field research (cf. Blommaert & Jie, 2010). 
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Indeed, it is tempting to embrace this treatment of interviews because the final 
product of research is also text. Researchers are used to quotations and feel 
uncomfortable with subjective descriptions and interpretations. Positivist 
grounded theory itself views the transcript as the basis of open coding. However, 
the reduction of interviews to transcripts is deeply problematic because many 
qualities of an interview are usually left out of transcripts. The relationship 
between the interviewer and the interviewee, the emotions encountered during the 
interview, the interview setting and the non-verbal interactions that take place in 
any interview situation are just four examples of phenomena that are rarely 
mentioned in transcripts. While transcription is a necessary aspect of most 
interview research, it tends towards de-contextualisation and reduction of 
complexity. Field notes (or memos) and photographs thus ought to complement 
transcripts and audio recordings to the largest extent possible. While memos form 
an important part of GTM in general, they are particularly important in the 
context of CGT, which sets itself the task of making the theorisation process 
involved in field research retraceable and honest. Memos and field notes allow the 
researcher to retrace discoveries and to look back at how critical grounded theory 
actually emerged. 
One of the most common attempts to categorise interviews is to describe 
them as structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Kvale, 2007). If the 
researcher’s purpose is to ‘control for’ a particular variable in order to find law-
like behavioural mechanisms (in accordance with a positivist, problem-solving 
approach), the structured interview is the way forward, as it emphasises strict 
adherence to the interview schedule. The semi-structured interview similarly calls 
for every question in the interview schedule to be asked, albeit permitting follow-
up questions. The unstructured interview is highly flexible, as it merely demands 
asking questions related to a set of pre-arranged themes. The latter approach 
allows for stark differences between interviews trying to appreciate specific 
phenomena as constitutive of ‘reality’ carried out as part of the same study. While 
CGT does not explicitly prohibit the use of structured interviews, it is nevertheless 
clear that they contradict the principles of retroduction and critical realism in a 
variety of ways. Firstly, there appears to be no meaningful way to employ 
structured interviews except for the purpose of finding law-like generative 
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mechanisms. Critical realism puts forward that we can only make estimations of 
mind-independent reality – the search for universal laws is in contradiction to the 
view that theory is necessarily historically specific and tentative. Laws can at best 
be tendential, as in historical materialism (see footnote 28). Secondly, the idea of 
retroduction requires flexibility in research design and practice. This is because 
research has to be responsive to the process of knowledge formation. If an 
interview schedule is inadequate to the experience of the field or no longer 
represents the researcher’s theorisation it can and ought to be changed. The 
rigidity of the structured interview leaves little space for such alterations. 
Therefore, the semi-structured and unstructured interview forms remain as the 
two preferable options for CGT research, as they enable a richer process of 
knowledge production. They allow the researcher to be flexible in the moment, 
responding to insights that may arise during the interview itself. 
Furthermore, theorisation often takes place during and in the immediate 
aftermath of an interview. Interviews are not necessarily merely conversations 
whose purpose is to acquire information, but highly subjective experiences. The 
experiences, emotions, intuitions and insights encountered during an interview 
and field research in general often serve the goal of setting and refining the 
research agenda. There may be important points that are ignored by the interview 
schedule which emerge during the course of the interview. Particularly emotional 
and sensitive topics may arise unexpectedly during the interview, requiring the 
researcher to respond accordingly. Retroduction not only allows for these 
considerations but actually encourages this process. The chaotic situation 
encountered in the field requires constant adaptations and readjustments in the 
interview schedule. This is because it is the very purpose of CGT to allow for 
“dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Ragin, 1994, 55). During the interview 
the abstract is confronted with the concrete. 
The retroductive principle has a significant impact on the coding 
procedure. Open coding assumes that the researcher is a clean slate and that 
theories are literally derived from just the data. The critical realist premises of 
CGT deny this possibility. Nevertheless, open coding can still be carried out, 
always remembering that the codes thus derived would not necessarily be 
developed by another researcher working with the same data and that the 
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questions asked in the interviews derive from initial conceptualisations. The 
categories that emerge when using this method can then be brought into dialogue 
with the categories of previously existing theories. One way of doing this is to look 
for equivalent categories within one’s theory of choice. It may thus happen that 
no equivalent category exists, requiring the formulation of new theories and the 
alteration of existing ones (although an existing theory may also turn out to be in 
line with the data). In this manner, the forcing of previously existing theories onto 
the data can be avoided. Nevertheless, a document may also be coded using the 
categories of existing theories. Mismatches between those existing categories and 
the text may still be identified and new theories developed. 
 
 
Research Agenda and Case Selection 
 
This section will explain the structure and methodology of this dissertation in the 
light of Critical Grounded Theory. It will be shown how the research agenda was 
formulated on the basis of my personal interests and of the literature review of 
grand and mid-range theories. Thereupon I will show how migration management 
was chosen as a critical case study to demonstrate the social consequences of 
neoliberal European integration and to understand the relationship between 
neoliberalism and neofunctionalism. 
 
 
Formulation of Research Agenda 
 
Glaser and Strauss’ research (1967) was based upon personal experience, and this 
PhD thesis certainly forms no exception to this tendency. Through my upbringing 
in East Germany, the gradual abolition of border controls and the introduction of 
the common currency I was confronted with the reality of European integration 
in a very concrete manner. Representing Malta at a European Council simulation 
on European migration policy generated a strong interest in the issue area and 
finally resulted in me writing my Bachelor dissertation on the impact of the Dublin 
II Regulation on the smallest EU member state. This interest was deepened 
through political activism in the area of asylum and migration, which resulted not 
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only in further motivation for the composition of a PhD thesis on this issue, but 
also in the selection of an emancipatory research agenda. Personal friendships 
with migrants and refugees in my home town contributed to my concern with the 
social exclusion of irregular migrants. Field research I carried out in Malta for my 
Bachelor thesis fostered the belief that this exclusion is related to European 
integration and to the Dublin Regulation in particular. I wanted to contribute to 
the creation of a counter-narrative against nationalist populism, which tended to 
frame irregular migration in terms of race and security while ignoring the inherent 
inequality of neoliberal European integration. 
 While I was always critical of neofunctionalism’s positivist underpinnings, 
I saw that there was an obvious fit between the neofunctionalist narrative of 
European integration and the legislative evolution of the European asylum 
system. This fit warranted for a closer examination of neofunctionalism as a proto 
theory which was carried out in Chapter 1. I found strong discursive similarities 
between European official documents and neofunctionalism, which prompted me 
to carry out key informant interviews with European Commission officials.30 
These interviews provided evidence for my initial pre-conceptualisation of 
neofunctionalism having been an influence on the European integration process. 
I saw the latter as related to the social exclusion of irregular migrants. 
 Neofunctionalism’s positivism, its lacking understanding of structural 
power, and its disregard for issues of social exclusion made an inappropriate 
framework for further analysis. I therefore consulted the critical literature on its 
own conceptualisations of European integration. The critical literature, rather 
than trying to merely explain European integration, focuses on the question of 
who benefits from the EU as it currently exists, and on why it produced inequality. 
The critical literature exhibited a focus on social purpose. Reading and reviewing 
this literature crystallised the research agenda and allowed me to see that if I 
wanted to understand the exclusion of irregular migrants within the context of 
European integration as influenced by neofunctionalism, I would have to address 
the question of social purpose. Chapter 2 thus identifies the consolidation of the 
position of transnational capital as the primary social purpose of the contemporary 
                                                          
30 Key informant interviews are carried with individuals possessing key insight into a particular 
community (Gilchrist,1992). 
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EU – nevertheless, several other aspects of the EU’s character remained obscure: 
what is the relationship between the condition of irregular migrants and European 
integration? The analysis of Gramsci’s writings as well as Chapter 3’s analysis of 
subalternity is meant to provide the theoretical tools for answering that question. 
Nevertheless, field research itself can provide insight into the mechanisms 
of social exclusion. The coding process of CGT as well as the theories outlined in 
Chapter 2 in turn permit for the contextualisation of these mechanisms within the 
European integration as informed by neofunctionalism (see Chapter 7). Critical 
theory’s emancipatory goals and the apparent over-simplification of the 
Gramscian concept of subalternity that one encounters in much of this literature 
furthermore calls for dialogue with subaltern groups, such as irregular migrants 
(Cornstock, 1982). This is further emphasised by the recent re-interpretation of 
Gramsci’s writings, which stresses human emancipation (e.g. Bruff, 2014; Horn, 
2011; Thomas, 2013; see Chapter 2). Field research can contribute to the 
achievement of emancipatory goals if it is used to allow the subaltern groups 
concerned to develop an improved understanding of their situation in relation to 
the political economy at large. It is hard to envisage how increased awareness can 
be created through academic literature – a blog, such as the one that I wrote during 
and following my field research, may be a much more effective and approachable 
method of dialogue. Other methods with emancipatory potential that I have used 
include the publication of articles in public media or giving public talks. 
 
 
Case Study Selection 
 
European integration is too broad a field to be studied and researched in its 
entirety within the scope of a PhD dissertation. A meaningful attempt to study the 
social purpose of European integration ought to necessarily limit itself to one 
particular aspect of the European project. In turn, a study of this particular aspect 
is meant to say something about European integration as a whole. The careful 
selection of this case study is therefore of crucial importance to achieving the goals 
of the research agenda. Before outlining why the management of irregular 
migration was chosen as the most relevant case study of European integration, it 
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will be explained by the single case method is a suitable approach to fulfilling the 
objectives of this dissertation. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) not only makes one of the most compelling cases for 
working with single case studies but also outlines how they should be chosen. 
While many authors (e.g. Campbell & Stanley, 1966) argue that case study 
research ought to be placed on the “methodological trash heap” (ibid., 220), 
Flyvbjerg puts forward that case study work is central to the human learning 
process (2001). He argues that in order to become an expert at a given task, it is 
not enough to study the practice of that task in a context-independent manner. 
Indeed, an expert is familiar with thousands of practical cases in their area of 
expertise. A person with no theory may thus be very good at performing a certain 
task if they have far-reaching experience, while they may be very bad at that task 
if they know the theory but lack experience. Case study research is thus essential 
in achieving expertise in a given subject, as it confronts theory with (subjective) 
reality. A similar point has been stressed by Yin, who argues that a single case 
study “allows investigators to focus on a ‘case’ and retain a holistic and real-world 
perspective” (Yin, 2014, 4). This real-world perspective can support an 
emancipatory agenda, as the qualitative, in-depth investigations that case study 
research tends to entail, may reflect the viewpoints of the subaltern groups (Feagin 
et al., 1991). 
The second point Flyvbjerg makes is that case studies are very good at 
producing particular, context-dependent theories. He emphasises that “social 
science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory;” 
particular theories are therefore the most promising avenue towards advancing our 
understanding of the social world (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 224). Individual problems can 
act as microcosms of larger phenomena. Nevertheless, it is often assumed that it 
is impossible to generalise from a single case study, as the conclusions that can be 
drawn from that case may not necessarily apply to all other cases in the same 
manner. While the critical realist foundations of this research do indeed preclude 
the making of strong and generalisable truth claims, the choice of the case study 
still aims at saying something about European integration in general. This does 
not negate the particularity and historical specificity of the conclusions drawn. 
Furthermore, as a physician can arrive at inferences about physical disorders 
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based on an inspection of their symptoms, a critical realist can draw some 
tendential conclusions on the structures of social systems based on a theoretically 
informed analysis of their manifestations. 
Flyvbjerg suggests the critical case as the most promising avenue for the 
making of ‘generalisations’. The critical case is one that has “strategic importance 
in relation to the general problem,” allowing for deductions such as, “if this is 
(not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases” (ibid., 230). Flyvbjerg 
discusses two types of critical cases, the ‘least likely’ case and the ‘most likely’ 
case. The ‘least likely’ case allows for the verification of propositions, assumptions 
and hypotheses. An example is Robert Michels’ study of oligarchy in 
organisations (1962). He argued that if an organisation with strong democratic 
ideals (i.e. that is ‘least likely’ to be oligarchical) exhibits signs of oligarchy, it 
implies that most organisations are oligarchical. The ‘most likely’ case in the other 
hand allows for falsification. It applies to case studies where all criteria for the 
fulfilment of a hypothesis are met, but which nevertheless strongly deviates from 
the hypothesis. The thesis follows this logic because asylum policy represents an 
area where the neofunctionalist hypotheses should apply. 
While case studies are rationalised using these criteria, the researcher’s 
intuition may play an important role in determining what constitutes a critical 
case. Flyvbjerg makes mention of this during his discussion of the paradigmatic 
case study, where he claims that “intuition may be the real, or most important, 
reason why the researcher wants to execute the project” (2006, 233). Although it 
is difficult to precisely define intuition, it is safe to say that intuition represents a 
subjective, rapid evaluative experience which is normally emotionally laden (see 
Weaver et al., 2014). The importance of intuition in case study research and 
Critical Grounded Theory as a whole cannot be understated. Indeed, it may be 
intuition which establishes subjective definitions of social problems and which 
plays the decisive role in the development of not merely case studies, but of 
preconceptualisations and theoretical elaborations. This applies particularly to 
research with vulnerable individuals such as irregular migrants, which is 
inherently more likely to be highly emotional and affective. Nevertheless, even if 
intuition is a crucial factor in the CGT process, every step of the way ought to be 
depicted in a traceable and logical manner to convince other researchers to draw 
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the same conclusions. Intuition ought to be justified and complemented by sound 
logic to construct a compelling argument. 
While CGT’s consideration of proto-theories aims at the generation of 
initial conceptualisations, these conceptualisations are often challenged by 
exposing them to the field. Case studies can be employed to generate grounded 
theory of the larger phenomenon in question if the case study selected is of critical 
importance for this phenomenon (e.g. Fernández, 2005). One method to find out 
which case study is of critical importance is to attempt to find a case on whose 
operation or failure a given phenomenon is dependent on – the weakest link 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). If this is accepted in relation to the topic of this dissertation, the 
question arises whether irregular migration management constitutes a critical case 
study, of whether the success or failure of European integration as a whole rests 
on migration management. I believe this to be the case for three primary reasons. 
Firstly, irregular migration, at least on a large scale, challenges the viability 
of the Schengen-system and thus of one of the cornerstones of the European 
project. The intergovernmental nature of the Dublin regime (see Chapter 1) is 
preferred to a European quota for the distribution of asylum seekers. This points 
to a lack of capability to deal with irregular migration at the supranational level. 
The Dublin regime should therefore hardly be seen as a genuinely European policy 
instrument. It does not advocate a European solution but protects national 
interests. Migration management, as the weakest link of European integration is 
further manifested in the contemporary public debate on the EU, which in no 
insignificant part focuses on the management of the ‘refugee crisis’. The 
mismanagement of the latter situation has become the raison d’être for europhobic 
neo-nationalist groups in many EU member states, the rise of which threatens the 
very survival of the European Union. 
Secondly, the most important objects of irregular migration management 
– irregular migrants – form a social group that should manifestly display the 
character of contemporary European integration. Irregular migrants form an 
extreme category of EU residents because they do not possess EU citizenship and 
are thus excluded from the most basic means of participation in the EU’s 
democratic institutions. They are often materially deprived, unfamiliar with local 
customs and culture, unable to speak the local language, ethnically distinct and 
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may be unaffiliated to any particular social group or organisation in the transition 
and host countries. Clandestinos are excluded from access to public services taken 
for granted by EU citizens such as medical care and education. They clearly form 
a social group in the European Union that exhibits obvious and numerous 
differences from the majority. They are some of the economically and politically 
weakest members of European society. Since they form such an extreme group, it 
is with them that the social purpose of European integration should become the 
most apparent. 
 Thirdly and finally, migration management represents a critical case study 
of European integration because the failure to integrate migrants into European 
society represents the failure of the EU as a civilisational project. After the horrors 
of World War Two, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 
part to prevent another European war, to reign in the destructive inclinations of 
nationalism and to turn (the Western part of) the continent into a peaceful and 
prosperous civilisation. The failure to integrate individual in a precarious situation 
dismantles this civilisational project and thus provides insight into the social 
purpose of European integration. 
In addition to these points, migration management is a suitable case study 
of neofunctionalist integration because it represents a policy area where the 
conditions for spillover are met in an especially powerful manner. There already 
exists a common border regime, a common visa policy, a common passport 
format, a common biometric database and a basic framework for the 
harmonisation of the 28 national asylum systems. A method to distribute asylum 
seekers across the Union in a proportional manner as well as the creation of a 
European asylum agency would be the obvious fulfilment of the neofunctionalist 
prophecy. If no ‘progress’ is made in this area, tremendous insight can be gained 
into the social purpose of neofunctionalist European integration. 
 
 
Research Design for Explorative Fieldwork 
 
This section is meant to outline the research design for the first phase of field 
research. The purpose of this phase was to understand the relationship between 
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policymakers in the European Commission and neofunctionalism through a series 
of semi-structured interviews. As such, they formed the explorative fieldwork 
carried out to substantiate the argument presented in Chapter 1, namely that 
neofunctionalism has in part shaped the recent European integration process. For 
this first phase, an emphasis will be placed on sampling procedure, interview 
procedure and evaluation procedure. 
It is important to state that during this research phase, it was planned to 
limit the study to the area of asylum policy. An asylum application is the most 
common way for non-EU citizens to gain a regular residency status that would 
permit them to remain on EU territory for an indeterminate period of time. It was 
only afterwards that it became clear that this limitation was in fact very 
obstructive, which is reflected in the scope of the main fieldwork. The primary 
reason for this alteration is that the boundaries between different categories of 
migrants (particularly asylum seekers, clandestinos and refugees) are extremely 
loose. As will be shown in Chapter 6, the dissociation of these groups from one 
another represents a significant obstacle to overcoming their subaltern condition. 
Through asserting the boundaries between asylum seekers, clandestinos and 
refugees, this dissociation would be reproduced. Nevertheless, despite this 
alteration in the research agenda, the results of the first phase of research remain 
relevant because they pertain to the relevance of neofunctionalism to European 
policymaking in general. 
 
 
Sampling Procedure 
 
Interviewees were selected using the European Commission staff database and 
advice from other researchers who had done similar research. Altogether, eight 
interviewees were contacted from the European Commission Directorate-General 
for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). DG HOME was chosen because 
it is the de facto ministry responsible for the area of migration. The European 
Commission represents the executive branch of the European institutions, which, 
according to neofunctionalist theory, pushes European integration forward. The 
Commission’s Directorate-Generals draft EU legislation and are involved in all 
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stages of the legislative process. Not only do they have a large impact on the 
outcomes of intra-institutional bargaining, but they also have the best overview of 
the policymaking process in its entirety. 
Contact was established using a letter in Portable Document Format 
(PDF) which was attached to an email sent to secretaries of relevant units within 
DG HOME. The letter asked European Commission officials whether they were 
willing to participate in a semi-structured interview on the history and evolution 
of the European asylum system that would last for approximately one hour. In 
every message, potential interviewees were asked whether they knew of any other 
relevant people that may be suitable for an interview, and if so, whether they could 
forward me their contact details. The recruitment procedure thus followed the 
snowballing technique (cf. Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). 
Using the above method, three interviewees were found. I was 
subsequently forwarded to another interviewee using the snowballing technique. 
To maintain anonymity, their names and positions will not be revealed, but it is 
fair to say that they played critical roles in relation to the research agenda. One 
interviewee was a former European Commissioner and, in fact, the interviewees 
matched the research agenda so well that further interviews with European 
Commission staff were considered unnecessary. 
 
 
Interview Procedure 
 
The semi-structured interviews followed a schedule that had been prepared within 
the context of the University of Liverpool’s ethical approval procedure. Semi-
structured interviews were given preference to unstructured interviews because 
there were specific questions that would definitely have to be asked. The semi-
structured interview allows the researcher to maintain a level of control over the 
interview process, while the unstructured interview implies the surrendering of 
control to the dynamic of the conversation (Corbin & Morse, 2003; Kvale, 1984). 
The latter approach may be suitable to the classical GTM, but in accordance with 
CGT it was preferred to confront the interviewee openly with the researcher’s 
initial conceptualisations. 
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The interviews revolved around four topics: the interviewee’s biography, 
the inception of the European asylum system, neofunctionalism and the evolution 
and practice of the Dublin Regulation. The section on biography included 
questions on the interviewee’s professional history and on the interviewee’s role 
in the construction and management of the European asylum system. The former 
was considered relevant because it may provide insight as to the approach to 
policymaking the interviewee adopts. The interview schedule contained a section 
on the inception of the European asylum system because this would help to 
illuminate whether the interviewee uses neofunctionalist logic to explain 
legislative evolution. An example of the questions posed is the following: ‘do you 
think that the need for a common asylum system arose from previously existing 
legislation or integration in other areas of policymaking’? The section on 
neofunctionalism aimed at confronting the policymakers with the theory itself. It 
would seek to determine whether the interviewees were familiar with 
neofunctionalism and whether they thought that it acted as a blueprint for their 
endeavours. Finally, the section on the evolution and practice of the Dublin 
Regulation was included because the Dublin Regulation is the most highly 
communitarised piece of asylum legislation. It was expected that questions on the 
Dublin Regulation would reveal the distance between policymakers and policy 
objects (i.e. asylum seekers).  
To ensure ethical standards were upheld, before the interview, I sent all 
participants a participant information sheet via email which states the purpose of 
the interview and the sampling procedure. The participant information sheet 
contained information on consent, the withdrawal procedure, complaint 
opportunities, confidentiality, insurance issues as well as on the purpose of the 
interview. It ensured that all interviewees were aware of the consequences of their 
participation. In this email, potential participants were also informed in advance 
about some of the questions that were going to arise in the interview. All 
participants had to sign a consent form declaring that they have read and 
understood the participant information sheet, which made sure that I had proof 
of them having understood the participant information sheet. Both the consent 
form and the participant information sheet were approved by the University of 
Liverpool’s committee for ethical research practice. 
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 In practice the three interviews deviated from the interview schedule in 
accordance with semi-structured interview practice, although the basic themes 
were maintained.  
 
 
Interview Evaluation Procedure 
 
All interviews were recorded using a voice recorder and subsequently manually 
transcribed. While there is a plethora of transcription methods (e.g. McLellan et 
al., 2003; Lapadit & Lindsay, 1999) and it is uncertain whether transcription is 
even a pre-requisite of coding, transcription was nevertheless carried out because 
text is more accessible than an audio recording. Text documents make coding 
easier because the origin of the code is visible. Furthermore, they can be navigated 
easily with word searches. All interviews were transcribed in a word-for-word 
manner. Words or phrases that could not be understood were left out, although a 
bracketed ellipsis was included in the text to indicate that some words were 
missing. Informal contractions (i.e. ‘wanna’, ‘gonna’) were left unaltered, and 
grammar was not corrected. Unfinished sentences were also marked with an 
ellipsis. 
Since it was the purpose of these interviews to investigate whether 
neofunctionalism plays an important role in European policymaking, the 
interviews were coded specifically for neofunctionalist categories such as 
spillover, inevitability, elites or technocracy. In all four interviews examples of 
these categories could be found.31 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Example: “The institutions are here. They are pushing for new legislation. Member states are 
unhappy with it, but either way… In fact, you have no option with a Commission proposal than 
to act on it.” (personal communication, 27 June 2013). This excerpt from an interview with a 
member of the European Commission staff contains the categories ‘inevitability’ (“no option with 
a Commission proposal than to act on it”) and ‘spillover’ (“The institutions are here. They are 
pushing for new legislation.”). 
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Research Design Main Fieldwork 
 
During the first phase of the research process I had developed initial 
conceptualisations of European integration and irregular migration management 
on the basis of an analysis of neofunctionalism as a proto theory. I had carried out 
exploratory fieldwork to ground these conceptualisations. Now, having developed 
the theoretical context for understanding the situation of irregular migrants within 
the practice of European integration as informed by neofunctionalism (see 
Chapters 2 and 3), the social purpose of European integration can be further 
illuminated by investigating how irregular migrants experience everyday life in 
the EU. In this manner the consequences of neofunctionalist integration can be 
shown. The results of this study were meant to be brought into dialogue with the 
categories derived in Chapter 3. However, new and different research questions 
on site were expected to emerge as part of the retroductive logic inherent to 
Critical Grounded Theory. 
 As opposed to the exploratory field research, this study required far more 
detailed preparation and planning. Furthermore, the research process evolved. 
This section will discuss the following aspects: research site selection, sampling 
procedure, interview procedure, ethical issues, sampling practice and field notes, 
interview practice and evaluation procedure. 
 
 
Research Site Selection 
 
According to Frontex there are eight major migratory routes into the EU. The 
most frequented routes are the Eastern Mediterranean Route and the Central 
Mediterranean Route. The Central Mediterranean Route leads to Europe via 
Malta and Southern Italy, and the Eastern Mediterranean Route goes through 
Greece and Bulgaria. Between 2011 and 2014, Frontex registered 70,000 illegal 
border crossings per year on the Central Mediterranean Route (on average) and 
40,000 illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean Route (Frontex, 
2015). Both individual values exceed the number of illegal crossings on all other 
routes combined. It is important where these routes cross the EU external border, 
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as it is usually the first member state that a migrant enters EU territory through 
that is responsible for his asylum application (see Chapter 1 on the Dublin 
Regulation). Asylum in turn is highly relevant here because an asylum application 
is the most common way for migrants that have entered the EU via these routes 
to gain a residency permit. Therefore two sites at the entry points to EU territory 
were selected for field research: Thrace and Sicily. 
Thrace represents a geographical region that is shared by Turkey, Bulgaria 
and Greece. The region has recently been physically divided by the construction 
of a border fence between Turkey and the EU. While the Greek islands on the 
Aegean are also important entry points for migrants, preference was given to 
Thrace primarily for practical reasons as research locations in both Bulgaria and 
Greece could be covered on the same trip. The Bulgarian towns of Kapitan 
Andreevo, Svilengrad, Lyubimets and Harmanli each contain important asylum 
accommodation facilities and Orestiada is the location of one of the largest ‘pre-
removal facilities’ and ‘first reception centres’ in Greece. Other factors in favour 
of Thrace as a research location include proximity to Istanbul Atatürk Airport and 
financial feasibility. Field research in Thrace took place between the 15th and the 
20th of March 2014. During this trip, it became clear that the centralisation of the 
Greek state would require a trip to Athens; during conversations with Greek 
administration officials in Orestiada, I was repeatedly forwarded to the Hellenic 
Coast Guard, the Asylum Service and the Greek police. All three institutions are 
based in Athens. Research in Athens took place between the 2nd of April 2014 and 
the 6th of April 2014. 
Sicily represents the most important entry point on the Central 
Mediterranean Route. Despite its size, Sicily is small enough to be easily navigable 
by car and hosts one of the largest asylum accommodation facilities in Europe 
(Residence degli Aranci in Mineo). The research stay in Sicily lasted from 30th of 
April to the 5th of May, 2014. 
Germany was selected as the final research location for a variety of 
reasons. First of all, it is the largest EU member state and receives the largest 
number of annual asylum applications. Furthermore, during field research in 
Greece, Bulgaria and Italy, many migrants had repeatedly stated that they 
intended on living in Germany. Field research in Germany would thus allow me 
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to investigate migrants’ experience in the country that represented their hopes and 
aspirations. Germany is a federation where the sixteen state governments are 
responsible for the management of asylum accommodation facilities – there was 
thus no obvious starting point for research with migrants. Out of a variety of 
options, the Saxon city of Leipzig was chosen for two main of reasons. Firstly, the 
city is my home town and I enjoy a strong familiarity with the relevant 
institutions. I had already carried out interviews with potential participants as part 
of another study, which I anticipated would increase the likelihood of success in 
the recruitment procedure. Secondly, I could accommodate a wide range of dates 
for interviews. Field research in Leipzig took place throughout the months of May 
and June 2014. 
 
 
Sampling Procedure Design 
 
To understand how relevant groups of migrants experience everyday life in the 
EU, I had planned to interview six groups of people: public officials, the staff of 
asylum accommodation facilities, asylum seekers, clandestinos, irregular 
immigrants working at fruit farms and fruit farm managers. Asylum seekers, 
clandestinos and fruit farm workers are commonly referred to as irregular 
migrants. Recruitment procedure, the number of planned participants and the 
reasoning behind the inclusion of each group will now be explained in detail. 
 Public officials are of key importance for understanding the practical 
implementation of the European and national dimensions of migration 
management at the four research locations. Potentially they would have first-hand 
information on the ways irregular migrants are received when they enter the EU 
and how they are treated upon reception. The label ‘public officials’ is of course 
very loose and includes employees of local administrations, ministry staff, agency 
staff as well as local and national politicians. Essentially this group includes 
European, national, regional and local civil servants dealing with asylum and 
migration. Especially in the light of linguistic barriers that were bound to play a 
significant role in establishing contact with administrations in Bulgaria and Italy, 
inclusion criteria for this group were left as flexible as possible (I speak German 
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and in Greece knowledge of English is widespread). Furthermore, responsibilities 
are allocated very differently at the four research locations. It would be unwise to 
exclude participants who are not involved in the local level of administration, as 
this level’s role in the area of migration management may be limited. I had 
intended to contact public officials prior to each research trip by email. First 
contact was meant to be established via email in Greek, Bulgarian and Italian 
respectively with the help of translators. Nevertheless, in the message that would 
establish first contact, the recipient was made aware that all further 
communication would have to take place in English, German or French. Once 
contact is established, the potential participants were to be sent a copy of the 
participant information sheet along with a request to set a date for a meeting. This 
procedure was intended to be followed by all participants who were contacted via 
email. It was planned that at each research location, at least two interviews would 
be carried out with members of this group. 
 The staff of asylum accommodation facilities hold a significant amount of 
insight into asylum seekers’ everyday lives. Furthermore, as they will have dealt 
with Dublin deportations the relationship between asylum seekers’ experiences 
and EU legislation will be clear to them. This group also has a key role in 
establishing contact between the researcher and other participant groups. Based 
on previous field research with asylum seekers in Malta and Germany, it was 
assumed that every asylum accommodation facility at all research locations will 
have staff members. These could be local or temporary international volunteers as 
well as full-time employees of the facility itself and the institution that manages it. 
Contact with this group was meant to be established via the public officials, via 
email or via personal contacts. If appropriate, public officials would be asked to 
forward an interview request to the staff of asylum accommodation facilities along 
with the participant information sheet that was prepared especially for this group. 
If this possibility did not exist, asylum accommodation camp staff was meant to 
be contacted directly via email or over the telephone. Two interviews were 
planned at each research location, which amounts to eight interviews with 
members of this group. A higher number would have been impractical to evaluate. 
Furthermore, the amount of time spent in Italy, Greece and Bulgaria in particular 
would inevitably be limited due to financial constraints. As interviews would have 
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to be carried out with the other groups as well, there would not be enough time to 
interview more members of this group. 
 Asylum seekers are people who have submitted an asylum application that 
has not yet been decided on. While first asylum applications are usually treated 
within 18 months, the waiting time for further applications can be significantly 
longer.32 Asylum seekers arguably form the group of migrants in Europe that is 
most exposed to the legal effects of European legislation due to the Dublin regime. 
Interviews with members of this group are therefore of key significance to gaining 
insight into the relationship between the lives of asylum seekers and European 
legislation, which in turn, can advance the understanding of the social purpose of 
European integration. It is important to state that asylum seekers are often 
regarded to form a vulnerable group; the ethical issues involved in dealing with 
this group will be discussed in subsequent sections. Contact with asylum seekers 
was meant to be established via the staff of asylum accommodation facilities. In 
emails the staff would be asked whether it was possible to introduce me to the 
inhabitants of their facilities upon arrival. In these emails, a participant 
information sheet for asylum seekers was included. Given potential language 
barriers, this document was formulated in simple English. This was not done to 
patronise asylum seekers, but to make absolutely sure that all the participants 
belonging to this group had understood the implications of their participation. I 
had planned for two interviews to be carried out at each location with members 
of this group. This choice was made using the reasoning employed for the previous 
group. 
 The fourth group to be interviewed are clandestinos. In Italian this word 
denotes an individual without valid travel or residency documents. Clandestinos 
may be illegal immigrants. However, such a person may very well be entitled to 
humanitarian protection, which is why the term ‘illegal’ can be misleading. 
Moreover, in some cases it may not be possible for a clandestino to apply for 
asylum, even though they desire to do so.33 A person may thus be a de facto asylum 
                                                          
32 After an unsuccessful asylum application it is possible to challenge the responsible authority’s 
decision and to reapply for asylum. 
33 This may be due to the extremely poor organization of some national asylum systems, such as 
the Greek asylum system. More recently, although this was not the case when field research was 
conducted, some countries are considering the introduction of upper limits for asylum 
applications. In January 2016 Austria had introduced a law setting the upper limit to 37,500 
asylum applications for 2016. 
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seeker and a de jure illegal immigrant. The boundary between the two groups is 
thus loose in a practical sense and only becomes clear in the legal meaning. Like 
asylum seekers, clandestinos are considered a vulnerable group and special 
precautions need to be taken to ensure that research with this group is conducted 
in an ethical manner. Contact was meant to be established through the staff of 
asylum accommodation facilities and through the dwellers of these facilities. The 
participant information sheet that was prepared for this group was largely identical 
to the document that was prepared for asylum seekers and was meant to be 
forwarded to participants in the manner outlined in the previous paragraph. 
Further ways of contacting members of this group were expected to be arranged 
on site. The number of interviews that could be carried out with members of this 
group was uncertain, although I had aimed for two per location. This would have 
amounted to eight interviews (see above paragraph for reasoning behind this). 
Especially relevant for Sicily, a review of the literature had indicated that 
there would be a link between the local economy and irregular migration. 
Irregular migrants constitute a widely available source of cheap labour and to 
understand migrants’ experience of European integration it was considered vital 
to investigate this link. The connection between a potential political economy of 
migrant labour and European integration exists because the fortification of the 
Schengen external border has resulted in a vibrant business sector of human 
smuggling. Furthermore, in the common European market low production costs 
are of key significance for peripheral regions. The Sicilian economy largely 
depends on fruit production which is why it was assumed that fruit farmer 
managers would be ideal interviewees for the study of this phenomenon. Fruit 
farm managers could provide insight as to how the acquisition of migrant workers 
is organised. Furthermore, I was very interested in their views on European 
migration management, as this groups benefits from it due its creation of a large 
undocumented labour force. Potential participants would be contacted in advance 
via email with an especially prepared participant information sheet. Nevertheless, 
it was clear that the chances for successful recruitment using this method were 
slim, as the interview would ask participants to reveal their involvement in illegal 
activities. Further recruitment may thus occur on site using the snowballing 
139 
 
approach. Given the difficulty involved in the recruitment procedure, I had aimed 
for two interviews with fruit farm managers. 
The sixth group of potential participants are fruit farm workers. Apart from 
working on a fruit farm, members of this group would also have to simultaneously 
be asylum seekers, a clandestinos, or undocumented workers without EU-
citizenship. While fruit farm workers constituted the primary target group, other 
undocumented workers with one of the previous three qualities would not be 
excluded from the study and the relevance of this participation would have to be 
decided on site. Like asylum seekers and clandestinos, fruit farm workers naturally 
form a vulnerable group. In many ways, their vulnerability exceeds that of all 
other participants because of information they may choose to reveal about their 
employers (see section on ethical issues). If their employers do not agree to them 
being interviewed, they may face maltreatment or dismissal. Recruitment would 
take place in two ways using the snowballing technique. Although I considered it 
unlikely, the fruit farm managers themselves may have wanted to introduce me to 
their staff. Had this been the case, the fruit farm workers interviewed would most 
likely not have criticised their employers. Alternatively, the staff or the inhabitants 
of asylum accommodation facilities may forward me to people working on fruit 
farms. Recruitment of members of this group would be limited to Sicily and given 
the difficulty that would likely be involved with finding participants, I aimed for 
carrying out two interviews. 
Altogether it was thus planned that 36 interviews would be carried out. 
However, given that interviews are merely one aspect of field research, and taking 
into consideration that this study does not aim for the generation of generalizable 
laws through the isolation of particular variables, it was accepted that the actual 
number of interviews may in fact deviate from the plan outlined here. The success 
of the recruitment procedure is dependent on many factors outside the researcher’s 
control, such as the structure of asylum accommodation facilities, language 
barriers or the openness of fruit farm managers towards my research. 
Nevertheless, conducting interviews at all these different locations would allow 
for potentially drawing stronger conclusions. 
Gender was deliberately not included in the selection criteria. First and 
foremost, this was done for practical considerations. It would most likely be hard 
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enough to find interviewees – including the restrictive category of gender as one 
of the selection criteria would have made recruitment even more difficult. 
Furthermore, given the neo-Gramscian emphasis on class as the primary unit of 
analysis, I aimed at telling the story of irregular migrants as a group in its entirety. 
Distinguishing between a male and a female story would have contributed 
towards the fragmentation of this group. The problems associated with this choice 
will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
 
Interview Design 
 
This section will discuss three aspects of the interview procedure. Firstly, it will 
be shown why the semi-structured interview was selected as the appropriate 
interview type for this study. Secondly, the design of the participant information 
sheets and the consent forms will be explained. Finally, it will be outlined how a 
separate interview schedule was developed for each group to understand migrants’ 
experience of European integration and the impact of European legislation on this 
experience. The interview schedule for each group will not be discussed. 
All interviews were planned as semi-structured interviews. The reasoning 
behind this choice is identical to that outlined in the section on the first phase of 
field research: semi-structured interviews avoid the rigidity of structured 
interviews, which contradicts the principle of retroduction. Semi-structured 
interviews were furthermore given preference over structured interviews because 
the former allow for control over the interview to remain in the hands of the 
interviewer. Unstructured interviews may be appropriate for studies without a 
clear research agenda, but this study started out with a set of concrete questions. 
The mismatch between the nature of unstructured interviews and these pre-
defined questions further encouraged the use of semi-structured interviews. 
In accordance with the ethical research procedure envisaged by the 
University of Liverpool, I planned for each participant to receive a participant 
information sheet before the interview begins. This document contains 
information on the purpose of the interview as well as the contact details of me 
and my supervisor. On the basis of having read and understood this document, 
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each interviewee would then be asked to sign a consent form to certify that they 
are aware of the consequences of participation. The participant information sheet 
as well as the consent form for asylum seekers and clandestinos was formulated 
in simple English to ensure that the consequences of participation are properly 
understood. The consent forms were nearly identical to those used in the first 
phase of the study. 
Each interview schedule contains an opening and a closing section which 
are very similar in content. After the investigator introduces himself, interviewees 
are requested to read the consent form, to tick the appropriate boxes and to sign 
the consent form, if they agree with its content. The purpose of the study is 
outlined once again and participants are reminded that they can stop the interview 
whenever they want and without explanation. According to the interview 
schedule, it is pointed out that the interview will last for approximately 45 
minutes. In the closing section of the interview, participants are encouraged to ask 
questions and they are reminded that everything that has been said will be kept 
confidential. 
The interview schedule for public officials is based around the following 
themes: biography, national asylum system, the European asylum system, the role 
of migrants in the European political economy and the future of the asylum 
system. This interview schedule is aimed especially at public officials who deal 
directly with matters related to asylum, and relevant adaptations were foreseen. 
The section on the interviewee’s biography was included to find out how they 
became involved in working with migrants. This may shed light on the way 
migrants are viewed (e.g. as an economic burden/opportunity, as victims of 
exploitation, etc.). Questions on the national asylum system were included for the 
same reason, although there was also a genuine need for information on migration 
management at the research location. The questions on the European asylum 
system aimed at exploring the impact of European legislation on the interviewees’ 
work. Furthermore, the questions examined how public officials perceive the 
impact of European legislation on the lives of asylum seekers and migrants in 
general. The sections on the role of asylum seekers and migrants in the European 
political economy were included because of a genuine lack of information. 
Inevitably, the interviewees would also give their opinion on this role. Questions 
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on the future of the asylum system were included because public officials have to 
work with the existing rules. It was assumed that members of this group would be 
very much aware of the consequences of European migration management – they 
may thus be able to locate where changes are necessary. 
The interview schedule that I had prepared for the staff of asylum 
accommodation facilities was very similar to the one prepared for public officials. 
The reasoning behind the inclusion of each theme was identical, although 
members of this group will clearly have a different perspective on the questions. 
Based on my previous research experience in asylum accommodation facilities, I 
assumed that this group would largely be sympathetic to migrants, being largely 
composed of volunteers. Before questions on the future of European migration 
management were posed, another theme was introduced: conditions in the 
centres. I had meant to ask interviewees on the kinds of problems they are dealing 
with in the camps (i.e. relations between members of different nationalities, drugs, 
crime, gender relations, etc.) and on their perception of the inhabitants’ everyday 
lives. I also intended to ask interviewees to establish links between their 
observations and the EU political economy. Furthermore, I wanted to ask 
questions about irregular migrants’ participation in the local economy. 
The same interview schedule was used for asylum seekers and 
clandestinos, which is why it can be discussed in the same paragraph. As asylum 
seekers and clandestinos may have been involved in illegal activities (such as 
unreported employment or illegal border crossings), the interview schedule 
includes a reminder that confidentiality may be broken if involvement in such 
activities is disclosed. However, in the interview schedule it is also pointed out 
that this does not apply to illegal border crossings, because the majority of asylum 
seekers and clandestinos have crossed the Schengen external border irregularly. 
The interview schedule includes four themes: biography, journey to Europe, 
reception (and accommodation) conditions and knowledge of the European 
migration system. The biography section builds trust between interviewer and 
interviewee and furthermore establishes the context for the subsequent section. 
The questions that were meant to be asked in this section pertain to the 
interviewee’s origins, to their profession, to their reasons for leaving their country-
of-origin, and, if they are an asylum seeker, to their reasons for demanding 
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asylum. Answers to questions on the interviewee’s travel route may already be 
indicative of their knowledge of the European migration system. A particular 
country may for instance have been chosen as the first point of entry into the EU 
because of the Dublin regime. This theme was also aiming at exploring the 
interviewees’ relationship with smugglers. The questions on reception (and 
accommodation) conditions were adapted according to the interviewee’s legal 
status. These questions aimed at investigating the extent to which the categories 
developed in the previous chapter (e.g. biopolitics and reification) can be applied 
to understand migrants’ experience. Questions on first contact and initial medical 
treatment may for instance be highly relevant for exploring the lived experience 
of biopolitics. If the participant is a clandestino, questions were asked on why the 
interviewee has not applied for asylum as well as on whether they have established 
contact with the local authorities. The fourth theme, which includes questions on 
the interviewees’ knowledge of European migration management were meant to 
find out whether the participants have made connections between their experience 
and the European political economy. 
Fruit farm managers are a group that was foreseen to be particularly 
difficult to interview. Members of this group who employ clandestinos and asylum 
seekers may not only be involved in illegal activities but also in behaviour that is 
widely considered to be morally questionable. It was planned that all potential 
interviewees would be made aware that confidentiality cannot be maintained if 
illegal activities are disclosed. The first part of the interview schedule deals with 
the participant’s biography, which establishes trust with the interviewer and 
contextualises the activities of the fruit farm. The second theme concerns the 
undocumented employment of clandestinos and asylum seekers. Participants are 
questioned on whether they employ members of these groups and on their 
motivations for doing so. Moreover, this theme aims at finding out how the 
government responds to the existence of an undocumented migrant labour 
market. The third theme deals with the relationship between migration 
management and undocumented migrant labour. It aims at exploring the 
participants’ awareness of the Dublin regime and other European migration 
instruments, and whether there is a perceived link between the migrant labour 
market and these legislative tools. Finally, interviewees were meant to be 
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questioned on their views on the role of the Italian government in migration 
management. 
The interview schedule for undocumented migrant workers is very similar 
to the one that was developed for asylum seekers and clandestinos. However, a 
further section was included on their employment. It aimed at finding out how the 
participants came to work on for instance fruit farms, how they are being treated, 
how much they earn and how the spend their everyday lives. Like asylum seekers 
and clandestinos, they were then asked to place their experience into relation with 
European migration management. 
 
 
Sampling Practice, Field Notes and Blog 
 
In practice, I ended up deviating from the recruitment procedure and the interview 
schedules. While this deviation was to a certain extent expected, recruitment 
nevertheless entailed several unexpected challenges. These challenges will now be 
discussed in relation to each of the six groups that were meant to be interviewed. 
 
 
 
 Recruiting public officials was by far the easiest aspect in organising the 
research. In Germany, two public officials from the city administration of Leipzig 
were interviewed. In Greece, public officials from the Greek Asylum Service, the 
Hellenic Coast Guard and the First Reception Service were conducted, and five 
interviews were carried out altogether. In Bulgaria, one public official from the 
administration of the city of Svilengrad was interviewed as well as one Austrian 
Frontex officer. In Italy, the recruitment procedure resulted in one interview with 
Group Planned Number of 
Interviews 
Actual Number of 
Interviews 
Public officials 8 10 
Camp staff 8 7 
Asylum seekers 8 10 
Clandestinos 8 3 
Fruit farm managers 2 0 
Fruit farm workers 2 3 
Total 36 33 
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a public official from the city of Catania. The limited success of the recruitment 
produce in Bulgaria and Italy is largely due to language barriers. Although first 
contact was established in Bulgarian and Italian, communication remained 
difficult. While interviews were arranged with a relevant member of staff of the 
Svilengrad city administration, the interview finally took place with the only 
employee who spoke English. In Italy, despite having contacted four different 
offices, no interviews could be conducted. 
 Recruiting camp staff was difficult in all research locations because in 
several cases the only non-residents available were security staff who did not speak 
English. Since the purpose of recruiting this group was to speak with people who 
have considerable insight into migrants’ everyday lives, the scope of recruitment 
was expanded to include employees of NGOs working with asylum seekers and 
clandestinos. Recruitment was undertaken via email, via telephone as well as via 
the snowballing technique. In Italy, one interview was carried out with the head 
of a medical aid facility in Catania. Furthermore, two employees of the Italian 
Refugee Council were interviewed. In Germany, an interview was conducted with 
an employee of the Leipzig Refugee Council. In Greece, interviews were carried 
out with a member of a Greek migrants’ association, with a member of staff of the 
NGO Metadrassi which specialises on interpreting as well as with an employee of 
an accommodation centre for asylum seekers. In Bulgaria, no interviews could be 
conducted, primarily because the camps were not staffed by anyone except 
security personnel. I regarded this to be a research finding in itself. 
 Recruitment of asylum seekers was in the six cases very different from what 
had been envisioned in the original recruitment plan. In Germany, three 
interviews with asylum seekers were arranged by the Leipzig Refugee Council and 
one interview was arranged through a personal acquaintance. The recruitment 
procedure in Athens was similar, and an interview was arranged through a 
member of staff of the asylum accommodation centre. In Bulgaria, the Pastrogor 
centre did not have specialised staff. Recruitment occurred outside the gate of the 
facility, where I was approached by several residents of the facility out of curiosity. 
Two residents were willing to be interviewed. Recruitment procedure in Sicily was 
identical which resulted in three interviews. 
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 Recruiting clandestinos was not possible in Germany and Bulgaria. In the 
German case, this is likely due to the fact that there are very few people belonging 
to that group residing within German territory. This is turn is the result of 
comparatively small size of the German irregular labour market, as well of 
Germany’s geographical location. In Bulgaria, no method was found on site 
which would allow for contact to be established with members of this group. In 
Italy and Greece, the presence of clandestinos is tolerated and even encouraged 
for a variety of reasons, such as dependency on undocumented labour and 
inaccessibility of the asylum procedure. For these reasons, contacting clandestinos 
was easier at these locations. Recruitment in Greece occurred outside the offices 
of the Greek asylum service, where two people were encountered who had 
unsuccessfully attempted to apply for asylum. They were thus still clandestinos, 
although they wanted to apply for asylum. Another clandestino was encountered 
on a street in Athens. In Italy, clandestinos were successfully recruited. However, 
all interviewees were also undocumented workers, which is why they form part of 
the final group of participants. 
  The recruitment of fruit farmer managers in Italy was unsuccessful. That 
was somewhat expected, as the participants would potentially be involved in 
illegal activities, implying that confidentiality could not be guaranteed. Although 
potential interviewees were contacted via email, no responses were received and 
interviews could not be carried out. 
 Recruitment of persons belonging to the final group of migrant workers 
was carried out in Sicily only, as explained in the section on recruitment 
procedure. Nevertheless, the recruitment procedure deviated from what was 
outlined before. One female migrant sex worker was recruited on the side of a 
road linking two major Sicilian cities. This method of recruitment has previously 
been employed for sex workers in Vietnam by Johnston et al. (2006). One fruit 
farm worker was recruited on his way back from work near the Mineo asylum 
accommodation centre. The third participant sold parking tickets in the city centre 
of Palermo. 
 While gender was deliberately excluded from the selection criteria, it 
should be stated that out of a total of 16 interviews with irregular migrants only 
three were with women, two of which were carried out in Leipzig. There are two 
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main reasons for this. Firstly, particularly in Italy the vast majority of irregular 
migrants are men; this applies to asylum seekers and clandestinos in particular 
(Fasani, 2010). Secondly, for cultural reasons it was more difficult to recruit 
female irregular migrants. As a male researcher I was unlikely to be approached 
by a woman with a North African or Middle Eastern background outside the gates 
of a refugee accommodation facility. Approaching such women may also have 
constituted a breach of cultural etiquette. In practice this problem was negligible 
because the majority of irregular migrants I encountered were men. 
 Nevertheless, although I considered the inclusion of the gender criterion to 
be potentially destructive to the generation of irregular migrants’ group 
consciousness, there is a clear gender bias in this dissertation. The sizable 
literature on women and migration bears witness to the fact that there is a distinct 
female migration and integration experience (e.g. Arizpe, 2014; Timmermann et 
al., 2015). This was also confirmed by my experience in the field (see subsequent 
section) – indeed, it is almost self-evident that particularly migrants originating 
from cultures with strong sexual segregation will have a gendered migration 
experience. A stronger emphasis on the inclusion of both male and female 
interviewees at all research locations may have added more facets to the narrative 
of irregular migrants’ experience of European integration. 
 Apart from these interviews, a research journal was kept at all stages of the 
research process. This journal contains extensive field notes as well as information 
on the numerous conversations that were held with individuals who were not 
officially interviewed. The links that exist between the interviewees are recorded 
to allow for the reconstruction of the snowball-sampling procedure. Furthermore, 
not all interviewees were willing to have their voices recorded for a variety of 
reasons. The research journal was used for note-taking of these conversations. 
Crucially, in the context of CGT, field research allows for the refinement of one’s 
research agenda during field research. The journal thus contains several pages 
listing new research questions as they arose and further reflects on preliminary 
theoretical hypotheses. 
 Before I began my field research, it was agreed between me and my 
supervisor that I would write regular blog posts to provide a publically available 
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reflexive account of my field research.34 Most blog posts were written during field 
research. The purpose of this blog was threefold. Firstly, the blog enabled all 
interviewees to receive near-immediate feedback on the interviews. It is a much 
more accessible way to stay in touch with participants than a PhD dissertation. 
When my dissertation is complete, I plan to publish my most important research 
findings on EUtopia as an attempt to implement my work’s emancipatory agenda. 
Secondly, the blog allowed me to stay in touch with my supervisor during field 
research. Thirdly, the blog permitted me to deal with emotional distress I 
experienced on site, which will be further discussed in the ethics section of this 
chapter. Apart from accounts of what I did in practice, these posts also contain 
initial attempts to theorise my findings by relating them to European integration 
more generally.  
 
 
Interview Practice 
 
As the previous section indicates, it was in practice very difficult to adhere to the 
planned sampling procedure. In some locations sampling proved altogether 
unfeasible, although the overall number of interviews was in line with 
expectations. This section will discuss two other problems that arose during field 
research. 
 While all interviews with public officials and camp staff were carried out 
in an office environment, interviews with migrants were conducted by the gates 
of accommodation centres and during extensive walks. This resulted in several 
difficulties. Firstly, filling in the participant consent forms proved difficult in this 
interview setting, as it was in many cases hard to find a smooth surface to write 
on. The participant consent form is designed for interviews taking place in an 
enclosed space rather than in the open where potential bystanders may comment 
on or make fun of the consent procedure. Adherence to the consent form 
procedure was thus a constant source of annoyance and frustration (see section 
on ethical issues). An open environment furthermore implied that it was difficult 
to be alone with the participants, who were often interrupted by friends or fellow 
                                                          
34 The contents of this blog are accessible on http://eutopia-blog.blogspot.com. 
149 
 
accommodation centre inhabitants. This was particularly the case at the Pastrogor 
and Mineo sites. At the latter location, I was at one point surrounded by at least 
ten young asylum seekers who were curious about my motives and intentions. 
Interviews were also often exposed to the suspicious glances of camps’ security 
staff. 
 Especially with asylum seekers, clandestinos and fruit farm workers, who 
in many ways constituted the most important group of participants, it was difficult 
to stick to the interview schedule. This was mostly because the interviewees were 
sharing details of their lives that were of a highly personal nature. It seemed 
appropriate to allow the interviewees to lead the conversations until silences arose 
and a new topic could be brought up. Particularly in the case of the interview with 
the female sex worker, I experienced great distress. I felt very nervous not only 
about the recruitment procedure itself, which required me to invite the interviewee 
into my car, potentially causing serious misunderstandings. I also felt unprepared 
to discuss issues involving sexual abuse and exploitation. Although I realised that 
the interview was highly relevant and important for my research, I often did not 
know how to respond to the interviewee’s statements, especially being as a male 
researcher. I was unsure whether it would be appropriate to ask about the details 
of her work. As a result of this discomfort, the interview lasted only for fifteen 
minutes and I felt great relief when it was over. 
 
 
Ethical Issues 
 
There are clear ethical issues related to research involving irregular migrants and 
a small number of articles has been published that deal with these issues (Düvell 
et al., 2010; Jacobsen & Landau, 2003; Pernice, 1994). This section will focus on 
the ethical issues that arose during field research with migrants in Sicily, Thrace, 
Athens and Leipzig. Ethical questions are particularly pertinent in the context of 
research with irregular migrants because they are often considered a vulnerable 
group. Some of the issues were foreseen, while others only became apparent on 
site. Each issue will be briefly discussed, whereupon it will be shown how this 
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issue was addressed. This list is of course non-exhausting, although an effort will 
be made to point out all relevant aspects. 
 Irregular migrants are regularly being referred to as a vulnerable group 
because of the precarious situation they find themselves in. This label is 
appropriate insofar as irregular migrants might possess no legal residency status, 
having little access to medical treatment, the regular labour market or political 
participation. However, defining vulnerability in terms of “[lacking] the ability to 
make personal life choices, to make personal decisions to maintain independence, 
and to self-determine” (Moore & Miller, 1999, 1034) seems to be inappropriate in 
this case. Such a description would reinforce the reduction of irregular migrants 
to victimhood and therefore be contrary to an emancipatory agenda which places 
a strong emphasis on the importance of human agency. Most irregular migrants 
are able to move freely within the territory of the state they reside in. They are 
furthermore part of the undocumented labour market. Coming to Europe was in 
most cases the migrant’s own self-determined decision. This does not preclude the 
fact that irregular migrants’ ability to determine their own destinies is often limited 
by incarceration, persecution and a variety of discriminating legal provisions, but 
it is problematic to apply the label of vulnerability to irregular migrants in general. 
The purpose of this argument is not to negate that the migrants concerned form a 
vulnerable group, but to underline their ability to be the agent shaping their socio-
political situation. 
 Seeking written consent from the participants was a major challenge during 
field research. Not only was it not guaranteed that all potential participants could 
read and write, but the ethical procedure that the University of Liverpool’s ethical 
review committee demanded had created an association of the interview with the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which the interviewee may perceive to work 
against him or her. In the case of asylum seekers, paperwork is often associated 
with the asylum application, which may be one of the primary causes of their lives’ 
(sustained) insecurity. Recruitment would have been more successful had there 
not been a need for the formality of the consent procedure. As Düvell et al. (2010) 
point out, seeking written consent can also be impractical because it can cause 
unnecessary risks for the participants. They may be prompted to “use false names 
or withdraw from the research” (ibid., 234) given that they may disclose their 
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involvement in illegal or criminal activities. During the first set of interviews, it 
was recognised that consent forms can form a barrier to recruitment. Thereupon 
it was decided to abstain from their use and to seek oral consent from the 
participants. This is conditioned upon complete honesty with the interviewees 
regarding the objectives of the study, the instilling of trust in the interviewee. 
 Field research may induce significant amounts of discomfort for the 
participants. Interviews may remind irregular migrants in particular of traumatic 
experiences which they may not want to remember. It is important that all 
participants are made aware of the potential consequences of their participation, 
which was stressed in the previous paragraph. However, during field research, it 
became clear that interviews can actually take on an “unexpected cathartic role, 
because it [allowed] the respondent to talk about both fact and feeling with 
someone who is listening very attentively” (Hiller & Diluzio, 2004, 13). 
 One ethical challenge that is often cited in this context addresses the 
physical risks that the researcher may be exposed to during field research. Migrant 
accommodation facilities are often associated with extreme material deprivation, 
high suicide rates, drug abuse, violence and murder. On site, the first four 
phenomena could be confirmed. This risk is further increased if the snowball-
sampling technique fails and participants have to be personally recruited without 
a mediator. Lack of access to the accommodation facilities themselves implies that 
the interviews would have to be carried out outside the gates, that is outside the 
space of responsibility of the security staff. This is a well-described problem in the 
area of research with irregular migrants. Düvell et al. (2010) suggest that 
withdrawal from the research site is the only possible choice of action if danger 
arises. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that researchers in this area have 
accepted that their research involves certain risks. 
 During field research, the researcher will not only be exposed to physical 
risks, but also to significant amount of emotional distress. It may in fact happen 
that the researcher is expected to help a particular participant. This is ethically 
unproblematic as long as these expectations do not cause the researcher to engage 
in activities that could be considered “immoral, illegal or disproportionate” 
(Düvell et al., 2010, 234). It is also important to find ways to deal with the 
emotional distress I was likely to experience during field research. The method 
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that I employed for this was the composition of the aforementioned reflexive 
research blog. 
 There is an inherent ethical dimension to any sampling procedure that 
involves directly approaching potential irregular migrants. Residency status 
cannot be immediately recognised, and approaching a possible participant based 
on their appearance or ethnicity involves racial profiling and risks insulting the 
participant. This problem can be avoided using third persons, as was discussed in 
the section dealing with sampling procedure design. Another method to avoid this 
problem is to wait until approached outside an asylum accommodation facility. 
 While this is true only for a small number of interviews, it was the case that 
some interviewees were under the influence of psychoactive drugs. At least one 
participant openly admitted to very recently having smoked cannabis and his 
responses were occasionally self-contradictory. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily indicate that these interviews should be considered unreliable or 
meaningless. Indeed, as Wright et al. point out, receiving divergent information 
“can increase understanding of complex behaviour patterns” (1998, 525). While 
it is not the purpose of this dissertation to understand complex behaviour patterns, 
divergent information can provide insight into the interviewee’s perception of his 
situation. Furthermore, divergent information can be a problem for all qualitative 
research and it is also very important to capture the interviewee’s perception of 
his life in the European Union. It ought to be stressed that the great availability of 
psychoactive drugs and their wide-spread use are of course also research findings 
in themselves. 
 I had expected that participants would reveal their involvement in illegal 
and potentially criminal activities during the interviews. This would nevertheless 
relieve me of my vow to confidentiality. Yet, disclosing the participant’s 
involvement in such activities may still be unethical. This can be exemplified with 
reference to illegal immigration. While this is technically a legal violation, it is 
certainly not a moral breach to cross an international boundary – an act which is 
only illegal because the irregular migrant does not hold correct documentation. 
Insofar it would be unethical to disclose this information and the anonymity of 
the participant would have to be safeguarded. The same logic can be applied to 
issues related to the implementation of the Dublin regime. It is common practice 
153 
 
for asylum seekers to lie about where they entered the EU on their asylum 
application. However, when it comes to serious crimes such acts of violence or 
sexual assault, confidentiality ought to be breached (cf. Wright et al., 1998, 533). 
With regard to intoxicants and psychoactive drugs, it appeared as though their 
consumption was tolerated by the staff of the asylum accommodation centre in 
question, which is why no action was undertaken to disclose this information.  
 
 
Interview Evaluation Procedure 
 
Upon completion I 
transcribed all 
interviews in the 
manner outlined 
previously. 
However, the 
evaluation 
procedure for these 
interviews differed 
from the evaluation 
procedure that was 
used for the first 
phase of research. 
The interview 
transcripts were in 
fact open-coded to 
the largest extent 
possible (see Figure 
4 for an example). It 
was considered 
important to allow 
the interviews with 
the migrants in particular to speak for themselves, as theoretically informed 
Figure 4: Example of open coding 
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coding may have reinforced migrant subalternity. Coding is nevertheless 
inevitably a particular interpretation of the data. Once the interviews were open-
coded, these codes were developed into the categories that had been developed in 
the previous chapter (i.e. reification, commodification, etc.). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to allow the reader to trace and understand the 
methodology that was employed for this dissertation. It has been shown how the 
origins of CGT can be traced back to the Straussian move in relation to the 
classical GTM, which accepted that previous held beliefs have an impact on 
theory generation. CGT nevertheless constitutes a relatively new addition to the 
plethora of methods; nevertheless, many researchers may have used retroductive 
logic without realising that they were. The historical dominance of positivism has 
prevented critical researchers from being open about their theoretical 
preconceptions. In this regard CGT and its critical realist underpinnings contain 
an element of pragmatism – it is simply unfeasible to view the world as a tabula 
rasa, even if it were desirable. Not all theories are equally valid; they can however 
be judged based on how good they are at explaining and understanding particular 
phenomena. 
 It is certain that the research design employed for this dissertation is not 
flawless. While the overall number of interviews that was carried out during field 
research appears to be in line with the ambitions of the research agenda, the 
number of interviews that was carried out at each location is small. Arguably more 
interviews should have been carried out. However, it is not the purpose of this 
dissertation to interview a sufficient number of irregular migrants to allow for 
generalizable inferences about their condition. Attempting such an undertaking 
would not only contradict the principles of retroduction, but would also be 
unfeasible. Furthermore, one might argue that since it is the aim of this thesis to 
shed light on irregular migrants’ everyday experience of the distinctly European 
occurrence of European integration, it was necessary to interview individuals at a 
variety of European locations, even if the number of interviews carried out at each 
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location was small. The European character of the experience of irregular 
migrants would have been undermined by stressing the need for a sufficiently high 
sample from each national context. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties that were in fact faced in recruiting 
participants were definitely underestimated. This was the case especially in 
Bulgaria, where linguistic barriers inhibited successful recruitment. Still, a large 
enough group was interviewed to allow for the creation of an idea of what it is like 
to experience European integration on an everyday level. The following three 
chapters will examine the results of this study and the conclusions that may be 
drawn from them in relation to the initial conceptualisations constructed through 
the consideration of proto-theories in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 will address the 
impact of neofunctionalist integration on European migration management itself, 
while Chapter 6 will address its impact on the everyday lives of irregular migrants. 
Chapter 7 will place neofunctionalism as well as those experiences within the 
context of the neoliberal hegemonic project. 
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Chapter 5: The Political Economy of European Migration 
Management 
 
While the phenomenon of migration into the European Union manifests itself 
very differently across the territory of the Union, there are nevertheless some 
features where the particularly European nature of contemporary transnational 
migration ought to be emphasised. At the European level, the materialisation of 
neofunctionalist ideology should be most visible in European policymaking. 
Although the relationship between neofunctionalism and the development of the 
European asylum system has already been alluded to in Chapter 1, this chapter is 
going to focus on the way neofunctionalism has informed European policymaking 
in the area of migration management in general. 
For many EU-Europeans, the terms European Union and Europe have 
become synonymous, even though the European Union covers only 44% of the 
geographical area of the European continent. Furthermore, the EU extends across 
parts of Africa and South America, and one of its member states is located entirely 
within Asia. Europe as a migrants’ destination is not to be equated with the 
European Union, particularly as Norway is one of the most desired destinations. 
Europe, the migrants’ destination, consists of a rather small group of states centred 
on Germany, Austria, the UK and Scandinavia. However, as a result of the 
legislation and the institutions whose development was briefly discussed in 
Chapter 1, migration has acquired an EU-European dimension. 
Firstly, this chapter is meant to provide an overview of migration into the 
European Union, which in turn provides the context for understanding the 
manner in which migration is managed. The three most striking developments in 
European migration management will be critically analysed in relation to 
neofunctionalism: firstly, the European Union has attempted to create a shared 
European outlook and a common technical language of migration, regarding this 
to be the prerequisite for building a common migration policy (Feldman, 2012). 
Secondly, in the context of spillover from the Schengen Agreement, the EU has 
pursued the somewhat contradictory policy of fortifying its external borders, while 
at the same time attempting to build an ‘Area of Justice, Freedom and Security’ 
within the Union itself. Thirdly, and this is an argument that can easily be 
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overlooked by scholars who tend to understand the EU as a closed system, the 
Union has attempted to externalise migration management to ‘third countries’ 
(i.e. states that are not members of the EU) in the European periphery (Boswell, 
2003; Lavenex, 2006). The latter development will be contextualised using 
dependency theory that was discussed in the previous chapter. From these 
developments, the application of a neofunctionalist-inspired policy approach for 
European integration is made apparent. 
 
 
Context: Migration in the EU 
 
Migration is a transhistorical phenomenon that has always been part of the human 
condition, and the European Union is today the most attractive migrant 
destination in the world. This is particularly striking as the EU lacks a migration 
system that would permit large-scale regular immigration of non-EU citizens. The 
only legal way to immigrate into the EU is via the so-called ‘Blue Card’-scheme, 
which permits ‘third-country nationals’ (i.e. people who do not hold the 
citizenship of an EU member state) access to the common labour market (Council 
of the European Union, 2009). The conditions for obtaining a Blue Card are a 
university degree and a job offer that pays at least 1.5 times the average salary of 
the EU member state in question. For Germany for example, this amounts to 
€46,400 per annum, with this sum being still greater in many other member states. 
The Blue Card is thus aimed primarily at the integration of highly skilled 
professionals into the European political economy. Other more precise conditions 
that need to be fulfilled to obtain a Blue Card differ between the member states 
(see International Organisation for Migration, 2009). Furthermore, some member 
states provide alternative possibilities to legally immigrate into the EU, for 
example by selling citizenship. Nevertheless, only a small fraction of immigrants 
arrive in the EU in this manner. Manning identifies the hope that a migrant’s 
personal situation will improve as well as that of his family as the main reason for 
migration (2005, 7). In the case of Blue Card holders, it may be assumed that a 
university degree is not the sole requirement for a very well-paid job offer, but that 
extensive work experience is needed. Although there may be a very small number 
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of exceptions, Blue Card holders will not have previously been in a situation where 
they needed to escape a situation of poverty. 
 Anyone who has entered the EU without a valid residency permit may be 
considered an ‘illegal immigrant’.35 Furthermore, while entry into the EU may 
have taken place in a regular manner, for example by means of a tourist visa, one 
may become an illegal immigrant once the residence permit loses its validity. In 
such cases, one of the most pertinent ways to require a residence permit is through 
an asylum application. Such an application may result in one being granted 
refugee status. According to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, which has been signed by 146 states including the member states of the 
European Union, a refugee is defined as follows: 
 
“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 1967). 
 
Poverty and economic deprivation are therefore not grounds upon which one can 
legitimately apply for asylum. In 2008, according to a study that was funded by 
the European Commission, between 1.9 and 3.8 million third country nationals 
resided illegally in the EU (Clandestino, 2009, 4). More precise and recent 
estimates are not available, and it is very well possible that the real number far 
exceeds this conservative estimate. It is clear however, that the large uncertainty 
about the real number of undocumented migrants in the EU underlines the very 
                                                          
35 In the language of policymakers, the words ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ are often used 
interchangeably. While ‘illegal’ denotes the severity of the committed legal offence, the word 
‘irregular’ possesses a less negative connotation. Essentially the words are however often used 
synonymously. The EU strives to end the use of ‘illegal’ in all official documents. There is a need 
to distinguish here between ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘illegal immigration’. While the EU avoids 
the use of the former very strictly, references to the latter may be found as illegal immigration 
remains a legal offence. Another word that is sometimes found in this context is ‘undocumented 
migrant’, particularly by NGOs and in texts that are critical of the securitisation and 
criminalisation of migration. By means of this rhetoric technique, the ‘undocumented migrant’ is 
denoted as being a member of a subaltern group. In this chapter, all three terms will be used in 
their appropriate contexts. 
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nature of the phenomenon, as migrants of this type fall outside the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state. 
 While the management of migration in the EU was at first limited to 
common visa rules and the abolition of border controls, it has since evolved to 
encompass the full-scale surveillance and control of population movements across 
the entire external border of the Union (Feldman, 2012, 63). However, such a 
move necessitated the creation of a common language of migration. 
 
 
The Creation of a Common Language on Migration Policy 
 
The embedding of the neofunctionalist integration agenda in the area of migration 
required the generation of a shared common outlook on migration into the 
European Union. Only then would the Europeanisation of migration be regarded 
as necessary and unavoidable. One of the means of creating this common outlook 
has been the use of a common technical language in the area of migration 
management. Technical language aims to “organise reality” (Halliday & Martin, 
1993, 169) in a manner that is accessible mostly to experts. During field research, 
it became clear that people working on migration issues throughout the EU are 
fluent in this language. Examples of this technical vocabulary are numerous: 
mixed flows, screening, ‘the procedure’, pre-removal centre, first-reception, 
‘Dublin unit’ or subsidiary protection – all these terms have a specific technical 
meaning, which has been defined by various EU directives and regulations. It is 
very noteworthy that officials at all research locations were familiar with this 
vocabulary in English, even though English was not the mother tongue of any of 
the interviewees. Using the example of globalisation discourse, McKenna und 
Graham (2000) argue that the scientific appearance of technocratic language is 
often used as a guise for ostensibly neutral policy objectives, but which are actually 
very much ideologically laden. They make the argument that “a specific form of 
technocratic discourse […] normalises neoclassical economic ideology in the 
process off advancing what appears to be technical solutions” to problems (ibid., 
219). Feldman (2012) sees the same type of development in the area of European 
migration policy. Through the “establishment of a common technical language 
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for separate policy problems,” the various national and regional perspectives of 
policy-makers are integrated into a shared European perspective (ibid., 57). 
Furthermore, technocratic language abstracts the very concrete issues that 
migrants and their respective host communities are struggling with. 
 The originator of this technical language is usually the European 
Commission itself, as it proposes legislation to be adapted and voted on by the 
European Council and the European Parliament. The legislation that concerns 
migration management always begins with an article that establishes definitions 
for the subject matter concerned. In the case of the reform of the Dublin II 
Regulation, which was discussed in Chapter 1, this article has been changed 
significantly (European Commission, 2008). The term ‘asylum’ for example, has 
been removed altogether to be replaced with ‘international protection’. The reason 
for this change is the Qualifications Directive of 2004, which establishes that 
international protection refers to both asylum and subsidiary protection (Council 
of the European Union, 2004). The latter in turn, relates to individuals to whom 
asylum law does not apply, but who would nevertheless be endangered if they 
were to be deported to their countries of origin. This is highly controversial, 
because this change allows for the removal of references to the Geneva 
Convention for Refugees. While the objectives of the Dublin III Regulation 
appear to go beyond the objectives of the Geneva Convention, the increasing 
irrelevance of the latter has been conducive to the externalisation of migration 
management which will be discussed later, but which ought to be seen as an 
outgrowth of the neofunctionalist integration agenda. A further paragraph that 
was introduced into the Definitions article of the Regulation defines the term ‘risk 
of absconding’, which refers to the risk that a migrant may escape when she is 
about to be deported. ‘To abscond’ is a verb that is used extremely rarely in the 
English vernacular, yet it has found its way into the technical vocabulary of 
European policymakers. Further examples are countless: ‘third-country national’, 
which in this case refers to people who are neither citizens of the EU, nor of 
another state which participates in the Dublin system such as Norway or 
Switzerland; ‘unaccompanied minor’, which refers to someone below the age of 
18 who arrives in the EU without the company of an adult who is responsible for 
him; and, ‘hit’, which refers to a match between a migrant’s fingerprint and an 
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entry in the Eurodac database. Officials in both Greece and Italy, although 
English is not their native language, were familiar with this vocabulary. 
 
 
The Development of a Knowledge-based Migration Policy 
 
Although language plays an important part in the creation of a common European 
outlook on migration, it is not the only realm where an attempt has been made to 
standardise “modes of knowledge” (Feldman, 2012, 69). Another example 
concerns the visualisation of migratory routes into the EU, most pertinently using 
an online tool called ‘i-Map’ which harmonises the geographies of European (and 
other) policymakers. On its website, i-Map is introduced as “a support instrument 
aiming to enhance and facilitate intergovernmental information exchange, and to 
support the development and implementation of knowledge-based co-operation 
initiatives” (Interactive Map on Migration, 2011). The idea of ‘knowledge-based 
co-operation’ reaffirms the neofunctionalist conceptualisation of European 
integration and migration management as a technical matter. Underlying this is 
the notion that policymaking is in need of the application of Weberian 
‘instrumental rationality’ (Sanderson, 2002). Migration policy is portrayed as a 
technical area where the ‘best’ policies can be determined if sufficient evidence is 
provided. Policymaking and governance are thus divorced from their inherently 
value-driven nature, and transformed into a state of technocracy (Fischer, 1990). 
The neofunctionalist template attributes great influence to epistemic communities 
in the European integration process (Niemann, 1998). These expert groups are 
thought to suggest the best cause of action to increase economic efficiency. In line 
with their functionalist forefathers, neofunctionalists predict that government will 
eventually be located where it can work most effectively, which can in turn be 
determined using scientific inquiry. In many cases, this will turn out to be at a 
supranational level. These supposedly non-normative policy prescriptions have in 
turn often provided the pretext to justify the implementation of neoliberal policies 
(McKenna & Graham, 2000). One example of this is the Schengen Agreement 
which permitted the free movement of people within the single European market 
and whose justification was derived using neofunctionalist logic. In the realm of 
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managing migratory flows towards the global core, expert knowledge is employed 
to create common ‘instrumental-rational’ policy-objectives by harmonising the 
individual actors’ perceptions. 
 The development of i-Map has provided an important tool towards this 
end. Although it is funded by the European Union, a very wide range of states 
participate in the production of i-Map, including a large number of African and 
Asian countries. The publically accessible version of the map provides a Mercator 
projection of the globe. Black, yellow and white lines distinguish between land, 
sea and air routes of migration. Feldman describes how “the viewer enjoys a 
god’s-eye view of the African land mass and the expanses of the Mediterranean 
Sea and a sense of mastery over clandestine movements” (2012, 70). Given the 
variety of supporting states, it is clear that the purpose of i-Map is not only to 
harmonise the perspectives of EU member states, but to bring in line the outlooks 
of the governments in the European neighbourhood. 
 
  
Performing Neofunctionalism: The EU as an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ 
 
The construction of a common European outlook on migration created the 
foundation for the pursuit of neofunctionalist integration. However, 
neofunctionalism is merely a method of integration, whose outcomes are 
determined by other factors (such as neoliberal ideology, as discussed in Chapter 
2). In different contexts the neofunctionalist logic may therefore produce different 
conclusions. In this section, it will be shown how spillover has in fact driven 
migration management in two seemingly contradictory directions. 
At the European Council meeting in Tampere,36 it was decided that the 
European Union should move towards the development of an area of freedom, 
security and justice. It was thought that since the EU had already built a “shared 
area of prosperity and peace,” it was now time to move into new areas of 
                                                          
36 The European Council is comprised of the heads of government of all EU member states. It is 
not to be confused with the Council of the European Union, which also represents the member 
states, but which consists of permanent national representatives. It also should not be confused for 
the Council of Europe, which is an intergovernmental institution with no affiliation with the EU. 
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governance. It is striking, that the establishment of the area of freedom, security 
and justice was framed in this manner, highlighting that the free movement of 
capital and the free movement of persons are two aims that are intricately linked. 
The Tampere meeting followed the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
allowed for the inclusion of the Schengen Agreement in the Union’s acquis 
communautaire. The freedom component thus related primarily to the free 
movement of persons across the territory of the EU, but as the Council 
Conclusions state, “this freedom should not […] be regarded as the exclusive 
preserve of the Union’s own citizens” (European Council, 1999). As a result, this 
“requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, 
while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to 
stop illegal immigration” (ibid.). The latter statement summarises the 
quintessence of the contradiction that has characterised European migration 
policy since its inception: while significant progress has been made towards the 
harmonisation of the European asylum system, and while the standards of 
national asylum systems have in many cases improved, access to European 
territory has become ever more difficult, making it harder for refugees to apply for 
asylum in the EU. 
 One of the most important instruments that the EU has used to improve 
the standards of the national asylum systems has been the European Refugee 
Fund. Between 2008 and 2013, €614 million were spent on the improvement of 
First Reception conditions, on the creation and enhancement of asylum services, 
on the renovation and construction of asylum seeker and refugee accommodation 
facilities, on the establishment of resettlement programmes,37 and on the support 
of migrants to participate in civil and cultural life. A further €676 million were 
spent on the Return Fund, which assists projects that facilitate the voluntary return 
of migrants to their countries of origin. €825 million were spent on the Integration 
Fund, which supports programmes for improving diversity management and 
projects that offer intercultural training and dialogue. During field research, it 
became clear that the European Refugee Fund is a very well recognised funding 
opportunity for government as well as non-government organisations that work 
                                                          
37 Resettlement refers to the transfer of asylum seekers, refugees and people under subsidiary 
protection to a different safe country. 
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with migrants. In key recipient countries Bulgaria, Italy and Greece, almost all 
migrant-related projects that were visited were at least partially funded by the 
European Refugee Fund. Under the new budget (2014-20), the three funds are 
combined into a single Asylum and Migration fund, which will supply €3.14 
billion with the overall objective of “the integrated management of migration” 
(European Commission, 2014a). Compared to the previous budget, this is only a 
marginal increase, especially when inflation-adjusted. Nevertheless, the European 
Refugee Fund has contributed significantly to the improvement of migration-
related infrastructure. Another way in which the EU has attempted to harmonise 
and improve the 28 national asylum systems in its territory has been via the 
creation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which became 
operational in 2011. EASO’s training curriculum has had the target of improving 
the quality of asylum decision. By training public service employees in the asylum 
area to handle asylum applications more thoroughly the First Instance acceptance 
rates38 in some member states, most significantly in Greece, have risen. This will 
be discussed in further detail in later sections. 
 While the EU has attempted to harmonise and increase the quality of its 
asylum systems, a parallel development has taken place in the area of immigration 
policy that has resulted in the fortification of the EU’s external borders. To speak 
of asylum and immigration policy is thus an oxymoron, as one policy is aimed at 
humanitarian protection, while the other is aimed at deterrence and policing. The 
term ‘Fortress Europe’ has been employed to describe the latter development 
because the EU’s external border has been cordoned off in several places. Apart 
from the well-known examples of the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, 
Greece has erected a 10.5km bladed-wire fence along a critical part of its border 
with Turkey. Surveillance along the majority of this border is now easy. Together 
with the easily policed Maritsa river, the fence seals off the narrow remaining land 
corridor. Bulgaria has recently completed construction of a similar fence along its 
own border with Turkey. While the EU has not funded the construction of these 
fences “because it considers [them] pointless,”39 the Union has contributed to 
                                                          
38 After an asylum application has been rejected, asylum seekers have to chance to reapply. First-
instance acceptance rates therefore refer to the acceptance rate of asylum applications after their 
first submission. 
39 The EU does not publically embrace the construction of fences because irregular migrants will 
always find another way to enter Union territory. 
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funding the installation of 23 thermal vision cameras along the Greco-Turkish 
border (Cercone, 2012; Nielsen, 2012). Between 2008 and 2013 the European 
External Borders Fund has provided €1.8 billion towards the establishment of 
common border control standards and the “protection against illegal crossing of 
the external border” (European Commission, 2014b). In the new budgetary period 
2014-20 the fund will be replaced by the Internal Security Fund which will have a 
budget of €3.7 billion – a significant increase, especially when considering that the 
growth of the overall EU budget was marginal. 
While EASO was created with the intention of improving the European 
asylum services, the area of immigration control has seen the crafting of a 
designated EU agency in 2005: the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, also known as Frontex. Frontex is headquartered in Warsaw, 
and concerns itself primarily with the coordination of European cooperation in 
the area of border protection. It operates primarily in the form of specific missions 
in critical parts of the EU external border. National police officers volunteer in 
these missions, primarily in the hope of improving their career opportunities. In 
the areas where field research was conducted, Frontex plays an important role in 
the reception and screening of irregular migrants. Levy (2005) traces the 
development of Frontex back to the emergence of a European discourse that 
‘securitised’ migration following the 9/11 attacks. Securitisation refers here to the 
notion that an idea or a phenomenon is discursively framed as an existential threat 
to the appropriate referent object. These “perceived threats may not be real, […] 
yet [could] have real effects” as a result of this representation (Buzan, 2000, 186). 
By means of a ‘speech act’, terrorism and migration were brought together using 
the argument that the prevention of the former requires the control of the latter. 
However, Neal (2009) disagrees, and convincingly demonstrates the 
disappearance of the securitisation discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. While 
Buzan et al. (1998) predicted that the securitisation speech act would be followed 
by the pursuit of extraordinary means to eliminate the discursively established 
security theory, this urgency quickly evaporated. Initial proposals for the creation 
of a European Border Police were rejected primarily by the British due to concerns 
about the loss of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, there existed a consensus on 
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the need for cooperation in the area of border protection. Crucially, a different 
discourse however was used to justify the need for such cooperation: the discourse 
of neofunctionalism. Neal emphasises that “Frontex is considered a logical 
continuation of the integration process and the principle of free internal movement 
in the EU” (2009, 344). Logic is clearly defined here in the neofunctionalist sense. 
However, while securitisation may not have served as the pretext for establishing 
Frontex, the agency is nevertheless an example of the securitisation of migration. 
The growing presence of this armed transnational border police at precisely the 
hotspots of ‘illegal migration’ underlines this point. 
Frontex is perhaps the most well-known example of the securitisation of 
migration, but there are other programmes that are equally significant in this 
context. The European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) that was launched 
in 2013 emerged out of a Commission proposal which identifies the need for 
European cooperation in the realm of border surveillance. Again, a 
neofunctionalist logic was applied, and it was shown how the existence of a 
common external border requires common border surveillance (European 
Commission, 2011). In a 2008 Communication by the European Commission, the 
need to “reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering the EU undetected” 
was pointed out as Eurosur’s number one objective. The installation of thermal 
cameras along critical parts of the land border was identified as one means to this 
end. However, critically, Eurosur is also to cooperate with one of the EU’s 
flagship space programmes – Copernicus. Copernicus is a satellite surveillance 
system that was originally conceived as a tool for monitoring environmental 
disasters. The programme was developed in cooperation with the European Space 
Agency (ESA), an intergovernmental organisation that has historically been 
exclusively civilian in character. While surveillance satellites can indeed be used 
to monitor the environment, the same systems can also be used for border 
surveillance. The SAGRES (Service Activations for Growing Eurosur’s Success) 
programme for example, which is a joint venture of Eurosur and Copernicus, is 
intended to monitor vessels at high seas as well as selected ports and coastlines of 
non-EU member states. This hints at the fact that so-called ‘third countries’ play 
a potentially very large role in the implementation of European asylum and 
migration policy, which will be discussed in the next section. 
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The Externalisation of Migration Management 
 
Apart from the tendency towards simultaneous harmonisation and fortification, 
the logic of neofunctionalist spillover was also applied to justify the externalisation 
of migration management to the European neighbourhood. As the Dublin regime 
has placed a particularly heavy burden on member states along the EU’s external 
border, these states have attempted to prevent irregular migrants from entering 
their territories by trying to place responsibility on third countries. In this context, 
‘third countries’ refers to both migrants’ countries of origin and transit countries. 
By framing the issue as an illegal immigration crisis rather than as a refugee crisis, 
the EU itself has contributed to this trend by arguing that illegal immigration can 
only be effectively combatted through cooperation with third countries, which 
should stop immigrants from arriving in the EU in the first place. This framing is 
the result of the Schengen regime and the Dublin Regulation, which have, to some 
extent, delegated migration management to the European level. The spirit of 
neofunctionalism is thus no longer confined to the EU itself, but ‘spills over’ into 
its neighbourhood. 
At the 1999 Tampere session of the European Council, the first step 
towards the creation of a common EU asylum and migration policy was not 
regarded to be the creation of a common European asylum system – instead, the 
priority was placed upon the cooperation with third countries. Boswell (2003) 
refers to two ways by which the EU has cooperated with the outside world in the 
area of migration. The first way relates to development assistance, trade, foreign 
direct investment and traditional diplomacy. These instruments have primarily 
been used in the countries of origin to prevent migratory flows from erupting in 
the first place. The second way refers to the externalisation of the “management 
of migration flows”, an objective targeted at the Tampere Council (European 
Council, 1999). This involves the cooperation with transit countries in the 
European periphery. It was assumed that while fences and increased surveillance 
along the EU’s external borders may be able to reduce illegal border crossings, 
action to combat illegal entry into the Union should ideally be taken in the transit 
countries themselves. Of course, the latter group has no incentive to keep migrants 
within their own territories, which is why they are often permitted to move on into 
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the EU. One Greek official stated that Turkey, being a transit country, “[helps the 
illegal immigrants] cross” (personal communication, 2 April 2014). The European 
Union has thus employed several measures to externalise the responsibility for 
irregular migrant flows towards transit countries in its immediate periphery, albeit 
with mixed results.  
Boswell (2003) distinguishes between two types of externalisation. Firstly, 
she argues, the EU has attempted to export tools of migration control. This has 
involved pushing transit countries to step up their border controls with non-EU 
countries, and to set up functioning asylum systems in the transit countries 
themselves. Secondly, Boswell argues that the EU has been trying to shift migrants 
back into the transit countries and the countries of origin by means of ‘readmission 
agreements’, which allow the EU member states to swiftly and unbureaucratically 
deport irregular migrants. However, this distinction ignores that both policies aim 
at the same outcome: the reduction of irregular migrant flows into the EU. To 
explain this point further, two of the externalising policy measures will now be 
studied more carefully: readmission agreements and the intensification of border 
controls in transit countries. 
 
 
Readmission Agreements 
 
One of the principal ways to externalise the traditional policy tools of migration 
management has been the conclusion of readmission agreements with transit 
countries and countries of origin (Trauner & Kruse, 2008). The most recent and 
widely known example of such an agreement is that between the European Union 
and the Turkish Republic. The signing of the agreement has been widely 
mediatised because a large share of ‘irregular entries’ into the EU occurs via the 
Turkish border. The agreement concerns people without valid documentation 
who reside in the European Union and who possess at least one of the following 
three qualities: current or former Turkish citizens who have not been promised 
naturalisation in one of the EU member states; non-EU citizens holding a valid 
Turkish visa; or, those residing within the EU “after having stayed on, or transited 
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through, the territory of Turkey” (European Commission, 2012a).40 Interestingly, 
while Turkey also ‘enjoys’ the complete set of reciprocal rights to deport 
individuals to the member states of the EU, another document admits that “these 
agreements have few benefits for the third country concerned” (European 
Commission, 2011). As a result, incentives have to be offered to the country with 
whom readmission agreements are concluded. The two primary instruments used 
is the launch of negotiations on the facilitation of visa free travel as well as 
financial assistance. In the case of the agreement with Turkey, both instruments 
were employed. However, it is uncertain whether visa-free travel will indeed be 
realised, as the readmission agreement merely opens the door to the initiation of 
negotiations.41 The reason for readmission agreements being included in this 
discussion of the externalisation of migration policy is that they can be seen as an 
attempt to create a migration buffer zone in the EU’s periphery. The simplification 
of deportations to countries that border the EU gives those countries an incentive 
to protect their borders against ‘irregular migration flows’, since migrants that 
have passed through their territories will eventually have to be readmitted if their 
asylum applications have been unsuccessful, and if they cannot be deported to 
their countries of origin. It is therefore preferable to prevent irregular migrants 
from entering the transit country’s territory in the first place. 
 
 
Externalisation of Border Controls 
 
Another way in which the EU has externalised migration management is by 
pushing third countries to adopt tighter border control policies. This is particularly 
poignant in the Libyan example. Libya is one of the main transit countries for 
                                                          
40 It ought to be noted here, that this does not imply that Turkey effectively becomes a member of 
the Dublin regime, as someone whose asylum application is being processed very much possesses 
the authorisation to reside within the territory of the responsible member state. However, after an 
asylum application has been rejected, the rules of the agreement do potentially apply, although the 
EU officially tries to make sure that deportation to the individual’s country of origin is impossible. 
This is very often the case if nationality cannot be established with sufficient certainty, or if the 
supposed country of origin refused to readmit the affected person. 
41 The EU currently has readmission agreements with Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cape Verde, Georgia, Macedonia, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sri 
Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. Negotiations on an agreement with Morocco have been going on 
since 2002, and the two entities have in 2013 signed a mobility partnership where they committed 
to signing a readmission agreement in the future. 
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migrants coming to Europe and, in 2009, it was estimated that up to two million 
people were awaiting passage across the Mediterranean (Milborn, 2009). The 
events of the 2011 civil war have transformed Libya from being largely a transit 
country to also being a source of migration itself. Libya features 4383km of land 
borders, the majority of which passes through vast and uninhabitable swathes of 
desert. This border can only be effectively controlled using a comprehensive array 
of methods such as satellite surveillance, cameras and patrols. The EU is 
providing assistance with all three instruments.42 The EU’s 2004 Aeneas 
Programme, which aimed at delivering financial and technical assistance to ‘third 
countries’ in the area of migration and asylum, was the first step towards the 
involvement of the EU with migration management in Libya. ‘Across Sahara’ was 
a project that was funded by this programme with €2 million, and which aimed at 
conducting a survey of the types of population movements at the border between 
Libya and Niger. Based on these findings, the project was meant to develop 
techniques to make border controls in Libya more effective, to fight against 
smuggling of migrants, and to facilitate “illegal immigration management” 
(EuropeAid, 2004). The cooperation between the EU and Libya was meant to be 
consolidated with the signing of the EU-Libya Framework Agreement. Although 
the Union never managed to complete negotiations on the agreement as a result 
of the fall of the Gaddafi government, the two entities had already agreed on a 
migration cooperation agenda which contains what would have been the most 
important points of a framework agreement. In the cooperation agenda, priority 
is given to 
 
“strengthening cooperation between Libya and [its neighbours] in the border 
surveillance and in the prevention of attempts of irregular migrants and 
smugglers to violate Libyan borders, through promoting joint patrolling, 
intelligence sharing, the development of joint training, the facilitation of 
working contacts and the establishment of dedicated communication 
channels aimed at transmitting early warnings and sensible data” (European 
Commission, 2010). 
                                                          
42 To allow more thorough border controls, the EU has in 2009 offered Libya the use of the 
Copernicus system to observe population movements across the border of Libya and Niger 
(Ronzitti, 2009). 
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As in the case of Turkey, this is done in exchange for visa liberalisation. 
This agenda is striking for several reasons. Firstly, it was negotiated with a 
government that several EU member states fought a war against just a few months 
afterwards. Secondly, Libya is not a member of the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, and it does not have an asylum system. This, of course, undermines the 
credibility of the EU’s supposed goal of protecting refugees. Thirdly, despite the 
fall of Gaddafi, the most important aspects of the agenda were implemented two 
years later, which underlines the priority that had been assigned to this 
cooperation programme. The European Union Border Assistance Mission in 
Libya (EUBAM) has been set up within the framework of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Over 100 staff participate in this mission, which is 
funded with €30 million per year with the aim of establishing ‘Integrated Border 
Management’ (IBM) in Libya. The meaning of IBM is vague. Hobbing defines it 
as the idea that “border procedures should be governed by modern economic 
strategies rather than slow bureaucratic structures” (2005, 1). He argues that IBM 
is characterised by three basic elements: (1) the interrelated problems of trade, 
crime and illegal immigration are to be tackled comprehensively; (2) the different 
national agencies responsible for different aspects of border controls should 
coordinate their activities; (3) neighbouring countries should work together in the 
management of their common border (ibid.). This narrative of the need for more 
cooperation within member states, between member states and between the EU 
and third countries clearly contributes to the securitisation of migration, while 
IBM is also being presented to be increasing efficiency. IBM is thus exemplary of 
the technocratic governance envisioned by neofunctionalism. 
The need for the externalisation of border controls towards the European 
periphery is portrayed as the result of functional spillover pressures emanating 
from the extent of integration in the Mediterranean region. The neofunctionalist 
policymaking approach is thus no longer confined to the EU itself, but spills over 
into its surroundings. EUBAM Libya trains Libyan border guards, carries out 
joint border-patrols and provides assistance in securing Libya’s coastline. Since 
2012 the governments of the UK, France and Italy have been involved in 
negotiations with the new Libyan government to facilitate multibillion euro 
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agreements between Libya and several large European security companies. 
Finmeccanica for example, one of Italy’s leading industrial corporations, has 
signed a contract with Libya on the installation of a satellite-based surveillance 
system to monitor the entire border (Shennib, 2013). Pushing countries to step up 
their border controls thus not only (potentially) curbs ‘illegal immigration’ into the 
EU, but also provides clear economic incentives. The semi-peripheral countries 
involved, such as Libya, often do not possess the necessary technical resources to 
set up sophisticated systems by themselves, which is why European companies 
are enlisted to provide the technical implementation. 
 
 
Externalisation and Dependency Theory 
 
To understand the phenomenon of the externalisation of migration policy, it is 
necessary to briefly assess the European Union’s role in the global political 
economy. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, dependency theory asserts that this 
political economy ought to be understood in terms of a global division of labour 
(Dos Santos, 1971; Ferraro, 2008). Peripheral countries are in a detrimental 
position in this global division. The core countries on the other hand have 
designed institutions and mechanisms to ensure that peripheral states will remain 
in this position. While peripheral states are responsible for the production of raw 
materials and the provision of cheap labour, core countries provide money and 
technology. This global division is perpetuated by means of international 
agreements and institutions promoting free trade (see Chapter 2 on the 
Washington Consensus). This forces peripheral states into a position whereby 
they can only maintain a comparative advantage by reducing labour costs and by 
continuing to sell raw materials without the added value of having turned them 
into useable commodities. In this context, migration from poor areas to wealthy 
areas would serve as a balancing mechanism that challenges the high standard of 
living enjoyed by the core, which is why migratory movements need to be 
confined to taking place within the periphery. The externalisation of European 
migration management is exemplary of this phenomenon, as the European Union 
forms part of the global core. It is ironic that the principles of freedom of 
174 
 
movement and the abolition of border controls feature very highly on the list of 
the European Union’s values and priorities. Indeed, cooperation with Libya and 
other neighbouring states underlines that the EU regards freedom of movement 
by no means as a universal principle. The establishment and intensification of 
border controls ought to be seen as an attempt to strengthen the sovereignty of 
national governments, which in the EU has partially eroded with its acquis and its 
supranational institutions. The freedom of movement that supposedly came along 
with this erosion as a result of neofunctionalist spillover is however desirable only 
between states and regions that are at the core of the global political economy. 
Semi-peripheral countries such as Libya are encouraged to limit the freedom of 
movement of people holding the citizenship of peripheral states. Nevertheless, the 
contradictory state of global capitalism also finds its manifestations in migration 
management. It will be shown later, how specific sectors of the European political 
economy are dependent on the limited inflow of undocumented migrants, as they 
potentially constitute an unorganised reserve army of low-wage labour. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has served two purposes. Firstly, it has been shown how 
neofunctionalist logic has been applied to the practice of migration management. 
Secondly, this chapter has delivered the foundation for an analysis of the effects 
of neofunctionalist integration on irregular migrants’ everyday experience of 
European integration, which will be discussed in the following chapter. It has been 
shown that neofunctionalist principles have been applied to create an EU-
European outlook on migration by means of a common technical language. 
Furthermore, the spillover of European migration management to third countries 
in the EU’s periphery has created a political economy that merits further research. 
Neofunctionalism has significantly contributed to the technocratisation of 
migration management, which has in turn widened the gap between European 
policymakers and migrants. A technocratic migration management apparatus has 
evolved as a result of the common functionalist outlook on migration and the 
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externalisation of migration policy instruments. This underlines the materiality of 
neofunctionalism as a method of European integration. 
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Chapter 6: Being ‘Exogenous Factors’ – Irregular Migrant 
Subalternity in the EU 
 
This chapter aims to shed light on how irregular migrants experience 
neofunctionalist European integration by presenting the findings of the main 
fieldwork. This is in line for Gramsci’s call for studying the relationship between 
the subaltern and the dominant social groups. The combination of neoliberalism 
and neofunctionalism has produced a very particular type of European Union, 
and the condition of irregular migrants is a materialisation of this Union’s 
character. While this chapter is very much the result of a normative concern for 
these migrants, irregular migration management is nevertheless regarded as a 
critical case study of the larger phenomenon of neofunctionalist integration. The 
Gramscian concept of subalternity that was outlined in Chapter 3 will be 
employed to provide a framework for this chapter. 
In its first section, four country profiles will be outlined on the four EU 
member states where field research took place. These profiles will emphasise the 
geographical, cultural and politico-economic differences between the research 
destinations, while also discussing each country’s experience with immigration. 
While Greece, Italy and Bulgaria have only become migration destinations in 
their very recent history, Germany has received large inflows of migrants since the 
1960s. If relevant, differences in the four countries’ asylum procedures will be 
highlighted. Nevertheless, the main results of the field research are not included 
in these country profiles, primarily because this would reinforce the division of 
migrants along national boundaries. Instead, six different aspects of irregular 
migrants’ experience of the European Union will be theorised and discussed in a 
second section, on the basis of field research that was carried out in Thrace, Sicily, 
Athens and Leipzig: human smuggling, first-reception, asylum management, the 
political economy of migrant labour, xenophobia and becoming European. For 
each theme, the impacts of European integration on the lived experience of 
irregular migrants will be emphasised. The concept of subalternity will be returned 
to at the end of the chapter, when obstacles will be listed that currently stand in 
the way of overcoming migrant subalternity. Knowing that there is an obstacle is 
the first step in overcoming it. 
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Context: Country Profiles 
 
Field research was conducted in four different member states of the EU: Greece, 
Italy, Bulgaria and Germany. Before looking at individual aspects of the lived 
experience of irregular migrants in the European Union, it ought to be made clear 
that each of these member states practices a different approach to the management 
of asylum and migration. Not only are their migration systems different, but the 
four countries have very different historical, cultural, politico-economic and 
geographical positions in the EU. Each of these aspects will be addressed in the 
following section on each of the four relevant member states. It should be noted 
that it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that irregular migrants’ experience 
in the EU should be regarded primarily through a national lens. The distinction 
between national groups of non-EU migrants is thus avoided for three reasons. 
Firstly, by definition a transnational migrant transcends national boundaries. 
Distinct national narratives of different national groups would fail to reflect the 
transnational perspectives of migrants in general. Secondly, the political economy 
of trafficking, which will be discussed later, goes beyond the category of the nation 
state. Smugglers operate across national boundaries and it is impossible to 
delineate between differing national experiences as a result. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, dividing irregular migrants into distinct groups according to the 
EU member state they find themselves in would contribute to the internal division 
of this subaltern group. While the experience of a migrant in Germany differs 
significantly from that of a migrant in Bulgaria, their backgrounds, aspirations and 
problems are strikingly similar. Overcoming the national division of migrant 
communities is an important step towards the generation of migrant solidarity. If 
irregular migrants were to become self-aware as a distinct political group with 
distinct problems and interests, a large leap forward could be taken towards 
changing their subaltern status. 
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Greece 
 
As a result of its geographical location in South-Eastern Europe in close proximity 
to the Mashriq countries,43 Greece has been one of the major gateways for 
migration into the European Union. Greece forms the centrepiece of what 
Frontex describes as the ‘Eastern Mediterranean route’ into the EU. Alongside 
the ‘Central Mediterranean route’ via Malta and Italy, it is the most important 
way into the EU for non-European migrants. Greece’s proximity to the Mashriq, 
its 400-year history within the Ottoman Empire, as well as the conversion of a 
large share of the population to Islam have made Greece a melting pot of Christian 
and Islamic civilizations (Yale, 1958). This is particularly noticeable in Greek 
music and cuisine, which largely have their origins in their Arabic and Turkish 
varieties. Even the Modern Greek language contains hundreds of words that are 
either of Arabic or Turkish origin. The orientation of Greece towards Western 
Europe should in this context be regarded as primarily a late 20thCentury 
phenomenon that is epitomised by the accession of Greece to the European 
Communities in 1981. Greece’s ties with the Mashriq were further accentuated by 
the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, which resulted in the 
immigration of approximately one million Anatolian Greeks. This caused the 
population to increase by almost 20% within one year. Nevertheless, within the 
scope of living memory, Greece has been a source rather than a destination of 
migratory movements. In fact, there are almost as many native Greek speakers 
outside Greece, primarily in the US, Australia, Germany, the UK and Canada, as 
there are within the Greek nation state. 
The recent wave of immigration into Greece began in the early 1990s 
during the dismantlement of ‘actually existing socialism’, with Albania being the 
main country-of-origin. When the Dublin and Schengen Conventions entered into 
force, which Greece accepted as a fait accompli which it could do nothing about 
despite the foreseeable difficulties it would cause (Sitaropoulos, 2000, 110), the 
country experienced the first significant arrivals of African and South Asian 
migrants. Triandafyllidou’s (2009) analysis of the history of Greek migration 
management since 1991 focuses on the fact that Greek immigration legislation 
                                                          
43 The Mashriq consists of Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Syria. 
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follows the principles of the European immigration instruments very closely. The 
Greek migration law of 1991, which made illegal immigration and assistance to 
illegal immigration criminal acts had failed to reduce the number of illegal 
immigrants, and a parliamentary committee was set up to revise the existing 
migration legislation (ibid., 160). After three years of negotiations, the committee 
was dissolved having produced no results. As opposed to Italy and Spain, Greece 
remained hesitant to provide amnesties to the hundreds of thousands of 
clandestinos who already resided in the country. Triandafyllidou argues that this 
is because of very strong Greek national identity; immigration was regarded as a 
threat to the “cultural and ethnic purity and authenticity of the nation” (ibid., 
162). Both socialist and conservative politicians regarded faster and more efficient 
deportations to be the primary instrument to tackle illegal immigration, and 
between 1992 and 1995 over one million immigrants, mostly Albanians, were 
deported. This represents 10% of the Greek resident population. The EU 
supported and partially subsidised the Greek efforts to deport illegal immigrants. 
In 1998, the first programme was launched that would give illegal immigrants the 
chance to legalise their residency status. Only 200,000 people would benefit from 
this programme, primarily because Greek hospitals were overwhelmed by having 
to issue huge amounts of ‘good health certificates’ that visa application required. 
Nevertheless, the 1998 regularisation programme laid the foundation for the 
integration of immigrants into the Greek labour market, but no efforts were made 
to integrate migrants into Greek society. This reinforced their subaltern status. 
The reforms of the Greek migration system that followed in the late 2000s 
occurred as a consequence of the passing of European regulations and directives, 
rather than as the result of political will (ibid.). 
In the early 2010s, the Greek government undertook a drastic measure to 
curb the number of illegal border crossings from Turkey. While the majority of 
the Greek-Turkish land border follows the river Maritsa (or Evros), a short 12.5 
km section does not and is thus difficult to control. In 2011, over 54,000 irregular 
migrants were detected during their attempt to cross the border in this area 
(Frontex, 2014a, 31). 97% of illegal border crossings occurred at the land border 
as opposed to the sea border. The construction of a 4-meter-tall bladed-wire border 
fence largely caused this migration flow to end. Between 2011 and 2013 the 
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number of documented illegal border crossings along the EU’s land border with 
Turkey dropped from 55,558 to 12,968. At the same time, the number of illegal 
maritime crossings increased from 1,467 in 2011 to 11,831 in 2013 (ibid.). Frontex 
itself confirms that the construction of the fence “produced a ‘displacement effect’ 
to the Bulgarian land border and the Greek sea border with Turkey” (2014b). 
While the overall number of irregular immigrants decreased significantly, they 
were willing to take a higher risk to enter Greece. This resulted in hundreds of 
deaths in the Aegean Sea as the small fishing boats that irregular migrants often 
arrive in are unsuitable for travel at high seas (e.g. Guardian, 2014). 
Of particular concern in the context of the history of Greek migration 
management is the evolution of the Hellenic Republic’s asylum system. In 2000, 
Sitaropoulos described Greece as a “‘(semi)peripheral’ European state whose 
refugee protection regime is still only it its infancy” (105). Until 2013, the Greek 
asylum system was managed by the Hellenic Police, responsible for the screening 
of all irregular immigrants.44 In 2012, 0.3% of asylum applicants were granted 
refugee status, 0.4% were granted subsidiary protection, and a further 0.2% were 
granted humanitarian protection (unaccompanied minors). 99.2% of asylum 
applications were rejected. These figures are largely representative of a period that 
began with the implementation of the Dublin Convention in 1997 and ending with 
the establishment of the Greek Asylum Service in 2013. It is even more surprising 
that even though an average of 300 people crossed the Greek-Turkish border 
illegally every day in 2010 (i.e. over 100,000 people), there were only 10,275 
asylum applications in the same year. 96.8% of these applications were rejected. 
Considering that the European average 85% of illegal immigrants apply for 
asylum (Morehouse & Blomfield, 2011), this number is very low. This is the result 
of a number of factors. Firstly, there was “a lack of adequate training of the border 
authorities dealing with asylum applications” (Sitaropoulos, 2000). Immigrants 
were thus often supplied with incorrect or insufficient information, and access to 
the asylum procedure was limited. Secondly, Greece is viewed primarily as a 
transit country along the path to wealthier countries with higher acceptance rates. 
European countries compete in a race-to-the-bottom by making themselves less 
                                                          
44 Screening involves several tasks such as ascertaining the identity and citizenship of the person 
involved. 
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attractive as a migrant destination by decreasing the number of successful asylum 
applications and by closing down their borders. This leads to the third reason for 
the low number of asylum applicants: the low acceptance rates create a 
disincentive for migrants to apply for asylum in the first place. 
 There were several reasons for the transfer of responsibilities from the 
Hellenic Police towards specific institutions created to deal exclusively with 
matters related to asylum and migration. When an interviewee, an employee of 
the First Reception Service, was asked why this development took place, the 
‘Greek Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management’ was given as the sole 
explanation. Supposedly this plan was aimed at “establishing an effective, 
humane oriented response to the current migration challenges including the need 
to combat irregular migration and to address the situation of vulnerable migrants” 
(Greek Ministry of Public Order, 2012). This plan has two essential components: 
the creation of a First Reception Service to handle the screening of irregular 
migrants and the establishment of an Asylum Service that is the only authority 
responsible for judging asylum applications. The interviewee explicitly stated that 
the creation of these institutions was a national decision that has nothing to do 
with any EU intervention. Another interviewee, who is the head of a Greek 
migrants’ organisation, argues that this development “would not have happened 
[without EU pressure]” (personal communication, 5 April 2014). He speaks of 
“huge [EU] pressure,” stating that Home Affairs Commissioner “Malmström 
used to come to Greece, I don’t know how many times she came, and she would 
come […] again and again and again” (ibid.). An employee of the Greek Asylum 
Service provides another insight by identifying the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) as the primary reason for the reform of the Greek asylum 
system.45 He stated that there “was a lot of pressure, friendly pressure of course, 
from European partners, both in the EU, and also [from the ECtGR], that the 
                                                          
45 In 2009 an asylum seeker who had fled Afghanistan because of persecution by the Taliban was 
ordered to be transferred from Belgium to Greece as the latter had been the country where he 
entered the EU. When we challenged this decision at the ECtHR, he was refused as the ECtHR 
trusted the Greek state to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the European asylum legislation. Upon arrival in Greece, he was detained at the 
airport, denied several of his rights, beaten, and subjected to degrading treatment. When the 
asylum seeker complained to the ECtHR again, the Court ruled in his favour, arguing that both 
Belgium and Greece were “in violation of their obligations under Articles 3 and 13” of the ECHR 
(Clayton, 2011). Dublin transfers to Greece were therefore effectively suspended until the Greek 
asylum system would undergo a significant reform. 
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asylum system in Greece has to be overhauled” (personal communication, 2 May 
2014). If the decision of the ECtHR was indeed the trigger of the Greek asylum 
system’s reform, it is noteworthy that a member of the subaltern group of illegal 
immigrants was able to single-handedly bring about these changes. The high 
human rights standards that exist within the EU can thus form one means to 
empower migrants. However, the ECtHR’s decision (see footnote 45) is also 
significant because the reform it resulted in was not the outcome of concerns for 
the situation of migrants in Greece. It appears as though the suspension of Dublin 
transfers was the decisive factor that finally resulted in this reform. The Asylum 
Service employee confirmed this, stating that “[the suspension of Dublin-
transfers] cannot continue ad infinitum, and therefore Greece’s European partners 
have every interest in the world to […] get Greece to overhaul its asylum system” 
(ibid.). At the same time, “Greece is very, very much interested in keeping the ban 
in place for the time being” (ibid.). 
 The suspension of Dublin transfers to Greece has created a situation where 
the Greek government can effectively blackmail the other member states by 
arguing that “if Greece’s European partners want the asylum system to go under 
once more, they can resume Dublin transfers” (employee of the Greek Asylum 
Service, personal communication, 2 May 2014). Greece has used this state of 
affairs to put pressure on other EU member states and the European Commission 
to provide funds for the establishment of the new asylum system. Indeed, much 
of the money that was invested into the improvement of Greece’s asylum and 
migration infrastructure has its origins in the European Refugee Fund. 
 Until very recently, the police was responsible for first reception and 
screening of irregular migrants. Even though the police’s involvement with 
matters of asylum embeds the criminalisation of migration into the EU, from the 
perspective of asylum seekers there was a distinct advantage to the old set-up: 
there are hundreds of police stations all over Greece. In principle it was therefore 
easy to access the asylum procedure, as the necessary infrastructure already 
existed. This changed in 2013 with the establishment of the First Reception 
Service and the Asylum Service. 
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Germany 
 
Germany is one of the most important migrant destinations in Europe. Despite its 
geographic position in the centre of the EU, in 2013 no other member state had 
received as many asylum applications as Germany, and Germany’s net migration 
rate far exceeded that of France and the UK standing at 5.8 migrants per 1,000 
inhabitants (Eurostat, 2014; Bauer et al., 2005). During field research and 
numerous conversations and interviews with migrants, it became clear that 
Germany in many ways represents the materialisation of the ’European Dream’. 
Germany’s comprehensive welfare system, its solid industrial basis as well as its 
growth rates despite the global economic turmoil have generated the idea that 
Germany is a land where anyone has the chance to live as he or she wishes, 
unrestricted by cultural, economic, religious or sexual obstacles. Nevertheless, 
until very recently, Germany regarded itself as a ‘no immigration country’. This 
self-understanding is vital in the contextualisation of the experience of migrants in 
Germany. 
 Schmidt and Zimmermann (1992) have attempted to conceptualise 
migration to West Germany (and Germany from 1990 onward) between 1945 and 
1992 as divided into four distinct phases: war adjustment (1945-54); manpower 
recruitment (1955-73); consolidation and restrained migration (1974-88); the 
dissolution of socialism and its aftermath (1988-92). The first phase was 
characterised by 11.5 million ‘ethnic Germans’ leaving territories that had either 
been formerly part of Germany, or that had historically been colonised by 
Germans. The second phase was initiated by an acute lack of labour that was 
caused by the need to rebuild destroyed industries and cities. As part of the ‘guest 
worker’ programme, West German companies thus recruited workers in several 
Southern European countries as well as in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. During 
this phase, the share of foreign workers in West Germany increased from 1.5% in 
1960 to 10% in 1973. The foreign population increased from 0.5 million in 1955 
to 4 million in 1973 (Bauer et al., 2005). There was an almost exact correlation 
between West German GDP growth and immigration rates. East Germany was 
faced with a similar lack of workers, and thus engaged in a parallel policy, albeit 
smaller in scope. The majority of these workers were from Vietnam, followed by 
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Mozambique and Cuba. After the first oil crisis in 1973, West German 
unemployment rose and the economic outlook became more pessimistic. This 
launched the third phase of migration into West Germany. The government 
seized all recruitment activities, and encouraged ‘guest workers’ to return to their 
countries of origin. Immigration became decoupled from GDP growth as family 
unifications became the major source of migrants. In 1980, the number of asylum 
seekers first surpassed 100,000, largely because of wars in Afghanistan and Sri 
Lanka. In contrast to West Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
continued its own guest worker programme after 1973. In 1988, over 100,000 
foreign workers lived in the GDR. The collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ 
triggered the fourth phase of immigration, which was constituted mainly of 
asylum seekers from formerly socialist countries. Germany became the major host 
for refugees escaping the Balkan Wars. The number of asylum applications in 
Germany reached its peak in 1992 when 400,000 applied for asylum. At the same 
time, the acceptance rates dropped from 29% in 1985 to merely 4% in 1992; more 
people thus received refugee status in 1985 than in 1992. In total, 1.2 million 
people migrated to Germany in 1992. The relaxation of emigration regulations in 
Central and Eastern Europe allowed for further ‘ethnic Germans’ to immigrate, 
allowing a further 400,000 to arrive in Germany between 1989 and 1990 (Bauer 
et al., 2005). 
 The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees caused a controversial 
public debate on the tightening of the German asylum law with the aim of 
reducing the number of asylum applications. Following the signing of the Dublin 
Convention, the 1993 Asylkompromiss resulted in the German constitution being 
changed to include Article 16a. It is noteworthy that the Dublin regime would 
have transgressed the Grundgesetz before this reform. The inclusion of Article 16a 
limited the fundamental right to asylum in Germany to people who had not 
immigrated through a country that was considered safe. The government thus 
made agreements with Romania, Poland, Switzerland, Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic to allow for the swift return of asylum seekers to these countries if they 
had entered Germany through them. Since the Dublin Convention applied to all 
other countries neighbouring Germany, the latter was surrounded by ‘safe 
countries’. The only legitimate way for a refugee to apply for asylum in Germany 
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was thus to arrive via plane or ship. As a result of this constitutional reform, as 
well as due to the end of the Balkans Wars and the relative stability in international 
relations, the number of asylum applications steadily declined until 2007. 
 According to the Qualifications Directive, asylum seekers in Germany 
may receive one of the following four statuses: refugee status, subsidiary 
protection, humanitarian protection, or rejection. Asylum seekers in Germany are 
not allowed to work, and they are not allowed to leave the city or county they live 
in without a special permit (cf. Residenzpflicht). If an asylum application is rejected, 
migrants are asked to leave Germany voluntarily. This also applies to migrants 
who are affected by the Dublin Regulation. If they do not comply, they may be 
placed in detention until they are deported, either to their country-of-origin or to 
the member state that is responsible for their asylum application (Pelzer & Sextro, 
2013). Until recently, so called ‘pre-removal detainees’ were incarcerated in 
regular prisons alongside other criminals. In July 2014, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that this practice constitutes a violation against the Returns 
Directive, demanding all detainees to be moved to facilities allocated specifically 
for pre-removal detention (European Court of Justice, 2014). In addition to the 
four statuses, Germany possesses a fifth instrument outside European legislation. 
If an asylum application has been rejected, and if the deportation of the affected 
migrant cannot be carried out, for example because there is a war in his country 
of origin, because the migrant possesses no travel document, or because the 
migrant’s country of origin is unknown, he may receive the status of Duldung, 
which translates into ‘toleration’. Duldung permits migrants to stay in Germany, 
although they are forbidden from working, from leaving the territory of the city or 
country they reside in without authorisation, from participating in free German 
classes and from leaving Germany. If they do leave German territory, they are 
forbidden from re-entering the country. Although the duration of possessing this 
status is limited to six months, it can in principle be renewed indefinitely.46 
                                                          
46 The English cognate of Duldung is the uncommon verb ‘to thole’, which means enduring 
something without complaint. Old English þolian refers to suffering, undergoing and surviving. 
The proto-Indo-European root tele means ‘to bear’ or ‘to carry’. This illustrates the way the state 
views migrants who possess this status, as it presents itself as being in a condition of enduring their 
presence without complaint. The word Kettenduldung (‘chain tholing’) is used to describe a 
situation where the Duldung status is repeatedly renewed. While the reference to chains is meant 
to emphasise the duration and repetitiveness of the situation, it can alternatively be understood as 
‘being in chains’. 
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 The most significant legal changes in the German immigration system 
occurred in 2005 when the ‘Bill on the Management and Limitation of 
Immigration and on the Regulation of Residency and Integration of Union 
Citizens and Foreigners’ entered into force. The law was presented as “[ending] a 
period of decades, where Germany was seen against all empirical evidence as ‘no 
immigration country’,” because it contains an economic immigration agenda 
(Bauer et al., 2005, 197). Nevertheless, although the bill affected nearly every 
aspect of German immigration law, the changes remain superficial. Very little 
actually changed in practice and many clauses were of a largely semantic nature. 
The most controversial change allowed foreign highly skilled professionals to 
immigrate to Germany if they have a job offer with an appropriately high salary 
(€49,600 per annum in 2016). Foreign graduates of German universities can be 
given up to 18 months to find themselves a suitable type of employment (German 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2013). The recruitment stop was 
maintained, and it remains very difficult to immigrate to Germany. 
The rich academic literature that deals with the reasons for the 2005 reform 
cites three major reasons for it. Renner (2005) views the bill as a step towards the 
establishment of a single European immigration system. Indeed, with the ‘Blue 
Card’ scheme of the European Union that entered into force in 2012, the German 
regulation on the immigration of highly skilled professionals largely became 
obsolete. Bauer et al. (2005) cite the contradiction between the empirical reality of 
Germany being an immigration country and the lack of immigration legislation 
as the major reason for the passing of the bill. This argument is however weakened 
by the fact that the reform was actually rather superficial, having very few practical 
consequences for the everyday lives of migrants in Germany. A more plausible 
reason is that the German government saw itself confronted with a public 
dissatisfaction with the former immigration regime. There existed a widespread 
impression that foreigners in Germany were insufficiently ‘integrated’ into 
mainstream society. So as not to seem helpless and paralysed, the government 
introduced compulsory ‘integration programmes’. To underline the distinction 
between wanted and unwanted migrants, the immigration opportunities for highly 
skilled migrants were enhanced, so as to give the impression that the German 
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policy is directed against the immigration of migrants that may ‘burden’ 
taxpayers. This may also explain the name of the bill. 
 The events triggered by the financial crisis of 2008 caused significant 
changes in the migration patterns in Germany. The country became the most 
important destination for migrants from Southern member states looking for 
employment. Nevertheless, a large share of these migrants left Germany very soon 
after their arrival. In the early 2010s, the number of asylum applications in 
Germany began to grow back towards the levels seen in the 1990s with 109,580 
new applications in 2013 (German Federal Office for Migrations and Refugees, 
2014). This number contains 35,538 so-called Dublin cases, which were requested 
to be transferred to the EU member state responsible (ibid.). Russians, Serbians 
and Afghans constituted the largest national groups among asylum seekers in 
Germany. The German government is thus considering declaring Serbia a safe 
third country to allow for a swifter return of asylum seekers from that country. 
 
 
Italy 
 
With the distance between Sicily and Tunisia only being 150 kilometres, Italy is a 
major point of entry for ‘illegal immigrants’ into the EU alongside Greece. 
Frontex considers the country to form the centre of the Central Mediterranean 
migratory route, through which 40,000 illegal border crossings have been 
registered in 2013 (Frontex, 2014c). Italy is a deeply divided country, with the 
North being highly industrialised and possessing one of the highest standards of 
living in Europe, and with the South being largely dependent on agriculture and 
being significantly poorer. The division is further underlined by the fact that only 
the south of Italy is a major recipient of European structural cohesion funds. In 
the context of the political economy of European integration, it is therefore not 
possible to speak of Italy as a single unit. The North and the South of Italy have 
entirely different functions in this political economy, which is accentuated by 
differing migration patterns in the two regions. The Islamic heritage which is 
particularly visible in the Sicilian capital of Palermo, the failure of central 
governance due to the influence of the mafia, and the existence of a large irregular 
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labour market have all contributed to the Italian South being an attractive 
destination for migrants from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Italy’s 
geographical location has furthermore made the region a point of arrival for 
refugees. Italy is one of the major recipients of Dublin transfers. 
 The post-World War II history of the Italian immigration experience can 
be seen as a melange of the German and Greek examples. Italy has been an 
immigration destination since the 1960s, possessing pull factors similar to those 
of Germany because of its industrialised North. At the same time, the large scale 
arrival of ‘illegal immigrants’ has given the Italian case a very Mediterranean 
character and Ammendola et al. (2004) describe Italy as an example of a supposed 
‘Mediterranean immigration model’. This model is thought to be characterised by 
large numbers of seasonal agricultural workers, a highly segmented labour market, 
illegal immigration, the transition from unregulated immigration towards its 
extensive restriction, and the exclusion of immigrants from social integration 
programmes. They trace the beginning of immigration to Italy back to the early 
1970s, when Italy became a fallback for migrants who had originally planned on 
moving to West Germany and other more attractive destinations. After the oil 
crisis of 1973, West Germany stopped its labour recruitment programme, leaving 
Italy as next choice. They evidence this idea by citing statistics that show that the 
number of migrants in Italy grew significantly during the 1970s. Colombo und 
Sciortino (2004) on the other hand, argue that this widespread narrative is based 
on a skewed analysis of the immigration data, which is based on the number of 
residency permits issued per year. Colombo and Sciortino point out that these 
statistics include expired residency permits. If these expired permits are removed 
from the data, it becomes apparent that migration to Italy began before 1973 and 
may therefore be a new phenomenon that is not necessarily related to the more 
restrictive immigration policies of several Western European countries. Between 
1970 and 1986 the number of legal foreign residents in Italy remained relatively 
constant between 150,000 and 200,000. Italy is clearly very different from the 
West German example, because it never had coordinated recruitment 
programmes. Nevertheless, the North possessed the same pull-factors as West 
Germany. Italian industrial companies recruited workers from various Arab 
countries, albeit on a far smaller scale than West German companies. Yugoslav 
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workers were hired to assist with the reconstruction work after the 1976 Fruili 
earthquake, and Tunisians came to Italy to work in the fishing industry. Until 
1986, the largest group of immigrants were colonial elites returning from former 
Italian colonies and other parts of Africa. Between 550,000 and 800,000 members 
of this group resumed residence in Italy during this period. About 20% of 
residency permits were issued to students. The number of asylum applications in 
Italy was extremely low (2,000-3,000), primarily because only people from 
COMECON countries were considered to be legitimate applicants. In 1970, 
members belonging to the ten largest national immigrant groups made up 50% of 
all immigrants to Italy. Towards the 1990s, immigration to Italy became far more 
heterogeneous (ibid.).  
1981 marked one of the first legislative interventions in the immigration 
field. The coalition government that was led by the Christian Democrats passed a 
bill that gave foreign workers with a company contract in Italy the same status as 
Italian workers. With the mass arrival of undocumented migrants and potential 
refugees the character of migration to Italy as well as the Italian immigration 
system changed significantly. During the 1980s, undocumented migrants began 
to arrive in Italy and, in 1986, an amnesty was granted to allow this group to apply 
for residency permits.47 Many of these arrivals were potential refugees, although 
it was impossible for them to apply for asylum unless they came from COMECON 
countries. Nevertheless, even after this regulation was lifted with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the annual volumes of asylum applications 
remained relatively modest, ranging from 680 to 2,590 between 1992 and 1997 
(NOAS, 2011). The first significant increase in the number of asylum applications 
occurred in 1998 after the Dublin Convention came into effect. Italy’s 
geographical location often made it the only EU member state where refugees 
would be able to lodge an asylum application. The number of applications rose to 
13,100 in 1998, and to over 30,000 in 1999, largely as a result of the Kosovo war. 
This level of applications submitted began to decline again after the war, but 
stayed at approximately 15,000 until 2007. This development is in stark contrast 
to the estimated one million undocumented migrants who resided in Italy in 2008. 
In January 2010, 4.2 million foreigners legally resided in Italy, further underlining 
                                                          
47 The amnesty served as a role model for the amnesty policies implemented in Greece in 1998. 
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how Italy has turned into an immigration destination. The largest group of legal 
foreign residents was from Romania (887,763). Due to the Romanian language’s 
similarity with Italian, Italy is a very attractive migration destination for 
Romanians (Istat, 2010). 
 To understand the discrepancy between the number of undocumented 
migrants and the number of asylum applications, one must consider the structure 
of the Italian asylum system. Before 2005, all asylum seekers were interviewed 
centrally in Rome. Due to a lack of accommodation facilities in the Italian capital, 
a large share of asylum applicants did not possess a fixed address. As a result, 
nearly 50% of all asylum applications received no verdict because the authorities 
were unable to contact the applicants. Furthermore, until 2005, there was neither 
a national first-reception system nor facilities to shelter new arrivals. The Bossi-
Fini law, which was passed in 2002 and entered into force in 2005, marked an 
extensive reform of the Italian asylum and migration system. The ‘Central 
Commission for the Recognition of the Refugee Status’ that was located in Rome 
was replaced by the ‘National Commission for the Right of Asylum’. The latter 
commission established seven (and later ten) regional asylum offices, significantly 
improving access to the asylum procedure. The recognition rates also increased as 
a result of the more thorough handling of asylum applications, from 25% in the 
early 2000s to 50% by 2008. The first reception Centro di Identificazione in Rome 
was replaced by a network of ‘Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers’ (CARA). 
A CARA centre is meant to host asylum seeker until their application has been 
completed, for a period of no more than 35 days. These facilities are not detention 
centres, as the residents are able to leave if they apply for permission to do so. 
After the completion of the asylum application, the asylum seeker should 
theoretically be allocated a place in a SPRAR centre. In 2002, the ‘System of 
Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ (SPRAR) was created to coordinate 
the efforts of the central government, the municipalities and NGOs to provide 
accommodation for these migrants. In 2010, there were 3,500 places in SPRAR 
facilities, which can host asylum seekers and vulnerable people for up to six 
months, although an extension is possible. In practice, however, the low number 
of places in SPRAR centres causes many asylum seekers to ask for an extension 
of their stay in CARA centres. 
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Bulgaria 
 
In the early 2010s, Bulgaria became a major destination for undocumented 
migrants entering the EU. The country’s land border with Turkey (240 kilometres) 
is slightly longer than that of Greece, and until very recently, few obstacles have 
prevented irregular border crossings. Bulgaria’s history is in many ways similar to 
that of Greece due to the country having formed a part of the Ottoman Empire for 
almost 500 years until 1878. This has left numerous visible traces in the Bulgarian 
cuisine, music and culture, and about 10% of the population are Muslims, which 
is the highest share of any EU member state. Since 1990, Bulgaria has suffered 
from large-scale emigration and very low birth rates. In 2013, only four countries 
in the world experienced a more rapid population decline than Bulgaria: Saint 
Pierre and Miquelon, Moldova, the Cook Islands and, notably, Syria. According 
to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, the population is set to decline to 
five million by 2070, down from nine million in 1989 (2014). Bulgaria has the 
lowest GDP per capita in the EU, standing at only 47% of the EU average. 
Nevertheless, alongside Greece, it forms the centrepiece of the core of the ‘Eastern 
Mediterranean route’. Due to the Dublin Regulation, Bulgaria is responsible for 
increasing numbers of asylum applications. 
 During the Cold War, Bulgaria formed part of the Soviet-dominated 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and maintained a very 
restrictive migration policy. Emigration in particular was to be prevented, 
especially for ethnic Bulgarians, which constitute around 90% of the population. 
Ethnic Turks were nonetheless able to leave the country. 160,000 ethnic Turks left 
Bulgaria between 1950 and 1952, and a further 350,000 left between 1982 and 
1992, largely out of fears of “enforced Bulgarianization and economic problems” 
(Fassmann & Münz, 1994).48 Nevertheless, Krasteva (2006) identifies three groups 
that did immigrate to Bulgaria before 1990. Firstly, students from ‘third world’ 
countries were encouraged to study in Bulgaria in an effort to spread socialist 
ideas. Secondly, leftwing activists and ideological sympathisers came to Bulgaria 
from Greece and Turkey. A third group is comprised of recruited Vietnamese 
                                                          
48 In this context, Bulgarianization refers to the loss of the distinct identity of ethno-religious 
groups residing in Bulgaria, and its replacement with a Bulgarian identity. The state can support 
this development by permitting schooling in Bulgarian only. 
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workers who came to work in the Bulgarian construction sector. These 
recruitment programmes were similar in character and scope to those in the 
German Democratic Republic. Bulgarian migration policy, however, changed 
substantially upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 From 1990 until the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007, 
immigration policy was in fact largely unregulated. Nevertheless, restrictions were 
in place for resident foreigners, exemplified by the ‘foreigners’ clause’ in the 
Bulgarian constitution, which stated that foreigners cannot acquire land in 
Bulgaria except through inheritance. This article was amended in 2005 in 
preparation of the country’s future EU membership. Despite this, apart from the 
European regulatory framework, Bulgaria does not possess “an articulated and 
comprehensive formal policy concerning non-citizens present within the territorial 
bounds of the state” (Lewis & Daskalova, 2008, 82). It is possible for non-EU 
citizens to work in Bulgaria under the condition that they possess a work permit. 
The application for this permit is submitted by the potential employer, whose 
foreign workforce must not comprise more than 10% of all employees, and who 
is obliged to pay the foreign worker a salary that is “significantly disproportionate 
to the minimum salary received by Bulgarian employees” (ibid., 86). Access of 
foreigners to the Bulgarian labour market is further complicated by ‘the triple 
procedure’, which requires work permit applications to be assessed by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, a Bulgarian diplomatic representation and 
the Ministry of Interior. Immigrants that have been granted refugee status, 
however, have access to the labour market, and are further supported by the 
National Programme for the Integration of Refugees, which was launched to fulfil 
Bulgaria’s humanitarian obligations as an EU member state. The programme 
offers language training as well as professional education, and establishes contact 
between refugees and their potential employers. Asylum seekers have access to 
the labour market, but only if their application is not processed within one year. 
 Between 1998 and 2012, Bulgaria received between 500 and 2890 asylum 
applications per year – a number that seems very low considering the country’s 
geographical location. In 2013, the number of asylum applications rose to 7,145, 
which represents an increase by over 400% compared to 2012 (Bitoulas, 2014). 
The majority of these applications were lodged by Syrians, for whom Bulgaria was 
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a fallback destination as a result of the construction of the border fence between 
Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria’s position as a migrant destination is thus a very 
recent, albeit probably temporary phenomenon, as Bulgaria has recently 
completed the construction of its own border fence with Turkey. The State Agency 
for Refugees has been created in 2002 to handle asylum applications. In line with 
the common practice throughout the EU, asylum seekers are detained for several 
weeks for identification and medical screening and for finalising their asylum 
applications. The status an asylum applicant will receive is in accordance with the 
European Qualifications Directive (i.e. refugee status, subsidiary protection, 
humanitarian protection or rejection). The Agency is notoriously underfunded 
and implicated in accusations of mismanaging money received from the European 
Refugee Fund in 2013 (Stamboliyska, 2014). Acceptance rates in Bulgaria are far 
above the EU average because the majority of asylum applications are lodged by 
Syrians. The civil war in Syria makes it very likely to receive the subsidiary 
protection status. 
 Despite Bulgaria having been an EU member state since 2007, Germany 
has undertaken extensive efforts to prevent the country from joining the Schengen 
Area. Although corruption and lacking the rule of law were cited in December 
2013 by the German home affairs minister as the primary reasons for Germany’s 
policy, the European division on Bulgaria’s Schengen membership reveals that 
strategic considerations may be the real cause of German unwillingness to 
incorporate Bulgaria into the Schengen Area (Zeit, 2013). While Greece held the 
presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2014, it vowed to support 
Bulgarian aspirations to join the Schengen Area, and Italy has similarly supported 
Bulgaria’s bid. This is no coincidence for the expansion of the Schengen Area to 
Bulgaria and Romania would open a borderless land corridor between the Turkish 
border and the EU core. If migrants succeeded in crossing the European-Turkish 
frontier unnoticed, the removal of border controls between Bulgaria and 
Romania, as well as between Romania and Hungary would make it significantly 
easier to reach more desirable destinations. Bulgaria thus forms part of an asylum 
buffer zone. 
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Being ‘Exogenous Factors’ 
 
Now that the national settings of the four research locations have been established, 
the experiences of irregular migrants will be discussed in six thematic sections: 
human smuggling, first reception, asylum management, the political economy of 
migrant labour, xenophobia and naturalisation. Each section will theoretically 
contextualise and analyse these experiences as aspects of irregular migrants’ 
subalternity, with reference to the categories that were developed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Human Smuggling and Reification 
 
If it is not possible to enter the European Union legally, creating a market for 
human smugglers to facilitate the transfer of migrants across the EU-border. This 
represents the first step towards the reification of migrants, a concept which was 
discussed in Chapter 3. I-Map, which  plays an important role in producing the 
homogenous outlook on immigration into Europe that a common European 
migration management strategy is believed to require from a neofunctionalist 
perspective, projects migrants as data streams rather than as human beings. As 
will be shown, smuggling is another method by which migrants are reified. Thus 
is an aspect of subalternity as dominant groups are able to travel relatively freely 
without the need of smugglers for their transit. By definition, the market for 
human smuggling requires the existence of barriers along the European border 
that are difficult to circumvent, and whose crossing constitutes a legal offence. 
These barriers, in turn, are the result of neofunctionalist integration, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
 Alongside war, slavery, prostitution, pornography and the illegal trade 
with human body parts, human smuggling is one of the ultimate forms of human 
reification. It represents a situation where control over one’s body is involuntarily 
surrendered for commercial purposes (cf. Wilkinson, 2003). It is involuntary 
because it arises out of the migrant’s state of need, and because there is no way to 
enter the EU without the use of smugglers. It is one of the ultimate forms of 
reification because the migrant is doubly reified. Firstly, reification takes place 
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during the initial financial exchange, where the migrant is seen by the smuggler 
not as a unique human being, but merely as a source of income. Reification is then 
repeated as the migrant’s body itself is the object that is being smuggled. The 
smugglers will expose migrants to all kinds of risks during the journey, including 
drowning, disease, injury, imprisonment, malnutrition and starvation, 
dehydration, sexual exploitation and rape, separation from one’s family, robbery, 
as well as extreme levels of psychological stress and anxiety. This is made possible 
by the lack of empathy on the part of smugglers. Ironically, the reification that 
occurs during the journey to Europe is associated by migrants with escaping 
another type of reification. Particularly for refugees, who may have been reduced 
to their value as weapons of war or objects of sexual gratification, coming to 
Europe represents the hope of being able to lead a self-determined life.  
 The restrictive immigration policies of the European Union have opened 
up a unique and unprecedented business opportunity for human smugglers. While 
fences and border patrols may be temporarily able to alter the direction of irregular 
migration flows, they have been shown to be ineffective in stopping irregular 
migration into the EU altogether. From the perspective of an irregular migrant, it 
is unimportant whether one enters Europe through Greece, Italy or Bulgaria, as 
all three are considered primarily as transit destinations. If it becomes more 
difficult to enter the EU through Greece, irregular migrants will enter through 
Bulgaria – the smugglers’ source of income remains. Furthermore, the more 
difficult it becomes to enter the EU, the more money is demanded for human 
smuggling, thus increasing the attractiveness of becoming involved in this 
business. While the EU has committed itself to “stopping those who organise 
irregular migration” (European Commission, 2013), the existence of a fortified 
external border is the very reason for the surge in human smuggling activities. 
Irregular migrants are willing to spend their entire possessions and to risk their 
lives in the attempt to reach Europe; further fortification will thus only increase 
their dependence on smugglers, reinforcing their subaltern state. 
Different smuggling destinations come at difference prices: €300 for 
Bulgaria, €3,000 for Greece, €8,000 for Germany and €10,000 for Sweden and 
Norway. Names are often irrevocably changed and birthdays altered to supply 
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forged travel documents which are then more likely to produce valid asylum 
claims. 
Although destinations and countries of origin may differ, irregular 
migrants’ experiences with being smuggled into the EU are often strikingly 
similar. One Syrian refugee who applied for asylum in Bulgaria described the 
existence of a ‘smuggling market’ in Istanbul (personal communication, 18 March 
2014). He described how easy it is to find smugglers in the Turkish capital, that it 
is actually the smugglers who approach the migrants: “Once they know that you 
are Syrian, they come to you. ‘Do you want to travel anywhere? Anywhere in the 
world you like…’ And every country has its own price” (ibid.). The way this 
refugee conveyed his experience is reminiscent of a travel agency. Smugglers thus 
try to present the smuggling experience in a non-reifying way, while at the same 
time maintaining an inherently reifying stance of cognition. It is noteworthy that 
the existence of the smuggling market is the result of European legislation such as 
the Dublin Regulation. This completes the picture of a political economy of 
smuggling. The ‘service’ provided by the smugglers themselves consisted of 
bringing the migrant to a place along the border that they knew was safe to cross. 
The Syrian refugee, who travelled with his wife and her parents, reported having 
to walk for one hour before reaching a small fence that they climbed across to 
enter Bulgaria. The risk to the smugglers themselves is thus minimal. 
 While land crossings across unsecured borders are relatively easy, the 
construction of fences along the EU’s external frontiers has shifted migratory 
routes towards the sea. Irregular migrants are well aware of the dangers inherent 
in travelling on the seas, and several interviewees referred to stories heard of 
deaths along the perilous journey. A former employee of the Hellenic Coastguard, 
who was regularly involved in rescuing migrants on sea, reported on the state of 
smuggler boats: “You will never go on board one of these boats. There is no safety, 
there is no security, there is nothing. They have no life jackets” (personal 
communication, 4 July 2014). The boats lack basic navigation devices, and the 
irregular migrants are often merely told to roughly head for a particular direction. 
It is common for smugglers to accompany the migrant boat with a second vessel, 
sometimes for part of the journey, and occasionally for the entire trip, particularly 
if the distances covered are short. According to the employee of the Hellenic 
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Coastguard, it has occurred that migrants were told by the smugglers that they 
were being brought to Italy, only to be left on the coast of the Peloponnese 
peninsula in Greece. Migrant boats regularly arrive on the coasts of Greece and 
Italy during extremely adverse weather conditions, when larger ships are 
forbidden from sailing (ibid.). This reflects the smugglers’ lack of empathy for the 
migrants concerned as well as their lack of expertise and experience with sea 
travel. A Nigerian irregular migrant who traversed the Mediterranean Sea from 
Libya spent five days on the vessel that carried her across 500 kilometres to Sicily. 
She reported that not everyone who travelled on the same boat with her survived 
the voyage, as six large waves nearly submerged the craft (personal 
communication, 4 May 2014). Particularly during adverse weather conditions, 
there is also a high risk of running out of petrol on the high sea. Smugglers are 
well aware of these risks, which explains why it is much more expensive to be 
smuggled into Greece than it is to be smuggled into Bulgaria. 
 In Sicily, the influence of the mafia plays a significant role in human 
smuggling operations. In most of Sicily, the mafia acts as a quasi-government 
which provides security to various businesses in exchange for protection rackets 
(Gambetta, 1996). The vast majority of Sicilian businesses are directly involved 
with the mafia, including the agricultural industry, which forms the backbone of 
the Sicilian economy (ibid.). While the dependency of agriculture in Sicily on 
cheap migrant labour will be discussed in later sections, it is important to mention 
that the mafia has turned the importation of workers from Africa into a source of 
income. Interviewees have reported that migrants are deliberately imported from 
Northern Africa to turn them into agricultural workers. An employee of the Italian 
Refugee Council told me that migrants have been seen to move from a Libyan 
smuggler vessel onto a Sicilian mafia boat before reaching Italian shores. This 
would at least tentatively evidence the close links between the mafia and 
smuggling operations. This commodification of migrants, their transformation 
into a cheap labour force, adds yet another level to the depth of their reification. 
 While smuggling is of course an important materialisation of the 
commodification of irregular migrants, it is nevertheless also a way to undermine 
the ascending hegemony of transnational capital. Smuggling and irregular 
migration represent the failure of the migration regime that the dominant groups 
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have established, whose aim is to curb irregular migration. Any opportunity for 
the world’s subaltern to enter Europe disturbs the hegemony that has produced 
migrant subalternity in the first place. In the case of neofunctionalism, this applies 
particularly because of the theory’s view of the European Union as a closed 
system. Smuggling and the possibility of irregular migration to Europe highlight 
the fallacy of this assumption. 
 
 
The Biopolitics of First Reception 
 
Upon arrival in the EU, migrants are placed in first reception centres where they 
undergo medical screening and where their identity and status are determined. 
The procedures that are carried out in first reception centres represent one of the 
most potent and apparent manifestations of biopolitics in the course of the 
experience of irregular migration to Europe. They also add another layer to their 
subaltern state, as members of dominant groups are unlikely to be exposed to such 
treatment. One of the ways in which migrants are exposed to biopolitics is through 
establishing urgent need for medical care as the arguably most legitimate way to 
achieve legal recognition (Fassin, 2001). The reduction to the ‘suffering body’ 
occurs when migrants receive the status of ‘vulnerability’, which is granted to 
pregnant women, unaccompanied minors (immature bodies) and people with 
serious illnesses. 
Upon arrival in Europe, the state apparatus views migrants primarily as 
potential transport vessels for contagious diseases. Newly arrived migrants are 
thus placed in quarantine until they are administered with forced vaccinations 
against the polio virus. Although racial discrimination has become the most 
illegitimate way of social categorisation, the ‘racialised body’ is an empirical 
reality on Europe’s borders. In Sicily, the vast majority of illegal immigrants are 
black, leading to extreme cases of racial segregation in migrant accommodation 
centres. 
In Greece, the newly established First Reception Service is meant to be the 
first government agency that an illegal immigrant comes into contact with. 
However, as the interview with a member of the Hellenic Coastguard showed, in 
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practice migrants are often first confronted with the Coastguard, with the border 
police, or with Frontex itself (personal communication, 4 July 2014). Both 
agencies are manifestations of biopolitics. Immigrants are meant to be brought to 
a First Reception Centre, that is a detention facility in which screening takes place. 
This process is extremely similar throughout the EU, although different agencies 
are responsible for first reception. In Germany, for example, the police is tasked 
with screening. Detention for purposes of identification is nevertheless standard 
practice. It thus becomes clear that when an illegal migrant enters EU territory, 
she loses control over her body. As of December 2013, the Greek First Reception 
Service ‘screened’ 13% of all documented illegal immigrants arriving in Greece, 
while the remaining 87% were 
screened by the police (personal 
communication, 2 May 2014). It is 
the First Reception Service’s 
medium-term goal to screen all 
illegal immigrants. There is 
currently only one First Reception 
Centre, which is located in 
Orestiada at the border with 
Turkey. A second one is under 
construction. 
The first step of screening 
involves the registration of the 
person concerned into the Eurodac 
database by means of taking their 
fingerprints. Eurodac is clearly an 
aspect of biopolitics, as it is an 
attempt to gather information on 
migrants’ unique physiological features. The fingerprint has established itself as 
the symbol used by asylum agencies and the European Commission for migration-
related matters. It can be found on the front page of an Italian brochure for asylum 
seekers (see Figure 5), and on the first page of the Greek equivalent. The migrant’s 
identity is reduced to physiology, as all other means of identification are 
Figure 5: Front page of the Italian guide for 
asylum seekers, whose production was funded 
by the European Refugee Fund 
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considered to be potentially unreliable. Thereupon, the migrant is identified via 
her documents and an attempt is made to determine nationality. Particularly in 
Greece and Italy, this is not always easy, as the majority of migrants (with the 
notable exception of Syrians) arrives without valid travel documents. Nationality 
can nevertheless be determined by asking immigrants questions about the city they 
claim to be from, which they are expected to know the answers to. Nevertheless, 
no method to determine nationality is absolutely reliable and mistakes are 
inevitably made. In all member states, medical screening is then carried out, with 
the primary purpose of determining whether the immigrant has been vaccinated 
against diseases that no longer exist in Europe. If an immigrant is unable to prove 
that he has been vaccinated, the vaccination is carried out immediately. According 
to the employee of the Greek First Reception Service the vaccination is not 
obligatory, although refusal to be vaccinated will result in one being put under 
permanent quarantine (personal communication, 2 April 2014). This is one of the 
most striking representations of biopolitics, as the state has authority over aspects 
of the migrant’s body. The final step of screening involves the immigrant being 
given information on his current whereabouts and on his rights and obligations 
under international law. During the interview, the employee of the First Reception 
Service presented a brochure in French outlining the details of the information 
that immigrants are given. The brochure is entitled “pous les refugies et les 
citoyens de tiers pays qui sont venus illegalement a notre pays,” a title which 
contains several grave spelling mistakes. The front page depicts a painted pair of 
hands that suggests protection and safety. However, one of the hands is dark-
skinned, and appears to be receiving, while the other is fair-skinned, and seems to 
be giving. Both interpretations are somewhat juxtaposed against the title of the 
brochure which translates into “for refugees and third-country citizens who have 
come illegally to our country” (Greek Ministry of Public Order, 2013a). The pages 
that follow contain maps of Greece and the EU. Greece is described as “the 
country of democratic values and respect for human rights,” as “the country that 
has given birth to theatre, tragedy and the attic comedy,” and as a society that 
“has always been receptive of difference” (ibid., 8). The brochure furthermore 
contains information on one’s rights as well as a list of useful phone number and 
addresses, among them being public institutions as well as NGOs. Once the 
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screening is concluded, it is determined to which of the following three groups the 
illegal immigrant belongs: vulnerable persons, asylum seekers or non-asylum 
seekers. The first group of ‘suffering bodies’ is composed primarily of 
unaccompanied minors, pregnant women and elderly people (Fassin, 2001). In 
Greece, about 10% of illegal immigrants belong into this group, which is referred 
on to the National Centre of Social Solidarity to be placed in accommodation 
facilities. The second group, which also constitutes around 10% of the total 
number of illegal immigrants in Greece, is referred on to the Asylum Service to 
submit an asylum application. The third group represents the vast majority of 
people who have undergone screening. Members of this group do not want to 
apply for asylum primary because they view Greece as a transit country.49 This 
group is referred to the Hellenic Police. The police will then arrange for members 
of this group to be put in so-called ‘pre-removal centres’ to wait for their 
deportation. These centres will be discussed later. 
For the duration of the screening, irregular migrants are forced to remain 
at the screening facility. An official request was made to the Greek First Reception 
Service to carry out interviews with the residents of the First Reception Centre 
near Orestiada, but this request was subsequently denied with no explanation 
being given. The only reception centre of the First Reception Service was opened 
in 2013 in the small village of Fylakio near Orestiada, being capable of holding 
240 people. Before the First Reception Service was created, the Fylakio facility 
served as a detention centre for illegal immigrants. A delegation of the German 
parliament’s home affairs committee which included five German MPs visited 
Fylakio in 2011 and reported “degrading and disgraceful” conditions inside the 
camp (Kolbe, 2011). Human Rights Watch also visited the camp, and described 
how the inmates have all “experienced or witnessed violence and ill-treatment by 
guards” (2009). The reduction of migrants to bare life makes them more 
susceptible to suffering violence as this is the only way left to punish people whose 
uncertain citizenship places them largely outside the jurisprudence of the state. 
The contrast between these brutal depictions and the claims of the employee of 
the First Reception Service could hardly be starker. The interviewee presented 
                                                          
49 Unofficial survey data exists that confirms that the overwhelming majority of migrants in Greece 
wants to move on to other EU member states.  
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photographs of children playing and laughing in the courtyard describing them as 
representations of “everyday life” (personal communication, 2 April 2014). 
Although the Fylakio centre received money from the European Refugee Fund 
for renovation purposes (European Commission, 2014c), there was a scabies 
outbreak in early 2013, and the centre lacks the daily presence of medical staff 
since May 2013 (Nielsen, 2014). In spite of this, the interviewee from the First 
Reception Service claimed that “it’s nice actually, they have a good time up there” 
(personal communication, 2 April 2014). This underlines the distance between 
policymakers and their policy objects, between dominant and subaltern, which 
has been produced by the neofunctionalist, technocratic mind-set. Upon arrival at 
Fylakio, each detainee is given a list of rules, the transgression of which will result 
in undefined consequences. Thus it is permissible to use mobile phones, although 
not “for ends other than for which they were intended” (Greek Ministry of Public 
Order, 2013b). It is strictly forbidden to take photos or videos inside the camp, 
supposedly “because this could violate the rights of the Centre’s other residents” 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, arguably the conditions at the Fylakio facility are among the 
best in Greece. Thousands of people are held in the country’s police stations under 
far less well documented conditions. 
 
 
Asylum Management as the Permanent State of Exception 
 
Asylum accommodation facilities have various names throughout the EU, but to 
many irregular migrants they are known by their German designation: Heim. 
Alongside its English cognate ‘home’, this term implies permanence, familiarity 
and safety. The Old Norse equivalent heimr referred to the boundlessness of the 
universe itself. Ironically, the CARAs and ‘open centres’ of Europe have become 
synonymous with a juristic no-man’s-land, with the materialisation of the state of 
exception (Hanafi & Long, 2010). The immigration situation at the EU’s borders 
has acquired the quality of being constantly in crisis. Indeed, a precarious state of 
existence is one of the hallmarks of groups in the early phases of subaltern 
development. The state of exception is the very nature of a type of irregular 
migration management that is primarily aimed at controlling and preventing the 
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movement of materially deprived people across national borders. While it is the 
obligation of every state that has signed the Geneva Convention on Refugees to 
establish a functioning asylum system, the creation of permanent reception and 
accommodation facilities may evoke the appearance of asylum being an actual 
immigration facility and thus act as a pull factor. Therefore, such facilities have to 
remain provisional. As a result, I postulate that governmental asylum and 
migration agencies are chronically understaffed and underfunded; the available 
accommodation is constantly insufficient for the number of new arrivals. Any 
other policy would increase the EU’s attractiveness as a destination for irregular 
migrants. This low-calorie diet which keeps the migration system in perpetual 
proximity to starvation causes it to tumble into a ceaseless state of exception.50 
Irregular migration, as one of neofunctionalism’s most poignant exogenous 
factors, is disorder in its essential form, and the state of exception is the sovereign’s 
only possible response to it. Irregular migrants’ subaltern status ensures that some 
of their values will always be in non-conformity with the values of the integral 
state, which further accentuates the need for the application of the state of 
exception. 
 It is important to understand that in the neofunctionalist logic, the state of 
exception of thought to be a major catalyst of deeper European integration. 
Schmitter (1971, 235-6) lists several potential ‘contradictions’ in the European 
integration process as reasons for the activation of spillover processes. One such 
contradiction is constituted by the unequal distribution of benefits to the 
participants in an integrative policy. The Dublin Regulation is clearly a case where 
the distribution of benefits is unequal, and it is only because of the Dublin system 
that the states on the EU’s external frontiers bear the brunt of the responsibility 
for immigration management. During a period of a very high number of new 
arrivals in 2011, the Italian Berlusconi government issued residency permits for 
illegal immigrants, allowing them to pass on freely to other EU member states. 
The state of exception was invoked, which finally resulted in the intensification of 
talks to reform of the Dublin Regulation. While EU official documents strictly 
                                                          
50 While this argument is my own deduction, it is inspired by Agamben (1998), whose work was 
consulted when I began to ground my conceptualisations as part of the retroductive process of 
this dissertation. I later discarded direct references to Agamben due to the incompatibility 
between his work and critical realism. Nevertheless, the notion of the state of exception comes 
from his work. 
205 
 
avoid the discursive creation of a European immigration crisis, the necessary 
‘speech act’ is performed by a variety of other actors including NGOs and the 
media. The European Commission invokes crisis situations mostly if it serves the 
purpose of furthering integrative policies. It can thus be seen that 
neofunctionalism indirectly produces the state of exception. If policymakers 
assume that the neofunctionalist spillover hypothesis holds, the creation of the 
state of exception can be employed to trigger further integration. Alternatively, 
depending on the policymaker’s intentions, the state of exception can also be 
employed to achieve different outcomes, including spill-back, where powers are 
retracted from the European level. 
During field research in Sicily, the effects of the state of exception have 
been vividly demonstrated. An employee of the Italian Refugee Council thus 
complained, 
 
“What I don’t understand is, why, in Italy, for ten years, always it’s an 
emergency. You cannot work only with emergency. You know that today a 
lot of people arrive, and you know that during the next few years people 
arrive. Why don’t you organise? Why do you only have emergency” 
(personal communication, 2 May 2014). 
 
While the state of exception is not identical to the state of emergency, the latter 
may serve as a justification for activating the former. This has indeed been the 
case. The most striking example of the state of exception that was encountered 
during field research was the Mineo Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers. Mineo 
is a small town situated scenically on a mountainside about 50km from Catania, 
Sicily’s second city. Before it became known for the CARA nearby, it had already 
acquired a reputation among Sicilians due to being in the vicinity of an American 
military base for about 400 soldiers. The US army had built an entire village for 
itself with a sophisticated infrastructure and reasonably high quality 
accommodation. When the US army abandoned the facility in the late 2000s, the 
so-called Residence degli Aranci (‘residence of oranges’) became a ghost town. The 
owner of the land it was built on, Pizzarotti, was a close associate of the former 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Furthermore, he enjoys the notorious 
reputation of maintaining close links with the Sicilian mafia. The Pizzarotti 
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Company and the Italian government agreed on a deal that would convert the 
Residence into a reception centre for asylum seekers. As of May 2014, the centre 
housed 4,500 asylum seekers, or eleven times the amount of soldiers that had 
previously inhabited the army base. The money that is required to maintain the 
facility comes from the European Refugee Fund. According to the Italian Refugee 
Council, €37 are spent per day on every person living in the centre, which amounts 
to €65mn per year for the 4,500 residents. The appropriation of financial 
resources, which according to the interviewee end up with the Pizzarotti 
Company, is another reason for the establishment of the state of exception (ibid.). 
According to the employee of the Italian Refugee Council, “emergency [is] the 
name you use in Europe to send money” (ibid.). The state of exception thus plays 
an important part in the construction of a political economy of European 
migration management. The Residence has furthermore become an important 
aspect of Mineo’s own local economy. While the town’s residents were initially 
opposed to the establishment of the camp, they quickly began to create business 
activities around selling goods to asylum seekers. The significant distance between 
the CARA and other settlements gave Mineo’s shopkeepers a monopoly position. 
The majority of Mineo’s population is now in strong support of the Residence. 
 While approaching the Residence, one is immediately struck by its location 
in the middle of seemingly endless fields of lemon and orange trees. There is no 
major town within walking distance. The refugee camp is surrounded by a barbed 
wire fence, and its boundaries are constantly patrolled by military Humvees. 
Soldiers armed with machine guns are placed along strategic locations of the 
fence. The houses that provide accommodation for the migrants appear to be in a 
very good condition at first glance. However, a closer look revealed that the glass 
in many windows had been replaced with garbage bags. Sometimes windows were 
boarded up. At the camp’s entrance gates, dozens of cars are parked for various 
reasons. People may come to sell goods to the residents, to offer to drive them to 
Catania, or to work at the Residence. All open business activity takes place outside 
the gates of the camp, as it is extremely difficult to gain permission to access. 
Money is largely unavailable to asylum seekers, and several residents emphasised 
that cigarettes form by far the most important currency within the facility’s fences. 
Although the residents are allowed to leave, they have to return to the camp within 
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three days, or else they are ‘dismissed’ – a term that all people I spoke with were 
familiar with, despite some speaking very little or no English. All residents are 
issued an ID card. This card contains a very low resolution photograph, name and 
birthdate, country of origin, gender, blood type, an ID number and a barcode. In 
the case of an ID card I photographed, the ID number ran into the 8000s. The 
migrant’s surname was gravely misspelled, and the birthdate was estimated to be 
the first of January. While the barcode and the ID number are also examples of 
reification, it is striking that the only accurate information the ID seems to contain 
are the migrant’s blood type and gender. The migrant is thus reduced to his 
physiology. While Gramsci stated that the “history of subaltern groups is 
necessarily fragmented and episodic” (1971, 206), this reduction of irregular 
migrants to bare life in fact robs them of their history. According to the residents, 
the CARA lacks basic medical facilities, and one young man showed me a badly 
scarred wound on his ankle that had obviously received only very rudimentary 
care. 
 While a CARA is intended for hosting migrants for a very limited period 
of time, I have spoken with people who have lived at the Residence for over three 
years (personal communication, 5 April 2014). The vast majority of residents are 
young men from different, sometimes mutually hostile, African nationalities. Up 
to ten people share the same bedroom and there is usually very little to do. The 
combination of boredom, stress and tension makes conflicts and confrontations 
between these young men inevitable. Suicides are common, with the last one 
having occurred just one week before my visit. It became immediately apparent 
from the dark circles and bloodshot eyes that many of the residents consumed 
cannabis or other drugs on a regular basis. Three out of four young men I spoke 
with confirmed that they smoked cannabis, one of them on a daily basis (ibid.). 
To understand the gravity of this situation one needs to understand that the 
majority of the residents are Muslims, for whom the use of psychoactive drugs is 
religiously forbidden. One interviewee from a Greek migrants’ organisation, who 
recently visited detention facilities in Italy, reported that detainees are offered 
sleeping pills to pass time: 
 
“They said, ‘We do nothing. It’s a very small area, and that’s why, when we 
are about, we go to the doctor.’ They give them some medicine to sleep! And 
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they sleep for hours. So that’s why many of them have psychological 
problems” (personal communication, 5 April 2014). 
 
When I asked the residents about the conditions inside the camp, they 
immediately complained about the food supply (ibid.). Apparently the same meal 
is being served everyday: pasta with oil. While this monotonous diet will cause 
malnutrition if consumed over a long period of time, this example is also 
illustrative of the further diminution of migrants to bare life. They are reduced to 
bodies that need to be kept alive. While many of the migrants do work, which will 
be discussed in later sections, the money they earn is often spent on buying 
something different to eat. 
The difficulty involved in the submission of an asylum application in 
Greece is a very poignant illustration of the state of exception. Under the rules of 
the new Greek asylum system, it is the Asylum Service that is responsible for the 
examination of asylum applications. Under the police system, access to the 
asylum procedure was extremely limited. One example are the infamous queues 
that often formed at the Greek Police Directorate on Petrou Ralli Street in Athens. 
According to an employee of the Greek Asylum Service, the Police Directorate 
opened its doors to “register applications every Saturday for about two hours” 
(personal communication, 2 May 2014). UNHCR reported the occurrence of 
fights over positions in the queue, and major health concerns were raised about 
the fact that those wanting to apply for asylum would often wait for many hours 
without access to a toilet and other basic supplies. Finally, only 20 persons would 
be selected for an interview, which would give them the chance to apply for 
asylum. The establishment of the Greek Asylum Service has somewhat improved 
this situation. There are currently offices of the Asylum Service in Athens, 
Thessaloniki, Lesbos and Rhodes. There are two small offices along the Turkish 
border and one mobile office. This means that to apply for asylum, a migrant will 
need to travel to an office of the Asylum Service, which is often difficult, especially 
considering that there are more than 200 inhabited Greek islands and thousands 
of islets for migrants to arrive on. The Asylum Service hopes to set up twelve 
regional asylum offices in the medium-term future. The Athens asylum office is 
open every weekday until 16.30, allowing far more people to apply for asylum. 
Nevertheless, the office is far from inviting. The facility is surrounded by barbed 
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wire fences, and any attempt to take a photo of it will immediately be interrupted 
by the numerous security staff. The new Athens asylum office is also notorious 
for the queues that regularly develop at its gates. During field research, I witnessed 
an Iranian man and his daughter in their attempt to apply for asylum. They were 
rejected despite having arrived well within the opening hours. The lack of 
interpreters and translators is one of the major problems of the Greek asylum 
system. Without translation, it is not possible to register an asylum application. 
At the moment an NGO called Metadrassi has taken on the task of providing 
translation services. Metadrassi is funded mostly from the European Refugee 
Fund, although finding sufficient funding is often difficult, causing the NGO’s 
translators to sometimes work for months without receiving a salary. The 
organisation was founded in 2009 with the purpose of improving the human rights 
situation of migrants in Greece by enabling government agencies and migrants to 
understand one another. Metadrassi has therefore been a major contributor 
towards overcoming migrants’ voicelessness, thus arguably raising them to the 
second level of subaltern development. 
If a migrant succeeds in applying for asylum, she is allocated to an 
accommodation centre by the Greek Ministry of Employment and Social 
Protection. The ministry holds a central database on all accommodation facilities. 
Contact between the centre and potential residents is established through the 
Greek Council for Refugees, a NGO that was founded in 1989 with the purpose 
of representing refugees in civil society. This Council represents one of the ways 
in which migrants have arguably reached awareness as a political group with 
distinct interests. In Athens there is a large number of decentralised 
accommodation centres for asylum seekers, which are operated by various NGOs. 
During field research, an accommodation centre was visited that was managed by 
Nostos, an NGO which aims to fight social exclusion and unemployment. The 
centre was located in a part of Athens that enjoyed a particular reputation, 
although the increased presence of migrants on the street was very noticeable. 
Until November 2011, the house that hosts the centre was used as a hotel. This 
was very obvious from the neatly arranged reception area and the yellow sign 
above the entrance door. This is the most important indicator that, despite the 
centre’s generally good condition, the Nostos facility is still an example of the state 
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of exception, as evidenced by the provisional character of the facility. The ‘hostel’, 
as the centre was referred to (personal communication, 5 April 2014), provides 
shelter for up 70 asylum seekers, 40 of which were minors, with the majority 
coming from Afghanistan, Sudan and Nigeria. Asylum seekers stay in the centre 
for an average period of one year, after which most residents will find private 
accommodation, often within the same neighbourhood. While it took between 
three to five years to assess an asylum application under the old police-based 
system, the new system works faster and is more thorough. The centre provides 
ready-made meals at set hours, which are served in what was evidently the hotel’s 
dining room. The services the shelter offers appeared to be of high quality. All 
rooms have individual showers, and the centre has a computer room, the 
equipment of which was donated by the UNHCR. Many of the asylum seekers 
were able to speak Greek, as a result of Greek classes that are offered particularly 
to the children. The centre was very clean, with the residents themselves being 
responsible for the maintenance of the facilities. It was clear that there was a good 
relationship between the staff and the residents. Funding, as with the majority of 
migrant projects in Greece, is provided by the European Refugee Fund. As the 
visit to the Nostos centre was arranged through the mediation of an employee of 
the Greek First Reception Service, it is unclear whether this centre is truly 
representative of the conditions in which asylum seekers in Greece are housed. 
However, as an asylum application also supplies applicants with a work permit, 
being an asylum seeker can indeed be the first step towards living a life based on 
economic security. It ought, nevertheless, to be said that the majority of asylum 
applications are rejected. Between June 2013 and May 2014, the Asylum Service 
made 4,600 decisions on asylum applications, 20% of which were accepted at first 
instance. A further 14% were accepted at second instance (Greek Asylum Service, 
2014). Although these figures are nearing the European average, they imply that 
the vast majority of migrants who apply for asylum will eventually be deported or 
live outside the legal framework of the state. 
The vast majority of illegal immigrants in Greece do not apply for asylum. 
This affects particularly migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Between June 
2013 and May 2014, 1,271 Pakistanis and 446 Bangladeshis applied for asylum. 
The first instance recognition rate for these applications was at the same time 
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extremely low at 2.7% and 1.5% respectively. For these groups, seeking asylum is 
therefore not a promising avenue towards becoming a legal EU resident. So called 
‘non-asylum seekers’ as well as asylum seekers whose application has been 
rejected, are placed and detained in ‘pre-removal centres’ which are dispersed all 
over the country. Illegal immigrants can be held in these detention facilities for up 
to 18 months to wait for their deportation. The official capacity of these standards 
is approximately 6,000, although several thousand individuals are also detained 
in regular police stations. If a deportation cannot be arranged, the detainees are 
released. EU-funded voluntary return programmes are offered to migrants to 
allow them to leave the country without enforcement (see Chapter 4). Access to 
pre-removal centres is extremely difficult, and a request to visit a centre in the 
Evros region was denied. Nevertheless, the NGO Doctors Without Borders 
(MSF) has recently published a comprehensive report on the conditions inside, as 
the organisation provides medical care in pre-removal centres in Western Thrace. 
The MSF report highlights the results of the state of exception, describing 
extremely poor hygiene conditions within the centres. This, they claim, 
contributes to the spread of respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases. Detention 
centres often exhibit lack of ventilation, overcrowding and inadequate heating. 
One MSF doctor reports having “seen patients who sleep on completely wet 
mattresses” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014, 9). Sanitary conditions are often 
extremely poor. When discussing the conditions inside the Komotini centre, 
which holds 540 persons, the report describes “waste from the toilets of the first 
floor […] flooding the bathroom on the ground floor” (ibid., 10). Riots in the 
detention centres are common, but easily quelled by the police (e.g. Wilson, 2013). 
This confirms Gramsci’s statement that “subaltern groups are always subject to 
the activity of the ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up” (1971, 207). In 
regular police stations, it is often the case that detainees have no access to natural 
light and fresh air. Inmates suffer from a total lack of medical care, with one man 
who had spent 17 months in detention stating that although he had complained 
about a severe toothache for weeks, he was only given medical attention when 
“taken to the hospital because [he] was bleeding after pulling out the tooth 
[himself]” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014, 12). Apart from physical health, 
mental health is a major concern for detainees. Migrants are often already 
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traumatised from their typically very difficult journey to Greece. Further trauma 
can be caused by misregistration. MSF has witnessed at least 100 cases where 
people who were obviously minors were wrongly registered as adults and thus 
placed in detention (ibid.). 
 The Bulgarian immigration situation is the most recent national case to 
have entered the state of exception. Following the fortification of the Greco-
Turkish border, Bulgaria experienced a major influx of irregular migrants. The 
first accommodation facility that asylum seekers are placed in is located in the 
Bulgarian border town of Kapitan Andreevo. It is a first reception facility where 
asylum seekers need to stay temporarily before being moved to an ‘open centre’ 
A Syrian refugee in Bulgaria described the time he spent there: 
 
“It was the worst experience of my life. It was humiliating. It was so bad. I 
have never been in jail, I have never been just inside a room, and closed by a 
key or something. You can’t go outside. You have permission to go to the 
WC, but everything else, it’s not good. But thank God, it was only a few days” 
(personal communication, 18 March 2014). 
 
After Kapitan Andreevo, the refugee was moved to a semi-open camp in 
Harmanli. With a population of around 14,000, Harmanli is one of the bigger 
towns of the border region of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. Since October 2013, 
it is the location of Bulgaria’s largest asylum accommodation centre which hosts 
1,100 asylum seekers, including 300 children. Like the Mineo facility, the 
Harmanli centre was established on a former military base, and the residents are 
housed primarily in military tents. During the winter of 2013/14, UNHCR and 
Amnesty International published reports on the catastrophic humanitarian 
situation in the camp. The tents that the majority of refugees slept in were designed 
for the summer with heaters unavailable. The Syrian refugee told me how his 
family 
 
“could just leave once a day, to buy something, food, to eat, and it was so 
bad. Once you arrive in Harmanli, the Bulgarians seemed like they had 
forgotten you; no papers, no green card to leave town or something like that” 
(personal communication, 18 March 2014). 
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The UN Refugee Agency further reported that basic medical care was unavailable, 
and that the camp’s sanitary conditions were completely inadequate (Cheshirkov, 
2013). The combination of the region’s humid subtropical climate and the mud 
that the camp was constructed on created ideal conditions for the spread of 
contagious diseases. Over 500 people had to share 10 communal latrines. A 
Bulgarian refugee lawyer confirmed that the camp is a manifestation of the state 
of exception, stating that “the camp in Harmanli is completely unlawful. There is 
no basis for its establishment in any of the adopted pieces of legislation” 
(Doychinov, 2013). An asylum seeker who resided in the camp pointed out that 
“if you have money, you get out [of Harmanli]” (ibid.). That is exactly what the 
Syrian refugee referenced earlier did: “So we paid again to move off to Svilengrad” 
(personal communication, 18 March 2014). The refugee’s report of having bribed 
someone reveals yet another aspect of the political economy produced by the 
inadequate provision of resources and the associated state of exception. The centre 
near Svilengrad is located in the outskirts of the very rural village of Pastrogor. 
The facility was opened very recently using money from the European Refugee 
Fund. According to a public official from the Svilengrad city hall, it is Bulgaria’s 
best accommodation for asylum seekers, being reserved almost exclusively for 
families (personal communication, 17 March 2014). During their stay in 
Harmanli, the Syrian refugee’s wife gave birth to twins, which is why they could 
legitimately be allocated a place in Pastrogor. 
 While Germany is regarded by many migrants to be their target 
destination, the EU’s wealthiest large country has also invoked a state of exception 
in matters of asylum and migration. The most important accommodation centre 
in the research site of Leipzig is located in an industrial part of the city, right 
between the city’s largest brothel and an Amazon plant. Housing between 300 and 
400 asylum seekers, it is in such a dilapidated condition that the official foreigners’ 
representative of the Saxon Parliament has demanded its immediate closure since 
2011. The maintenance of the facility has been delegated to a private security 
company, which nevertheless has neither the responsibility nor the competence 
for dealing with the social problems inside the centre. The city of Leipzig pays for 
two social workers, which are employed by RAA, an association that deals with 
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refugees. As in Sicily, this association is chronically underfunded. The head of 
RAA stated that there are significant drug problems in the facility. In May 2013, 
an asylum seeker died of an overdose of heroine while inside the camp. His body 
was only discovered one and a half months later, after the residents had 
complained of the smell. While the city has been planning to shut down the centre 
for several years, the exceptionally high number of new arrivals has forced 
Leipzig’s mayor to concede that “we cannot house that many people decentrally. 
We will continue to depend on centralised accommodation to overcome this” 
(Leipziger Volkszeitung, 2014).51 The word ‘overcome’ (cf. bewältigen) underlines 
how the current asylum situation constitutes a state of exception. The city’s 
strategy to place asylum seekers in decentralised accommodation facilities all over 
Leipzig’s territory has been met with widespread opposition involving petitions, 
protests and interest group formation. During an interview with the most 
important spokesperson of this opposition movement, it became clear that it is 
largely rooted in islamophobia. The city has plans to place an accommodation 
centre for asylum seekers in the village of Portitz, which has a population of just 
1,000 people, but which nevertheless belongs to Leipzig’s territory. When I asked 
the spokesperson about the reasons for his opposition, he replied that children 
would become afraid if they saw a woman with a headscarf on their way to school 
(personal communication, 15 April 2013). While islamophobia is not in itself 
indicative of the state of exception, it nevertheless serves as a justification for the 
invocation of the state of exception.  
 
 
The Political Economy of Migrant Labour 
 
Having discussed reification, biopolitics and the permanent state of exception, yet 
another process can be added to migrants’ experience of neofunctionalist 
European integration: commodification. In the Marxist understanding, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3, commodification refers to the process whereby things that 
are not previously treated as commodities become bought and sold on the market 
                                                          
51 In 2014 the city of Leipzig maintained the policy that large accommodation centres should be 
shut down and replaced by small centres (decentralised accommodation). 
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like any other good. Within the capitalist mode of production, commodification 
is one of the quintessential qualities of subalternity since it assigns labour a 
monetary value, allowing it to become dehumanised and stripped of its identity. 
The concept is thus closely related to reification because commodification cannot 
occur without labour being treated like things. At the same time, reification can 
occur without commodification.52 The subaltern state of irregular migrants is 
emphasised by their participation in the irregular labour market which excludes 
them from the benefits of the welfare state. 
It is not only because of their geographical location that Greece and, 
especially, Italy have become important migrant destinations; it is also because 
both countries host large underground labour markets. This simplifies the process 
of finding informal employment in Greece and Italy, but it also makes it easier to 
work in the profession one has learned, as an accreditation is not entirely 
necessary. In Germany on the other hand, it is often difficult to gain recognition 
for one’s qualifications. In the course of the post-Fordist restructuring of the 
Italian economy, in particular, the importance of self-employment in some sectors 
of the Italian economy has seen a dramatic increase facilitating the growth of the 
informal labour market. Between 1981 and 1995, self-employment in agriculture 
rose from 26.5% to 41.7%. At the same time, the share of informal workers in the 
agricultural business has risen from 46.7% in 1981 to 62.8% in 1995. Of course, it 
ought to be stated that the deregulation of the labour market that has occurred 
simultaneously has somewhat “weakened the heuristic value of the dichotomy 
formal/informal” (Quassoli, 2002, 228). Nevertheless, it is clear that from the 
perspective of a clandestino, the more informalised a labour market is, the more 
job opportunities there will be. The growth of the informal labour market that 
occurred during the post-Fordist restructuring of the Italian economy has 
therefore created a significant pull-factor for migration. Thus it can be explained 
that both Greece and Italy maintain contradictory migration regimes: on the one 
hand, they have been accused by other EU member states of not ascribing 
sufficient rigour in controlling their borders, and of having too many migrant 
                                                          
52 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of reification and commodification. While commodification 
will always be accompanied by reification, reification can occur without commodification. One 
example of this is transaction in a supermarket, where the consumer is reified but not 
commodified. 
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regularisation programmes. On the other hand, they have been accused of abusing 
migrants’ human rights. Both Italy and Greece view immigration as a “necessary 
evil” (Triandafyllidou & Ambrosini, 2011, 253). While they want to prevent the 
arrival of more asylum seekers, they do not want to totally discourage the irregular 
arrival of cheap migrant workers. Nevertheless, the creation of an informal 
economy had already begun before migrants began to arrive in Greece and Italy 
in large numbers. Indeed, agricultural jobs are seasonal by their very nature, which 
also encourages informal employment. 
 The creation of an environment favourable to the reinforcement of 
subalternity through informal employment can be seen as an instance of 
neofunctionalist European integration for two reasons: firstly, the functional logic 
of neofunctionalism implies that government ought to be located at the level 
where its instruments can be applied most effectively. In the context of neoliberal 
hegemony, this means that some policy areas ought to be liberalised altogether. 
This is one of the easiest ways to prevent tensions that may cause the integration 
process to stagger. The EU has actively participated in the deregulation and 
liberalisation of the European labour market (cf. Gill, 1998), as this was an 
important aspect of encouraging greater labour mobility within the common 
market. Irregular migrants are excluded from this mobility, which is one of the 
reasons for the existence of very different political economies of irregular migrant 
labour in the EU’s core and its periphery. At the same time, and that is the second 
reason for the favourability of Mediterranean Europe to informal employment, 
the introduction of the euro has amplified the economic division of the EU. While 
this will be discussed in more detail later, the common currency has removed an 
essential element that was previously used by national governments as a means to 
gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other member states with higher rates of 
productivity: currency devaluation. During periods of economic stagnation, 
Mediterranean member states would devalue their currencies to boost their 
exports. The termination of this instrument leaves only the reduction of wages to 
increase the competitiveness of the national export industry. This applies in 
particular to the agricultural sector, where productivity is lower than in other 
member states. This produces a situation where cheap labour is needed, and where 
immigration is the major supplier of this commodity. 
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 In Sicily, a political economy of migration has been created through the 
existence of a mafia-based link of smugglers and agricultural employers. During 
an interview with a representative of the Italian Refugee Council, I was told that 
a boat of the mafia has been observed picking up irregular migrants from a 
smuggler boat on sea. It is well known that the major agricultural companies in 
Sicily are linked to the mafia. Furthermore, the interviewee stressed the total 
dependence of the Sicilian agriculture on migrant workers: “I think if there are no 
migrants here, the agriculture is going to finish, to die” (personal communication, 
2 May 2014). One manifestation of this dependency is the Residence degli Aranci 
itself, which is conveniently placed in the middle of endless fruit farms. During 
my visit to the Residence, I witnessed how hundreds of migrants returned from 
working in the fields. While the migrants work eight-hour shifts, their salaries 
amount to only €15 per day. All of the farms surrounding the Residence rely on 
migrant workers, with many of them producing their fruits organically.53 Another 
job that is particularly popular in Palermo is parking security. While parking is 
free in most of the city, one will regularly encounter people offering to watch one’s 
car while one is absent in exchange for a moderate fee. During a conversation with 
a Ghanaian man who was working in this business, I found out that the Italian 
employers pay between €10-20 per day to their migrant employees (personal 
communication, 2 May 2014). The parking security business is illegal, and it is 
operated by the Sicilian mafia. Employees are paid every day after they finish their 
shifts. In Sicily, but also in Athens, it is common for African migrants to sell DVDs 
and household items that are presented on blankets or bed sheets spread out on 
the ground. 
Forced prostitution of African migrants is a widespread phenomenon in 
Sicily. One young woman from Nigeria had her trip organised by her friend who 
was also from Nigeria, but who had already come to Italy. The young woman was 
told that she would earn a wage by taking care of an old woman when she arrived. 
After the long trip through the Sahara desert and across the Mediterranean Sea, 
her friend informed her that the job with the old woman was no longer available, 
and that she would have to do ‘street work’ for the time being. She was forced to 
                                                          
53 The European organic label is thus no guarantee that a product has been produced using only 
regular workers. It may very well be that a fruit has been grown organically with the help of an 
exploited worker, which calls for the introduction of a fair trade label within the EU. 
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surrender all the money she earned to her ‘friend’. At first, she spent three months 
in Milan, but was soon sent back to Sicily (personal communication, 4 May 2014). 
The situation is very similar in Greece. During an interview a representative of a 
Greek migrants’ organisation spoke of thousands of cases of forced prostitution 
(personal communication, 5 April 2014). In the Omónia area of Athens, dozens 
of black young women could be seen offering sexual services. 
 
 
Xenophobia 
 
Gramsci argued that “for the social elite, the members of subaltern groups always 
have something of a barbaric or pathological nature about them” (Gramsci, 1996). 
It is therefore not surprising that the arrival of large numbers of migrants in the 
EU, legal and illegal migrants alike, has been accompanied by an upsurge in 
xenophobic attitudes. As a consequence of the destruction of the soul, the 
reification of the self and the commodification of the body, self-identification has 
reached its focal point in religious neo-nationalism. Through disenchantment 
Christianity has largely been disrobed of its spiritual core – what remains is a 
‘Judeo-Christian heritage’ which is largely embraced even by non-Christians. In 
turn, this new Christian identity requires an ‘other’ to contrast itself against. 
Muslim immigration to Europe has provided this ‘other’, and islamophobia has 
become the most striking aspect of neo-nationalist rhetoric (Wodak et al., 2013). 
 The extreme poverty that irregular migrants often live in exposes other EU 
citizens to the true extent of social inequality and insecurity in the EU. The 
European Union has contributed significantly to the deconstruction of the welfare 
state, most recently through its demands to partially liberalise the pension systems 
of the 28 member states (European Commission, 2012b). Following the sovereign 
debt crisis, “popular austerity and the associated reductions in public expenditure 
[have been promoted] as the only credible solutions for the present economic 
deadlock” (Nousios et al., 2012, 7). The ostensible inevitability of welfare state 
retrenchment have caused Europeans to increasingly identify with the polity they 
know best: the nation state. This is because “national order offers a path to social 
unity as a remedy for contemporary anxieties” (Feldman, 2012, 40). The 
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precarious situation of irregular migrants is a materialisation of these anxieties, 
and their rejection in the guise of nationalist discourse can be seen as a 
manifestation of the fear of poverty and social insecurity. Furthermore, the 
association of national identity with a particular (supposedly Judeo-Christian) 
ethics and a particular ethnicity can be seen as a response to disenchantment. This 
has robbed ideas of their intrinsic worth. Nationalism counters this development, 
as it ascribes intrinsic belonging to a particular nationality. Migration poses a 
threat to this ‘natural’ identity as it changes the ethnic and cultural composition 
of the nation. 
Exposure to racism has become an everyday aspect of irregular migrants’ 
lived experience of European integration. Racism and xenophobia provide an 
important backdrop against which the fortification of the EU’s borders can take 
place. Anti-immigration policies have been normalised, and they are practiced by 
nearly all members of the political spectrum. In Greece, for example, it was during 
the Socialist government of George Papandreou that the inhumane treatment of 
migrants was most excessive. Furthermore, the Socialist government 
commissioned the erection of the fence along the border with Turkey. The 
normalisation of neo-nationalism can be seen as an instance of Gramsci’s 
trasformismo, a term which he uses to describe the “molecular absorption of leading 
elements of a class into another class’s project” (Thomas, 2009, 373-4). Therefore, 
while radical right-wing parties may have gained considerable support among 
European electorates, their success has been limited by the adoption of right-wing 
positions by the mainstream parties. In turn, the increase in right-wing positions 
among populations along the EU’s border has been reinforced by European 
legislation. The Dublin Regulation shifts the responsibility for preventing 
immigration to the peripheral member states, while it also causes the 
concentration of migrants in these same member states. Large amounts of 
migrants living in poverty and having to resort to irregular means of employment 
have contributed to xenophobia and nationalism because of the image of migrants 
thus evoked. Nationalism has been instrumental in the fortification of the EU’s 
borders, as it has provided the ideological context for this fortification to take 
place. 
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Greece is the most well-known example of the rise of racist parties in the 
EU. As of April 2014, unemployment in Greece stands at 27.3% – the highest in 
the EU. Migrants suffer especially from the terribly difficult economic situation 
that the country finds itself in as a result of the austerity policies associated with 
the ‘sovereign debt crisis’; racist attacks that are becoming more widespread 
throughout the country. The rise of fascism, finding a significant expression in the 
growth of the Golden Dawn party, which achieved 9.4% in the 2014 European 
Parliament elections, has been accompanied by an increase in the number of 
xenophobic attacks. Golden Dawn blames immigrants for the economic crisis, 
having formed militias to try and deal with the perceived problem. During my 
visit to an accommodation centre for asylum seekers, I was told immediately upon 
arrival not to disclose the location of the centre to anyone, out of fear of racist 
attacks. 
At the research location of Leipzig, xenophobia also represents a very 
widespread phenomenon. In 2013, the city registered 58 cases of racially 
motivated violence. One of the most flagrant manifestations of xenophobia is the 
resistance to the establishment of decentralised accommodation centres for 
asylum seekers throughout the city. During a meeting of this opposition 
movement in the village of Portitz, the vast majority of the village’s population 
attended the meeting to voice their disapproval of the city’s plans. This is 
particularly striking as the electoral turnouts in Leipzig have traditionally been 
very low, indicating low levels of politicisation. When the Islamic Ahmadiyya 
community announced its intentions to build a mosque in a part of Leipzig with 
a very high population density, a petition was signed by over 10,000 people to 
protest against the construction of the house of worship. During an incident in 
November 2013, the heads of several pigs were impaled and placed in a circle on 
the area of the future location of the mosque. The entire area was covered in pigs’ 
blood. In Saxony, the neo-Nazi National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) 
gained 3.6% of votes in the 2014 European elections. The NPD currently holds 8 
seats in the Saxon parliament, and has based its campaign for the 2014 Saxon 
parliamentary elections on stopping the construction of further accommodation 
centres for asylum seekers. Since December 2013, the party has held a 
demonstration every month against an accommodation centre that was 
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established in very close proximity to a school building. Furthermore, the right-
wing populist party Alternative for Germany, which gained 10.1% of Saxon votes 
in the 2014 European elections, similarly engages in anti-Islamic and xenophobic 
discourse. 
 
 
Becoming European 
 
Everyday life is shaped by countless instances of recognition. Through recognising 
others, we decide who they are, and recognition is one of the main tools employed 
to make the social world navigable and intelligible (Patchten, 2003). Furthermore, 
we ourselves have a strong need for recognition, as there is a perceived link 
between recognition and identity, which labels our defining characteristics as 
human beings. In his famous essay on the politics of recognition, Taylor puts 
forward that identity is shaped by recognition, as we tend to adopt the image that 
society projects back towards us. However, we are also shaped by misrecognition, 
which can cause massive damage if society’s projection of ourselves is demeaning 
and contemptible. Taylor states that “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict 
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and 
reduced more of being” (1992, 25). Nevertheless, recognition is a basic human 
need. Given the phenomena that were described in the above sections, it is not 
surprising that irregular migrants would crave to be recognised. Recognition is 
perceived as a means of overcoming subalternity. As irregular migrants are often 
reduced to their ‘otherness’, their religious identity or their value as labour power, 
becoming European is associated with regaining a sense of self. However, 
xenophobia is not limited to irregular migrants. As interviews revealed, 
naturalised individuals equally experience being discriminated as a result of their 
skin colour or their religion. If irregular migrants “become incorporated in foreign 
nationalities,” they mostly do so “in a subaltern role” (Gramsci, 1996, 104). 
During interviews, migrants referred to a variety of motivations for coming 
to Europe, but three themes were of particular importance: physical safety, 
improved material conditions, and self-realisation. These themes are not mutually 
exclusive. For refugees from war zones, the physical safety that the European 
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Union provides was the main reason for migration. One Syrian refugee stated that 
“I came here to live, to have my children grow up in a safe place” (personal 
communication, 18 March 2014). The concern for the security and wellbeing of 
one’s family was cited by nearly all interviewees as a primary reason for migration, 
and rarely were irregular migrants concerned only for their own safety. For many 
irregular migrants, coming to Europe was linked with the hope of improving the 
material conditions of oneself and one’s family. In Catania it has become a major 
business to offer sending money to African states. A third theme that was regularly 
referred to was self-realisation. One Iraqi refugee stated that his motivation to 
come to Europe “mainly was to have the freedom to do whatever you want to do” 
(personal communication, 10 July 2014). Europe is thus perceived to embody 
security, prosperity and freedom – it is never defined according to political 
institutions like the European Union. Spaces where the perceived definition of 
Europe does not apply, are consequently not seen as being European. Thus a 
refugee in Bulgaria stated, “I have not seen Europe yet,” despite his physical 
presence on the European continent and in the European Union (personal 
communication, 18 March 2014). Europe is not only a space; for many it is a 
utopian idea. 
Nevertheless, the legal recognition that is involved in becoming a 
European citizen represents the ultimate materialisation of this idea. Acquiring 
European citizenship is linked to the hope of being recognised as a European 
human being rather than as a refugee, an immigrant, an alien or a black person. 
Naturalisation is relatively easy for refugees, but for migrants residing illegally on 
the territory of an EU member state this can become very difficult. In Italy and 
Greece, which have particularly high populations of illegal immigrants, 
citizenship is denied even to the children of migrants. Although exact figures are 
unknown, it is certain that hundreds of thousands of children of migrants in Italy 
and Greece do not possess a European citizenship. In 2013, Germany had very 
few illegal residents due to its geographical location. Naturalisation of refugees 
requires eight years of legal residency, adequate German-language skills, 
knowledge of the German constitution and a means to secure a living that does 
not depend on social welfare. Among other things, residing in the European 
Union without being a European citizen or a residency permit implies exclusion 
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from political participation, exclusion from the regular labour market and 
discrimination in the education system. It is thus impossible to attain the goals 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. European citizenship furthermore 
represents the final goal of many migrants, because it cannot be revoked. The 
status of an asylum seeker is unsecure at best, as there is no certainty about the 
outcome of the application. Residence permits are usually not permanent and, 
even when they are permanent, they can be invalidated. European citizenship also 
gives one the ability to reside in a member state other than the one where one has 
applied for asylum, which is particularly important for asylum seekers who have 
family members in another country. Many of the sources of subalternity thus 
appear to be removed through the acquisition of EU citizenship. 
Although European citizenship gives one the opportunity to participate in 
political life, it is by no means guaranteed that migrants will as a result reach the 
second stage of subaltern development. Indeed, upon receiving citizenship, former 
irregular migrants may deny that they continue to be a ‘migrant’. In Leipzig, three 
people were interviewed who had come to Germany as asylum seekers and who 
had subsequently received German citizenship. All three had little interest in 
European and German migration management, even though they could identify 
with the struggles of the hundreds of thousands of people who arrive every year 
on Europe’s shores. One even called for a more restrictive immigration policy. 
Underlying this assertion is the attitude that since one has managed to become 
European and to achieve the three goals mentioned earlier, every migrant has the 
same opportunity. Whoever does not manage to reach this status, only has himself 
to blame. On the one hand, this reflects that naturalised migrants want to leave 
their pasts behind. A group consciousness of irregular migrants does not develop 
because they want to feel as though they completely belong to the society they 
decided to move to – association with their migrant history sets them apart from 
mainstream society. On the other hand, the attitude that an ‘unsuccessful migrant’ 
only has himself to blame can be understood as a consequence of the neoliberal 
doctrine of being responsible for one’s own wellbeing and prosperity. Either way, 
migrants are in this way prevented from developing the group identity that is 
needed for overcoming subalternity. It is noteworthy that what Gramsci calls the 
“mechanistic conception” (i.e. determinism) is the “religion of the subaltern” 
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(Gramsci, 1971, 647) because it frees the subaltern from responsibility of taking 
action. The idea that subalternity is rooted in personal failure rather than social 
structures is in line with the neoliberal model for the political economy that is 
promoted primarily by liberal and conservative parties. As neoliberal theory is 
based on the positivist tradition, it exhibits precisely the deterministic attitude that 
Gramsci refers to (see Chapter 7 for neoliberalism’s ontological underpinnings). 
Nevertheless, migrant organisations have begun to attempt to make an 
impact on policymaking in the European Union. The most important example of 
the politicisation of irregular migrants is the numerous refugee councils which 
have been established in most EU member states. ECRE, the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles is an umbrella organisation of 82 migrant NGOs dispersed 
throughout Europe. These refugee councils and NGOs set themselves the task of 
“advancing the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons” and of 
“[promoting] the establishment of fair and humane European asylum policies and 
practices in accordance with international human rights law” (ECRE, 2014). 
Refugee councils attempt to point out violations against international law in the 
management of asylum applications, and they often operate accommodation 
facilities for asylum seekers. They maintain volunteer programmes to provide 
psychological support, and to assist asylum seekers with the bureaucratic 
challenges of living in Europe. In Italy, is it very difficult for migrants without 
valid residence permits to access medical care. Migrants are afraid of going to the 
hospital because this would inevitably involve the disclosure of one’s status to the 
public authorities. Furthermore, they may only receive basic healthcare, which 
excludes for example the medication required by people with HIV. The Jesuit 
Refugee Service therefore provides free medical assistance for migrants, 
irrespective of their legal status. 
Nevertheless, although Gramsci has argued that a subaltern group’s ability 
to form institutions representing its interests is a step towards overcoming 
subalternity (Gramsci, 1971, 202), one should not mistake refugee organisations’ 
efforts to improve the lives of irregular migrants in Europe with an attempt to 
change their subaltern status. It is difficult to discern charity organisations from 
political organisations; migrants’ organisations may have a strong interest in 
improving the lives of individuals, although they do not attempt to challenge the 
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systemic reasons of their subalternity. Moveover, refugee councils are in many 
cases founded, managed and operated by non-migrants, underlining that irregular 
migrants lack unity and self-consciousness as a social group. 
 
 
Obstacles to Overcoming Irregular Migrant Subalternity 
 
NGOs often depict irregular migrants as victims. When reading the NGO reports 
on migrants, one regularly encounters expressions such as: “vulnerable people are 
subjected to,” “exposure to violence,” or “serious medical cases being neglected” 
(Doctors Without Borders, 2014). The title of the report, Invisible Suffering, further 
suggests that migrants are rendered invisible. A victim is someone who is helpless 
and unable to defend himself. A victim is passive and totally dependent on the 
mercy of the perpetrators of the injustice inflicted.  The passive voice that is used 
in the quotations cited above further emphasises this connotation. The reduction 
of migrants’ lives to victimhood does not contribute to the systemic overcoming 
of their undeniably miserable condition. As Gramsci’s research agenda on the 
subaltern is ultimately aimed at overcoming their subordination, it is worth 
reflecting on the factors that stand in the way of this endeavour. 
 The nature of a migrant’s experience of being in a state of transience is a 
key obstacle. The migrant community is perpetually changing. New migrants 
arrive in the EU, while others are deported, or seize to identify themselves as 
migrants. Asylum seekers become refugees or deportees. Refugees become 
European citizens, and tourists become illegal immigrants by overstaying their 
visas. The Dublin Regulation drives the involuntary movement of large amounts 
of people through the EU, turning asylum seekers in Germany into asylum seekers 
in Italy. Migrants often have no historical, cultural, economic or family ties with 
particular European cities or regions; they move more often, which prevents the 
development of close networks of friends and acquaintances. This state of flux is 
detrimental to the development of political groups and to the emergence of group 
consciousness. While the concentration of migrants in particular geographical 
spaces tends to decrease over time, Colombo and Sciortino (2004) nevertheless 
show how national groups tend to settle in the same areas of a country. The ties 
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that thus form are ties based on national and ethnic identity, rather than on 
migrant identity. 
 Another obstacle to overcoming migrants’ subaltern status is their re-
confinement to national territories. It is potentially one of the strengths of a 
political organisation of migrants that it would transcend national boundaries. It 
is in the nature of transnational migration to move beyond the frontiers of nation 
states, which is why migrant group consciousness would have to necessarily be 
post-national. The Dublin Regulation is one of the instruments that strongly 
reasserts national divisions. The Dublin regime allocates each asylum seeker one 
specific state that is responsible for them. Asylum seekers are not allowed to leave 
that state for as long their asylum application is processed. Once refugee status 
has been granted, it is extremely detrimental to any hopes of naturalisation to 
move to another state, because several years of permanent residence are required 
to attain citizenship in the state in question. The existence of 31 different asylum 
procedures within the Dublin area creates strong divergence in asylum seekers’ 
experience of migration. While Greece and Italy employ extensive detention 
policies, Germany offers a relatively more positive experience. This obscures that 
irregular migrants are fundamentally part of the same transnational phenomenon. 
National differences are reasserted, causing the fragmentation of migrants into 
national groups. 
 Closely related to the previous argument is the fact that irregular migrants 
do not share the same background. Linguistic divisions are in the nature of a 
migrant community. These divisions are reinforced in asylum accommodation 
centres and refugee camps. Within these facilities, particular language 
communities quickly develop. Furthermore, migrants tend to import hostile 
relations between ethno-linguistic groups to their destination countries (e.g. 
hostility between Kurds and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis). Furthermore, with the 
possible exception of French and English, migrants will rarely speak European 
languages. Integration into the political system is significantly more complicated 
if migrants are unable to speak the language of the country they reside in. For 
political participation, an excellent knowledge of that language is advantageous. 
In Germany for example, this is made even more difficult by the federal 
government’s refusal to offer free language classes to asylum seekers. However, 
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even if the national language is acquired and a sufficient proficiency is reached, 
this merely enables the migrant to participate in the national political system, 
which may further embed the fragmentation of the migrant community into 
national groups. 
 A fourth obstacle, already mentioned in the previous section, is the lack of 
identification of naturalised migrants with irregular migrants. The denial of 
belonging to a ‘transnational migrant community’ may be the deliberate result of 
a migrant’s desire to disassociate herself from this instable, stressful and insecure 
phase of her life. It may also be the consequence of the socialisation into societies 
within which neoliberal individualism is influential. Nonetheless, it is very 
detrimental to the development of a political consciousness. Naturalised migrants 
are the only members of the migrant community who are allowed to participate 
on all levels of political life in Europe. The most obvious manifestation of this is 
the fact that participation in national and European elections is limited to 
European citizens. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the empirical foundation of this dissertation. It offers 
an account of how contemporary European integration is experienced by 
members of the subaltern group of irregular migrants. In conjunction with the 
previous chapter, which has discussed the contemporary character of European 
migration management, this chapter has provided country profiles to further 
establish the context in which migrants’ experience takes place. Nevertheless, 
while these national differences are important to understand the story that was 
just told, they should not obscure the fact that migrants are fundamentally part of 
the same European or even global phenomenon, albeit with contextual variations. 
Neofunctionalist integration is an important ingredient in the production 
of the experiences that were outlined in this chapter. For every aspect of migrant 
experience that was discussed, a clear link could be made with the premises of 
neofunctionalism. The technocratic attitude towards policymaking that 
neofunctionalism embodies is a key element in human reification, because 
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technocracy denies that policymaking is inherently value-driven. The functionalist 
removal of values from human decision-making has resulted in the denial of the 
intrinsic value of the human being and her qualities, which are reduced to their 
economic valorisation. The state of exception is not only part of the system of 
European governance, but neofunctionalist integration is actually thought to feed 
on it, as crises have the potential to propel the spillover process forward. The 
growth of the irregular labour market is linked to the deconstruction of the welfare 
state. On the basis of these findings, the next chapter will show how the experience 
of irregular migrants has implications for the wider character of European 
integration. Neofunctionalism, which has provided the ideological background 
for this chapter, is intricately linked to the neoliberal programme. 
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Chapter 7: Three Contradictions of Neofunctionalist 
European Integration 
 
Having examined neofunctionalism, its method of integration, its consequences 
on the management of irregular migration and its experience by irregular 
migrants, a puzzle has emerged that calls for further analysis. If the negative 
impacts identified were envisaged as spillovers able to drive integration forward, 
why has the EU chosen this particular neoliberal trajectory? After all 
neofunctionalist integration is not inherently neoliberal in character and therefore 
does not necessarily produce the hegemony of transnational capital. This chapter 
represents the critical grounded theory that is the outcome of the retroductive 
knowledge formation process of this dissertation. It will attempt to contribute to 
understanding the social purpose of European integration. If the European 
Union’s migration management is a critical case study (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2003) of 
European integration, some answers to this question can be arrived at. Based on 
the findings that were made during the main fieldwork, it will be argued that 
contemporary European integration has the primary purpose of shaping Europe 
according to neoliberal principles. The neoliberal restructuring of the European 
political economy is the result of transnational capital seeking conditions 
favourable to its further accumulation. After this argument has been presented, 
the relationship between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism will be developed. 
While neofunctionalism is not necessarily neoliberal, it will be shown that Haas’ 
theory has often acted as an attempt to legitimise neoliberal policies. 
 In his principal monograph The Great Transformation, Hungarian political 
economist Karl Polanyi describes the ‘double movement’ as one of the most 
visible contradictions of capitalism: the implementation of a free market economy 
is accompanied by the establishment of regulatory state institutions (Polanyi, 
1944). In the context of European migration management, three further inherent 
contradictions that are more specific to neoliberalism ought to be highlighted in 
this chapter. Firstly, the neoliberal emphasis on the free movement of people, 
goods and capital is accompanied by nationalism (Feldman, 2011). Secondly, 
while neoliberalism demands the state’s retreat, it also becomes more involved in 
the area that Foucault called biopolitics (1997). Thirdly, the intra-European 
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division of labour clashes with the global division of labour, as regions that are 
located in the global core at the same time form part of the European periphery. 
Migration, both its experience and its management, illustrates this condition 
particularly poignantly. 
 
 
European Integration and Neoliberal Hegemony 
 
Having pointed out the faults of neofunctionalism’s unfounded vision of 
European integration as a closed system, quasi-isolated from the outside world, 
and having examined in detail how European integration is experienced by the 
subaltern group of migrants, this section will attempt to place the development of 
the EU within the context of neoliberal restructuring. Furthermore, the role that 
neofunctionalism has played in this process will be elaborated on, highlighting the 
social purpose of European integration. 
 
 
Europe’s Neoliberal Renaissance 
 
Before discussing the character of European integration, it ought to be highlighted 
that there are important differences between early European integration and the 
contemporary European Union. Several different interpretations have been 
offered to understand the first wave of European integration, which lost its 
momentum in the late 1960s. The first Kantian interpretation suggests that the 
collective European nightmare of World War II underlined the urgent need for a 
European system of peace and cooperation (e.g. Trachtenberg, 1999). In his 
famous ‘United States of Europe’ speech of 1946, Winston Churchill implied that 
European integration was the only way to avoid another European war, and the 
EU’s peace-making role continues to be cited as the most important raison d’être 
by European politicians. A second interpretation suggests that European 
integration formed part of the ideological confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union (e.g. Lundestad, 1986). A Western European economic 
alliance would decrease the likelihood of the spread of communism, which was 
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considered a real threat in the post-War era. This argument resonates with the 
realist school of international relations. A third interpretation suggests that 
European integration represents the inclusion of Western Europe into the 
American Fordist model of accumulation (e.g. Jessop, 1995). The expansion of 
the market is a defining aspect of capitalism itself and it is thus unsurprising that 
the foundation of the European institutions may be seen as an example of this 
tendency. While the three interpretations were developed within three distinct 
schools of thought, they are nevertheless not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if the 
third interpretation is taken as the guiding premise, they may in fact be mutually 
constitutive. The inclusion into the Fordist system was predicated upon political 
stability and reduced vulnerability to alternative ideologies. It is worth noting that 
at least two of these factors address exogenous issues. Neofunctionalism tends to 
view exogenous factors as insignificant or disturbing influences on the integration 
process, which hints at the theory’s incapacity to understand European 
integration. 
 The renaissance of European integration in the mid-1980s nevertheless 
followed a different reasoning, which should be seen in the context of Fordism’s 
organic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s (see Chapter 2). Harvey argues that a 
period of ‘flexible accumulation’ replaced the Fordist model and it is clear that a 
neoliberal, finance-based accumulation strategy has played a dominant role in 
global economic development since the 1980s (Harvey, 1989). The rise of 
neoliberalism should be viewed within the context of the re-establishment of 
capitalist class hegemony after power had shifted towards labour – it is thus that 
the rhetoric of “freeing the market from the shackles of the state” can be explained 
(van Apeldoorn, 2002, 55). Neoliberal globalisation is characterised by processes 
of the globalisation of production and the globalisation of finance. The 
globalisation of production was motivated by the crisis of Fordism, requiring the 
relocation of production to new geographical areas. The reality of this process is 
evidenced by a dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 1970s 
and the rapid increase in the number of transnational corporations. An increasing 
share of FDI is going into developing countries. Approximately one third of global 
FDI originated from the 100 largest corporations, highlighting the concentration 
of control over global production (UNCTAD, 2014). It is very important to 
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underline that the globalisation of production was not linked to a class 
compromise between peripheral labour and capital. While production in peripheral 
economies rose, this rise was not accompanied by an appropriate increase in 
salaries. This is the consequence of the need to keep production costs low. 
Through the destruction of traditional agriculture large migratory flows towards 
the global core were generated. 
 The globalisation of production went hand in hand with the globalisation 
of finance. After the collapse of Fordism, the deregulation of the financial sector 
provided a new growth impetus. Financial regulation during the 1970s and 1980s 
focussed primarily on five areas (Versluysen, 1988). Firstly, through the 
elimination of controls on transnational capital flows, by which countries like 
West Germany, Switzerland or Japan had attempted to control the international 
use of their currencies, international capital markets were created. Secondly, 
financial markets, including financial firm operations, were liberalised to 
stimulate competition between them. A financial service provider could now 
simultaneously be involved in underwriting (i.e. assessor of a client’s credit-
worthiness) and banking (i.e. providing loans and other financial products). This 
greatly increased the financial sector’s scope for international operations. Thirdly, 
the government bond market was restructured with the aim of curbing inflation. 
The diversification of the bond market was achieved for example by repackaging 
government bonds through breaking up the bond into several smaller bonds (i.e. 
‘coupon stripping’). This stimulated demand for government bonds by a wider 
range of financial institutions. Fourthly, through the abolition of disclosure rules 
information on credit worthiness could be acquired by financial institutions. This 
allowed for the creation of hedge funds, who engage in the practice of pooling 
various types of capital with different associated risks to create securities and other 
financial products. Finally, the financial sector was deregulated through the 
harmonisation of the standards of prudential supervision. This served the purpose 
of enhancing the competitive conditions of financial institutions by creating a 
‘level playing field’ (ibid.). The deregulation of the financial sector generated a 
type of capital that is far more mobile than industrial capital, being able to move 
across partly dismantled national financial jurisdictions. The transnationalisation 
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of capital markets was one of the primary reasons for the need of a new wave of 
neoliberal European integration. 
 Although there were several competing models for European integration 
in the 1980s (see Chapter 2), neoliberalism came to dominate as the hegemonic 
project of a transnational capitalist class. Van Apeldoorn (2002) highlights the 
significant role of the European Roundtable of Industrialist’s in Europe’s 
neoliberal transformation. He argues that as a result of the globalisation of 
production, the influence of European neo-mercantilists in the ERT was waning. 
At the same time, European industry was actively engaged in globalisation, 
making neoliberalism the most attractive economic programme for creating a 
favourable environment for capital accumulation. The influence of neoliberalism 
is especially obvious in the area of monetary integration, where the Maastricht 
criteria established strict rules to prevent inflation, while notably measures to curb 
unemployment was omitted (van Apeldoorn, 2003). It is ironic that inflation 
represents the greatest danger to financialised accumulation, while the interest 
regime of the financial market is itself the cause of inflation (Toporowski, 2000).54 
Nevertheless, it was neither the Single European Act nor the Maastricht 
Treaty that hailed the second wave of European integration in the 1980s. Indeed, 
it was the Saarbrücken Agreement and subsequently the Schengen Agreement of 
1984 that represented the first significant step towards deeper integration since the 
Treaty of Rome. It is thus meaningful to examine the relationship between the 
European migration regime and the neoliberal hegemonic project. 
 
 
Neoliberalism and Migration Management 
 
Before discussing the impact of neoliberalism on the European migration regime, 
it ought to be highlighted that neoliberal ideology has also played a significant role 
in fuelling global migratory movements. To a large extent, this is the result of the 
                                                          
54 Inflation has the potential to destroy capital by increasing the money supply and 
simultaneously decreasing the value of the currency that capital is denominated in. Inflation is 
however the product of the interest regime, which calls for a constant increase in the money 
supply. This is the result of all money having been loaned by someone. The institution that loans 
money will ask to receive its loan back along with a particular amount of interest. This causes a 
constantly increasing money supply. Interest is one of the primary ways of the expansion of 
financial capital, but its consequence (inflation) is simultaneously threatening to destroy capital. 
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neoliberal approach to development. The Washington Consensus represents the 
clearest formulation of neoliberalism in the realm of development policy. 
Williamson (1990) argues that the Washington Consensus is characterised by ten 
key points: budgetary discipline, reduction of subsidisation, tax reform, market-
determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, 
openness to foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and 
strengthened private property rights. Although the continued relevance of the 
Washington Consensus has been debated (cf. Stiglitz, 1998), it is questionable 
whether another development paradigm has indeed replaced it (Babb, 2013), or 
whether more recent programmes represent merely “a modest retreat from [the 
original] extremist neoliberal fundamentalism” (Fine, 2006, ix). The Washington 
Consensus’ neoliberal demands were in fundamental contradiction to European 
subsidies of industry and agriculture. Subsidised agricultural products from the 
European Union were and continue to be exported to developing countries. These 
countries in turn are themselves discouraged from subsidisation and encouraged 
to embrace trade liberalisation. This dramatically decreases the competitiveness 
of local agriculture in the developing world. The target of poverty alleviation is 
undermined by this development, which consolidates global inequality and 
increases migration pressures towards the global core. 
 Another more practical link between neoliberalism and global migration is 
alluded to in Harvey’s argument about the neoliberal pressure towards universal 
marketization (2005), which of course also applies to ‘human resources’ and 
labour power. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that the commodification of 
labour is an inherent feature of capitalism that is by no means unique to 
neoliberalism. If the market value of human beings is determined by their capacity 
to contribute to the productive processes of a particular society, it is clear that in 
a post-industrial society with large demands for highly skilled labour, immigrants 
with high levels of education are preferred to immigrants with low levels of 
education. Through the relocation of production to developing countries the 
demand for low-skilled labour in Europe has decreased. At the same time, 
structural global inequality that is in part the result of neoliberal development 
programmes has increased international migration pressures. Legal ways to 
migrate to Europe are thus available only to individuals possessing recognised 
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degrees and qualifications. Migrants who do not possess these qualifications have 
no choice but to opt for irregular migration paths and asylum applications. This 
discrimination between highly-skilled and low-skilled migrants is at the heart of 
the contemporary European immigration regime. As was discussed in Chapter 6, 
the irregular labour market that exists outside is often the only way for low-skilled 
migrants to receive an income. 
The impact of neoliberalism on the European migration regime is evident 
since the onset of integration in this area. In 1991 the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists published a report entitled Reshaping Europe. Van Apeldoorn 
describes this as “a first step in the direction of an emerging synthesis of embedded 
neo-liberalism” (2002, 152). Although the report was published significantly after 
the Schengen Treaty was signed, it nevertheless underlines the fit between the 
goals of the Schengen system and the principles of neoliberalism. The report 
contains a map of the US and Western Europe demonstrating that border controls 
contribute significantly to delays in road transport. The result is ostensibly that the 
2,000km journey from Chicago to Tucson takes 33 hours, while the 2,000km 
journey from Antwerp to Rome takes 57 hours (European Roundtable, 1991, 
32).55 The ERT implies that the insufficient trans-European road network as well 
as the presence of border controls significantly increases travel times, calling for 
the expansion of the former and the abolition of the latter. The freedom of 
movement, that is deeply enshrined in the Treaty of Rome primarily, concerns 
workers, and the renewed emphasis that this idea received in the 1980s and early 
1990s goes hand in hand with the neoliberal project. The Commission White 
Paper Completing the Internal Market of 1985 discussed the existence of border 
controls as a reminder for the ordinary citizen that European union is incomplete 
(European Commission, 1985). Allowing for the trans-European allocation of 
human resources according to demand calls for the abolition of such symbols, and 
demands the realisation of the Adonnino Committee’s ‘people’s Europe’.56 It is 
                                                          
55 This data is in fact skewed, and its reliability should at best be called into question. The journey 
from Antwerp to Rome is merely 1,600km long, while the shortest distance between Chicago and 
Tucson covers over 2,700km. 
56 In 1984 the Adonnino Committee was tasked with promoting symbols of European 
integration, allowing for the greater identification of Europeans with the European institutions 
through a ‘people’s Europe’. The common European passport design or the adoption of the flag 
of the Council of Europe by the European Communities is part of the Committee legacy 
(Adonnino, 1985). 
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worth highlighting that the abolition of border controls was indeed primarily a 
symbolic act, as this had no impact on European citizens’ right to reside in other 
member states. While residence in the country in which one holds the citizenship 
is unrestricted, one cannot reside in another member state for an extended period 
of time without working or studying there. Deportations from one member state 
to another are in fact still carried out. It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that labour 
is a fictitious commodity partly because it cannot be moved about like goods and 
money. In the human mind, symbolic boundaries can be just as manifest as 
physical boundaries – it is for that reason that the abolition of border controls 
represented an important aspect of the neoliberal agenda for European 
integration. 
 Nevertheless, the process of encouraging the free movement of European 
labour through the abolition of border controls is not free of contradictions. The 
flipside of the internal openness of the Schengen system is the EU’s external 
fortification, which forces refugees to rely on smugglers for entering Europe. As 
Overbeek points out, “migration is not the only, and for that matter numerically 
not the most important, way in which labor throughout the world increasingly 
stands in direct competition with labor elsewhere” (1998, 66). The boundless pool 
of cheap labour in the developing world, the possibility of the separation of the 
labour-intensive from the capital-intensive aspects of production, and the 
development of technology allowing from the transnational coordination of 
production and assembly facilities permitted for the creation of a global labour 
market that is shielded from the potentially adverse effects of transnational 
migration (Fröbel et al., 1977). Large-scale migration from the developing world 
to post-industrial economies would cause the degradation of salaries in the latter, 
potentially undermining consumption. The prevention and deterrence of 
migration towards the core (in the European case through the Schengen and 
Dublin regimes) is thus an essential aspect of migration management. However, 
this system is not fool-proof, and millions of migrants have been able to enter the 
European Union. Fortification and migration control have resulted in the creation 
of a new type of subalternity, the experience of which highlights the reifying 
character of contemporary European integration. In parallel, the existence of this 
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perspective may provide the foundation for the emergence of a counterhegemonic 
movement. 
 The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 has caused a crisis of 
finance-based accumulation that has put the viability of the European migration 
regime into question. With the ascending hegemony of transnational capital, the 
importance of global finance has risen dramatically, which is reflected in the 
differential profit rates of financial and non-financial companies (Duménil & 
Lévy, 2005). The derivation of profits was achieved primarily through financial 
transactions rather than through productive activities, and finance-based growth 
had by the end of the 20th century become the dominant growth model in Europe 
and North America. Another method of accumulation that was employed in 
particular by German and French companies has been the incorporation of 
Southern Europe into the zone of Northern European capital. Southern European 
imports were to a large extent credit-financed, allowing the South to become 
particularly vulnerable to financial speculation (Becker & Jäger, 2012). Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal furthermore experienced over-investment into the real estate 
sector. According to Overbeek (2012), financialisation has resulted in a crisis of 
overaccumulation which is evidenced by the vast amounts of liquidity that have 
been provided by central banks to resolve the crisis. The condition dubbed ‘the 
sovereign-debt crisis’ has posed an existential threat to the European Union itself; 
the latter’s legitimacy is now in question (Cafruny & Ryner, 2011). Nevertheless, 
this label is a misnomer, as it was not sovereign debt itself which caused the crisis, 
but the rising interest rates which were caused by speculation on debt defaults 
within the eurozone. As the Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy were 
locked into an unsustainable exchange rate regime through EMU, the crisis 
provoked further divergence. Economic stagnation and extreme unemployment 
have caused the eruption of severe doubts about the sustainability of the finance-
driven growth model in parts of the eurozone. 
 It is not a geographical coincidence that the member states which were 
worst affected by the financial crisis are in many cases congruent with the member 
states experiencing the worst problems with immigration. On the one hand, the 
budgetary issues of Greece and Italy removed their ability to act decisively on the 
provision of humane accommodation for asylum seekers. Moreover, Greece has 
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used its budgetary vulnerability as a means to disrupt the application of the Dublin 
regime arguing that austerity has made it impossible to fulfil the obligations 
imposed on it by the Regulation. However, more importantly, the existence of a 
large informal labour market in the EU periphery provides superior employment 
conditions for persons residing illegally in the EU. The existence of this labour 
market is structurally conditioned by their non-industrial, import-dependent 
politico-economic position within the EU, which to a large extent prevent the 
emergence of a strong welfare state. The austerity-fuelled euroscepticism that rose 
in Greece and Italy called into question the Schengen and Dublin regimes, 
resulting in the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and the 
reform of the Schengen acquis to simplify this procedure. Increasingly 
authoritarian policies such as the construction of border fences along the Schengen 
Area’s external borders are in line with Bruff’s authoritarian neoliberalism 
(2014).57 In the same way that neoliberal governments attempt to prevent future 
changes to neoliberal policies by enshrining them into the constitution, the 
erection of border fences is very difficult to reverse. 
 
 
The Neofunctionalist Connection 
 
In this section it will be argued that neofunctionalist integration theory played the 
role of providing legitimacy for the neoliberal project. The neofunctionalists form 
one part of Gramsci’s intellectuals that always accompany hegemonic social 
groups. Neofunctionalism’s technocratic vision of governance allowed for 
neoliberal policies to be presented as necessary and inevitable. To explain and 
substantiate this argument, the ideological compatibility of neofunctionalism and 
neoliberalism will be demonstrated. Moreover, several empirical examples shall 
be drawn on to show how neofunctionalism has justified neoliberalism. 
                                                          
57 Current discussions on the future of European migration management include the establishment 
of European asylum offices in conflict zones. Legitimate asylum seekers could thus apply before 
entering the EU’s territory, allowing for the introduction of tougher border surveillance, as all 
those who have not already applied for asylum must be illegal immigrants. While these measures 
are in practice difficult to implement, they nevertheless illustrate the severity of the policies 
proposed. 
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 Friedrich von Hayek is the intellectual that developed one of the clearest 
formulations of neoliberalism. Hayek argued that the vast majority of human 
institutions have arisen not because of deliberate design, but spontaneously, 
without guidance or planning (von Hayek, 1991). Hayek provides the example of 
the pricing system, arguing that it delivers the uncoordinated coordinating 
mechanism required by a division of labour that specialises individuals in 
particular fields of knowledge. Other examples of unplanned institutions include 
language, traditions, rules and exchange mechanisms. These findings are not only 
rooted in empirical observation, but also in the assumption that “there is a limit 
to humankind’s ability to consciously and comprehensively design, direct and 
predict the nature of human institutions and their outcomes” (Chia & Holt, 2009, 
40). The future is unknowable because of our incomplete knowledge of all factors 
determining its path. Based on this idea is the neoliberal critique of state reason, 
which puts forward that the state’s incomplete power to know prevents it from 
making the right decisions. Still, Hayek assumed natural laws “based on 
spontaneously ordered institutions in the physical (crystals, galaxies) and social 
(morality, language, market) worlds” (Peters, 2001, 21). Striking similarities with 
positivist epistemology can thus be identified: the physical world is ruled by laws 
and knowable through our senses. The only reason for why we cannot predict all 
events within it is incomplete knowledge. This rationalist empiricism is also 
present in neofunctionalism, as was shown in Chapter 1. 
From the abovementioned assumptions stems the foundation of neoliberal 
governmentality. Neoliberal policymaking presumes that human potential can 
best be achieved through free markets, free trade and private property rights. The 
role of the state is limited to creating institutions that allow for the functioning of 
these practices. The state should protect the integrity of money as well as the 
physical and legal safety of its citizens, and it should create markets where they 
do not exist (e.g. water, education, health care, social security). Once markets 
have been created, state intervention into these markets should be kept at a 
minimum. The role of the state is thus largely administrative rather than political 
(Harvey, 2005, 2). The neoliberal view of the state is thus compatible with 
neofunctionalism, which views the ideal state as a technocratic institution whose 
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decisions are not moral-rational but profit-rational (see Chapter 1 on 
neofunctionalism and hermeneutics). 
 Apart from the ontological and epistemological fit between 
neofunctionalism and neoliberalism, numerous empirical examples of integration 
show how neofunctionalism has served as a justification of neoliberal policies. As 
White (2003) shows, neofunctionalism has provided the intellectual framing for 
early European integration, specifically with regard to the Hallstein Commission 
(in office from 1958–1967, see Chapter 1). As the neoliberal hegemonic 
programme is becoming increasingly authoritarian (Bruff, 2014), 
neofunctionalism’s technocratic vision of government serves as the legitimation 
of neoliberalism. One example of this is alluded to in Chapter 1, where I highlight 
that the functional link between freedom of movement and the abolition of border 
controls is at best questionable. The British example shows that the existence of 
border controls is not necessarily an obstacle to intensive trade relations. Frontier 
checks are of no consequence to the movement of capital, and while Polish 
membership into the EU in 2004 caused large-scale emigration from the country, 
membership of the Schengen Area in 2007 was actually followed by a decrease in 
emigration (Kowalska, 2012). Nevertheless, it was neofunctionalist reasoning that 
was used to justify the Schengen Agreement, a cornerstone of European migration 
management as well as one of the key projects of the European integration. The 
Schengen system was presented as the “natural consequence” of the Treaty of 
Rome (Taschner, 1997, 16). This shows that neofunctionalism was drawn on 
ideologically and that the theory was employed to justify an ultimately neoliberal 
policy. 
 Crucially, the use of neofunctionalism as a justification for neoliberal 
policymaking is not limited to the area of European migration management. After 
the abolition of border controls, the introduction of the common currency was the 
next major milestone in the EU’s neoliberal transformation. Cafruny and Ryner 
trace the introduction of EMU’s predecessor, the European Monetary System 
(EMS), to the West German failure to import American inflation, causing an 
appreciation of the deutschmark (2007). This created the threat of competitive 
devaluations within Western Europe causing the Schmidt government to push for 
the introduction of an exchange rate regime on German terms in exchange for 
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supporting other currencies with German foreign reserves. The need for a stable 
exchange rate mechanism within the eurozone thus arose from the deep economic 
integration that had resulted from the creation of the Common Market. This is an 
example of functional spillover. During periods of substantial economic growth, 
other European economies raised their interest rates to release the tensions within 
EMS, but during economic stagnation devaluation could not be employed to 
boost exports. As a result, the budgetary discipline required by EMS could no 
longer be maintained and the system failed in 1992. The euro was meant to rectify 
earlier mistakes by means of the Maastricht criteria. The latter made budgetary 
discipline a precondition for membership of the eurozone with the primary aim of 
preventing inflation. The European Central Bank was created as an independent 
institution, whose status could only be changed through a unanimous decision 
within Council. The failure of the EMS called for deeper integration at the EU 
institutional level according to neofunctionalist principles. The creation of the 
euro represented a significant neoliberal policy turn, as it disabled two of the most 
important macroeconomic policy instruments: interest rate determination and 
currency devaluation. Neoliberal policies were deeply embedded into the 
institutional set-up of the eurozone, which was portrayed as a natural outcome of 
earlier integration, despite wide-spread popular resistance against the common 
currency. 
 The path-dependency that neofunctionalism prescribes was continued 
during the contemporary economic crisis which had brought the euro to the brink 
of disintegration. When Mario Draghi called the decision to introduce the euro 
“irreversible,” he implied that there was no alternative to the further transfer of 
powers to the European level, and eventually to the harsh austerity policies 
imposed on those countries subject to speculation (Draghi, 2012). The clauses of 
the fiscal compact, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European 
Stability Mechanism, the fiscal union, the banking union – all these instruments 
and institutions were created because the costs of abandoning the monetary union 
altogether were deemed too high. Some commentators hailed this development as 
“the revenge of neofunctionalism” (Cooper, 2011). George Papandreou’s threat 
of holding a referendum on the Greek austerity deal sparked wide-spread panic 
among European policymakers, causing the EuroStoxx 50 to fall by over 10%. 
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Public support for austerity was limited at best, which is evidenced by the Greek 
general election result of May 2012, where the ruling Socialist party’s result fell by 
30%. This confirms Bruff’s argument about authoritarian neoliberalism, as less 
and less heed is paid to public opinion. European policymakers have retreated into 
neofunctionalist determinism to justify their decisions. 
 The relationship between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism is such that 
the former provides legitimacy for the latter through its technocratic reasoning. 
Neofunctionalism is nevertheless not necessarily a neoliberal programme of 
integration. It can be linked with any political ideology or hegemonic project that 
shares its technocratic view of governance.  
 
 
Three Contradictions of Neoliberal Europe 
 
The process of the neofunctionalist neoliberalisation of Europe is not free from 
contradictions. Indeed, in this section, it will be shown that the process is 
inherently contradictory. The policy responses that these contradictions require 
can be seen as instances of Gramscian trasformismo, providing signs of the failure 
of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Firstly, as the research findings presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 showed, neoliberal migration management in Europe has 
resulted in widespread xenophobia and the resurgence of neo-nationalist 
movements. Secondly, while neoliberalism calls for the reduction of the state’s 
influence, neoliberal migration management has brought forth the state’s 
increasing involvement in biopolitics. Thirdly, the conjunction of neoliberalism 
and neofunctionalism has reinforced an intra-European division of labour that is 
in contradiction with the global division of labour, threatening to undermine the 
unity of the European Union as such. 
 
 
Nationalism and Neoliberalism 
 
European migration management has resulted in the rise of nationalist 
movements in most EU member states. As the majority of humanity cannot 
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migrate to Europe legally, irregular migration via an asylum application 
procedure has been the most important means for the global subaltern to reach the 
European continent. As an asylum application is an instrument designed to seek 
protection rather than as a mean to immigration, there have been widespread 
claims that European national asylum systems have been abused by economic 
migrants who have no right to political asylum. At the same time, those who 
receive asylum are accused of receiving disproportionate financial support, 
particularly when compared to unemployment benefits, which are very low in 
some member states such as Greece or Bulgaria. This results in two different 
subaltern groups – those dependent on social welfare and asylum seekers – being 
played off against one another. Furthermore, as the asylum applications of people 
who do not suffer from persecution are mostly rejected, many people reside in the 
EU without a regular residency permit, forcing them into a life of poverty and 
irregular labour outside the realm of the state apparatus. In line with Gramsci’s 
argument, members of such subaltern groups are regarded as having a “barbaric 
or pathological nature” (Gramsci, 1996). Members of this group have been the 
primary targets of xenophobic attacks in Greece and Italy. The neoliberal 
migration regime, that was constructed using the integrative logic of 
neofunctionalism, requires Europe to “strengthen [its] barriers against the 
spillover of misery” (Ries, 2010, 14). The presence of undesirable exogenous 
factors at the margins of society is therefore inevitable, as the attractiveness of 
Europe as migration destination remains, while no border can be entirely shut 
down. The nationalist movements that result from this configuration can in turn 
result in the re-erection of internal frontiers within the EU and the Schengen Areas 
via trasformismo or electoral victories of right-wing populists, undermining the 
neoliberal model of European integration. 
The coupling of neoliberalism and nationalism is further reinforced by the 
ontological fit between both ideologies. Neoliberalism, which demands the free 
movement of labour, and nationalism, which calls for the disintegration of the 
European Union and the return of the nation state, are of course in many ways 
located on opposite ends of the political spectrum. While one is concerned with 
capital accumulation, the other is concerned with identity. Nationalists pose as 
the defenders of the nation against the dangers of European integration and 
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globalisation, while neoliberals emphasise the opportunities of the free circulation 
of goods, capital and labour. Nationalist rhetoric focuses on the threat of 
islamisation and multiculturalism, while neoliberals denounce nationalism as 
populism and xenophobia. At first glance, the two arguments appear diametrically 
opposed to one another, which appears to define the range of the political 
spectrum on migration management. Nevertheless, nationalism and neoliberalism 
are phenomena that regularly co-occur (cf. Bond, 2011 on South Africa; Doğan & 
Haser, 2014 on Turkey). Nationalism is actually linked to neoliberalism in a 
variety of ways (cf. Feldmann, 2012; Calavita, 2005; Žižek, 2002). Importantly, 
both approaches share their lack of concern for the lives of the migrant subaltern 
themselves. 
 Harmes (2012) deconstructs the supposed theoretical dichotomy between 
neoliberalism and nationalism. Pointing out that both Thatcher and Reagan are 
examples of the neoliberal right, he puts forward that neoliberal theory is often 
very different from neoliberal practice. Neoliberals often employ nationalist 
rhetoric out of expediency rather than theoretical necessity in an effort to gain 
support for their agenda. Nevertheless, nationalism has played an important role 
in pushing the neoliberal programme for European integration forward. Indeed, 
as was discussed in Chapter 2, Gramsci himself would argue that a hegemonic 
project such as neoliberalism (in capitalism) is necessarily national in nature 
(Gramsci, 1978; Shilliam, 2004). The maintenance of the regional single market 
requires the establishment of supranational institutions. Nevertheless, these 
institutions’ ability to interfere with the market ought to be kept at a minimal level; 
nationalism is necessary to prevent the excessive transfer of regulatory powers to 
the regional level, which would be required to regulate effectively (e.g. financial 
transaction tax, re-regulation of the financial industry). Nationalism thus 
contributes to the embedding of neoliberal policies (cf. Buchanan, 1995). 
 Žižek emphasises the “structural role of the populist Right in the 
legitimation of current liberal-democratic hegemony” (2000, 37). He argues that 
neo-nationalism plays the role of the ‘common enemy’ of the legitimate forms of 
political engagement. The designation of the right as the common enemy supplied 
the evidence for the argument that the hegemonic system is in fact benevolent. 
Nevertheless, Žižek puts forward that this strategy is designed to weaken the real 
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adversary of the dominant political forces: the radical left. As European social 
democrats have abandoned their formerly held notions of class struggle and anti-
capitalism, the right has moved in to cover this terrain, albeit tainted with racial, 
national or religious parochialism. As the neo-nationalist right moves into this 
position, the dominant classes can point towards the dangers of extremism, 
allowing for the marginalisation of the left’s political programme through an 
association with nationalism and euroscepticism. Žižek is deeply critical of the 
mainstreaming of neoliberal ideas, blurring, ultimately transforming and 
eradicating the differences between centre-left and centre-right political 
movements. The most pertinent expression of this tendency is the trend towards 
‘grand coalitions’ between conservative and social democratic parties (e.g. the de 
facto coalition between the European People’s Party and the Party of European 
Socialists in the European Parliament following the 2014 elections). These are 
either unavoidable because of nationalist electoral victories, or they occur because 
of the unwillingness of social democratic parties to enter coalitions with the radical 
left. 
 
 
Biopolitics and Neoliberalism 
 
In the previous chapter the biopolitics of migration was discussed and its lived 
experience described. Nevertheless, given the neoliberal character of European 
integration, it is somewhat surprising to find that the politics of the body plays 
such a significant role in the story of migrants. Given the neoliberal principle of 
reducing the size of the state to safeguarding the proper functioning of the free 
market, it is odd that the neoliberal state would have a biopolitical agenda. This 
contradiction will now be considered. 
 Rossi (2013) demonstrates the relationship between neoliberalism and 
biopolitics with reference to homeownership and the subprime mortgage crisis of 
the late 2000s. He begins his analysis arguing that the emergence of consumerism 
occurred with the introduction of consumer credit, which both facilitated and 
depended on the expansion of homeownership. Homeownership was presented 
as providing the sense of belonging and identity that was lost through alienation 
246 
 
at the workplace, and campaigns to promote homeownership have been part of 
the neoliberal agenda since its inception. Thatcher, Sarkozy, Berlusconi and 
Cameron all promoted homeownership as one of the pillars of the Western way 
of life. George W. Bush referred to homeownership as the foundation of an 
‘ownership society’. The expansion of homeownership, coupled with the 
deregulation of the mortgage market is, of course, one of the root causes of the 
subprime mortgage crisis. This points to the significance of the involvement of the 
subaltern, both on a domestic and a global level, in a financialised economy. The 
poor are no longer only exploited workers but also over-indebted consumers. The 
fact that the crisis centred on one of the essential requirements of the human body 
– shelter – stresses the fragility of the biopolitical pattern of accumulation. This is 
because the body is not a commodity produced for sale on the market (cf. Polanyi, 
1944 on fictitious commodities). Neoliberalism and financialised accumulation is 
thus linked to the commodification of the body. 
 In the case of Integrated Border Management (IBM), the entanglement of 
neoliberalism and biopolitics becomes particularly apparent (cf. Sparke, 2006). 
This can be explained with reference to Polanyi’s notion of the double movement. 
Contrary to the expectations of neoliberalism, the implementation of free market 
principles will not lead to the reduction of the state’s scope of influence. Indeed, 
the task of maintaining the functioning of the market requires intensive 
bureaucratisation as well as the assembly of data on several economic variables, 
including migration. It is important to consider that marketization requires 
commodification and that labour is treated as a commodity like any other. At the 
same time neoliberal social practices take place within a globalised context. The 
biopolitics of migration management is thus in many ways comparable to the anti-
counterfeiting measures and quality control procedures imposed on imported 
goods. The state’s increasing scope of control confirms Bruff’s argument that 
neoliberalism is becoming increasingly authoritarian. 
The European Core-Periphery Divide 
 
In Chapter 6, it was highlighted that there are strong differences in the experience 
of irregular migration between different territories of the European Union. While 
Bulgaria, Greece and Italy are usually defined as transit countries, Germany is 
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seen as a migration destination. This is further reflected in the smuggling prices 
and in some member states’ possession of a large underground market for irregular 
migrants (cf. Overbeek, 1998, 71). In 1992, Cox put forward that there is a core-
periphery divide within the most advanced economies. While the core consists of 
high-skilled and high-paid labour that exhibits great levels of mobility within their 
particular region (e.g. the EU), the periphery consists of a “precariously employed 
labour force segmented by ethnicity, gender, nationality, or religion” (Cox, 1992, 
28). Nevertheless, while Cox and Overbeek discuss this division in terms of 
distinct social groups or classes, more recent analyses of the European political 
economy have suggested a territorial division of Europe into core and periphery. 
This section is intended to answer three related questions: what are the 
characteristics of the European core and periphery? Does this distinction enhance 
our understanding of European integration? How does it relate to global core-
periphery relations? Particularly the answer to the third question will clarify the 
contradictory nature of the EU’s internal divisions. 
 The use of the terms ‘EU core’ and ‘EU periphery’ became widespread 
after the 2004 enlargement, although a precise definition as to the content of this 
terminology is missing. Therefore it should not be equated with the use of the 
terms as employed by dependency theory. Barrios et al. (2004) define Spain, 
Greece and Ireland as the EU-periphery due to low levels of FDI inflows before 
becoming EU member states, without however defining the periphery’s 
counterpart. Brülhart et al. (2004) define core and periphery very simplistically 
according to GDP and geographical location. With reference to the 2004 
enlargement, they argue that territories of new member states that are situated 
nearby wealthier regions are likely to benefit more from membership. 
Plechanovová (2011) views the core-periphery distinction within the EU in terms 
of social network analysis: while the members of the core are tied closely to each 
other, the members of the periphery have more relations with the core than with 
each other. While these definitions are relatively vague, the economic crisis has 
resulted in more precise statements about the nature of the EU’s internal divisions. 
Dabrowski has developed one of the most elaborate definitions of a peripheral 
countries, stating that they belong to one of three groups: (1) EMU members with 
“weak macroeconomic fundamentals” in the Mediterranean region; (2) new 
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member states which are not yet EMU members; (3) members of the European 
Economic Area, important EU-European neighbours and potential future EU 
member states (2010, 49).58 The first group is part of the periphery because of high 
fiscal deficits and high public debt. In turn, this implies that core member states 
have low fiscal deficits and low public debt levels. The second and third groups 
are part of the periphery because of exchange rate volatility, which has made them 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, causing some to resort to 
demanding IMF interventions (e.g. Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Ukraine, Iceland, 
etc.). 
Featherstone and Kazamias, albeit having published their work six years 
before the crisis, explicitly state that although their use of ‘EU-periphery’ stems 
from the dependency school, it is employed in “a much weaker, descriptive sense” 
(2014, 2). They identify the Mediterranean region as the EU’s periphery for the 
following reasons: 
 
“the economic inequality compared to northern EU states; the historically 
distinctive mode of the region’s economic development and social 
stratification as a consequence of ‘late industrialisation’ and the relatively 
greater importance of agriculture and services; the financial dependence of 
EU development aid; the structural power of Germany in shaping the EU’s 
policy agenda in many areas; and the lesser bargaining strength of the ‘south’ 
in EU treaty negotiations” (ibid.). 
 
This represents one of the most articulate definitions, which allowed the term 
‘periphery’ to enter the diction of Marxist scholars of European integration (e.g. 
Overbeek, 2012). Becker and Jäger similarly embrace the idea, arguing that “the 
crisis has shown the ruptures between core and periphery in Europe” (2012, 169). 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that while there are clear territorial 
distinctions between different member states’ political economies, these 
distinctions also exist within the territory of the member states. 
 In order to summarise the different conceptualisations the intra-European 
core-periphery divide, the following can be said: the core is understood as 
                                                          
58 According to this systematisation, in 2010 the European core thus consisted of Finland, Sweden, 
Germany, Benelux, France, the UK, Ireland, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia and a few micro-states. 
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possessing export surpluses, lower levels of dependence on the EU market for 
these exports, high levels of social equality, stable and high GDPs, high 
immigration levels, low unemployment rates and high industrial productivity. 
Furthermore, the core is the origin of intra-European foreign direct investment, 
while also hosting Europe’s major creditor institutions. Germany, Benelux, 
Scandinavia and Austria clearly belong into this group, with France traditionally 
belonging to it also. Furthermore, there can be said to exist a European semi-
periphery, which is dependent on EU cohesion funds, exhibiting low unit-per-
labour costs, lower and unstable GDP levels, low budget deficits, export deficits, 
industrialised economies, and high levels of financialisation driven by private 
household borrowing (Becker & Jäger, 2012). The semi-periphery has strong links 
with the financial sector of the eurozone, and is thus very susceptible to currency 
fluctuations. The countries belonging to this group are primarily those who joined 
the EU in 2004 and 2007. Finally, the periphery is also dependent on EU cohesion 
funds, being shaped by large export deficits, high levels of social inequality, 
service-based industries, very high levels of unemployment (especially youth 
unemployment), unstable GDPs with strong booms and depressions, large 
irregular labour markets, high levels of irregular immigration, widespread 
corruption, high levels of household and government-driven financialisation as 
well as strong political polarisation. Greece, Southern Italy, Spain and Portugal 
are examples of this group. It is important to note that there are significant regional 
differences within some member states. The economic structures of East Germany 
and Southern Italy significantly differ from those of their counterparts, and in 
many countries the capitals form distinct zones. 
 In the above paragraph the terms periphery, semi-periphery and core are 
deliberately used to create a link between the European division of labour and the 
global division of labour, as defined by dependency theory. There are clear 
parallels between the functional role of the global periphery and the European 
periphery, as both zones serve the purpose of sustaining their respective cores’ 
dominance. The global periphery fulfils this role by providing cheap labour as well 
as cheap raw materials. The European periphery on the other hand has imported 
the core’s goods using capital that was itself provided by the core. Nevertheless, 
apart from relatively high levels of unemployment, large irregular labour markets, 
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widespread corruption, and dependency on foreign aid, there are numerous 
differences between the European and the global periphery. The most striking 
difference is that the European periphery is significantly wealthier and more 
productive than the global periphery. Moreover, in the European periphery wealth 
is not necessarily an indicator of structural status. 
 At this point the contradictory nature of the EU’s division of labour 
becomes apparent. In the global power structure, the EU as a whole certainly 
forms part of the core, being much wealthier than the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, in the European context, peripheral roles are played. In Cardoso’s 
terms (see Chapter 2), the region that was previously referred to the European 
periphery could thus be called a dependent and developed periphery. It is 
dependent because it depends on imports and capital from the core, and it is 
peripheral because it sustains the core’s structural position. This contradictory 
position finds a materialisation in European migration management; the Dublin 
Regulation makes no distinction between different European regimes of 
accumulation or structural zones. Migrants thus often feel as though they had not 
arrived in Europe yet, despite them being on EU territory. The economic crisis 
was similarly an expression of this contradiction, as a kind of fiscal policy was 
posthumously expected of the peripheral member states that their structural 
positions did not permit (e.g. trade surpluses to generate lower budget deficits). 
Nevertheless, while the crisis called for the introduction of European government 
bonds to decrease peripheral interest rates, the neoliberal austerity policies have 
actually increased the periphery’s structural dependency on the core, 
consolidating the core’s dominant position. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the neoliberal character of contemporary European integration 
was explored and its links with neofunctionalism were shown. The social purpose 
of neofunctionalist integration is to provide legitimacy for Europe’s neoliberal 
restructuring, especially when other forms of legitimacy (e.g. public consent) do 
not apply. Contemporary neoliberalism in Europe is therefore to a large extent 
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underpinned by neofunctionalist technocratic reasoning. The ideological links 
between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism are striking, and the compatibility of 
the two ideologies is therefore unsurprising. Neoliberal restructuring in turn 
consolidates the ascending hegemony of transnational capital.  
 At the same time, neofunctionalist neoliberalism has produced 
contradictions which find their manifestations in the precarious situation of 
irregular migrants (as well as other subaltern groups) in Europe. The two first 
contradictions that were discussed are arguably inherent features of the neoliberal 
governance regime. While nationalism is the result of neoliberal migration 
management whose construction was justified using neofunctionalist logic, 
biopolitics can be seen as an instance of Polanyi’s double movement. Crucially, 
both phenomena undermine the principles of neoliberalism and may bring about 
a new transformation of the political economy. Both nationalism and biopolitics 
require the extension of the state’s system of control. This is an expression of an 
increasingly authoritarian state apparatus, which undermines a consent-based 
hegemony of transnational capital. The development of a group of intellectuals to 
provide a public voice to irregular migrants could provide a unique perspective on 
this development which may aid this group in overcoming their subaltern 
position. 
The third contradiction, albeit belonging to a different group, is 
nevertheless similarly the result of neofunctionalist neoliberalism. The 
stratification of the European political economy is certainly in part the result of 
the neoliberal principles underlying the common currency, which neglect 
macroeconomic mechanisms of convergence (such as European government 
bonds or measures to curb unemployment). Nevertheless, understanding these 
contradictions represents an important step towards bringing about the social 
changes necessary to overcome the neoliberal hegemonic programme. 
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Conclusion 
 
Irregular migrants, the ‘spillover of misery’, live at the fringes of European society. 
Their material deprivation, their political exclusion, their reduction to being a 
‘problem’ – these issues are related to the European integration process. This 
epitomises the social concern that forms the heart of this dissertation. If the aim 
of human emancipation is taken seriously, the structural causes underlying 
migrant subalternity in the European Union have to be demonstrated and brought 
into the open. In turn, the lived experience of irregular migrants can provide 
insight into the social purpose of European integration, which may in turn explain 
migrant subalternity. 
 As part of the retroductive logic of CGT, Chapter 1 attempted to address 
migrant subalternity by looking at the most popular theory of European 
integration: neofunctionalism. The theory’s positivist outlook and its lacking 
understanding of structural power make it an ill-suited approach for a critical 
study of the EU. Nevertheless, the closeness of its category to the emergence of 
the European asylum system, which in many ways contributes to irregular 
migrants’ precarious situation, calls for Haas’ theory to be closely examined. 
Chapter 1 thus proposes that the apparent relevance of neofunctionalism can be 
explained because the theory has in part shaped in the integration process in the 
area of migration management. This is evidenced by the results of explorative 
fieldwork and key informant interviews. While neofunctionalist integration is not 
necessarily neoliberal, it nevertheless poses dangers. If the theory’s technocratic 
vision of government is translated into political practice, this may result in the 
erosion of democracy. Furthermore, the theory’s reduction of exogenous factors 
to disturbing influences may result in inward-looking policymaking. Either way, 
neofunctionalism does not necessarily produce one type of political economy – it 
ought to be investigated why it has helped to shape Europe’s particular 
institutional arrangement. 
 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 defined this dissertation’s research agenda and 
addressed methodology by looking at a different set of (proto-) theories. A 
combination of neo-Gramscian insights into structural power and dependency 
theory’s conceptualisation of global inequality permits for an understanding of the 
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(neofunctionalist) European integration within the practice of a neoliberal 
hegemonic programme as well as for a theorisation of migratory movements. 
Nevertheless, within the context of the study of European integration, authors 
using neo-Gramscian theory have displayed a slight elite-bias, despite Gramsci’s 
emphasis on the role of the subaltern. Subalternity ought to be seen not as a 
perpetually reproduced state of powerlessness and silence, but as a transitory state 
with concrete social roots that can be removed. Subalternity is thus an 
emancipatory term which aims at overcoming itself. Conceptualising the 
subaltern state of irregular migrations is therefore of prime importance to 
removing the obstacles that cause it. This literature review allowed for the 
definition of a research agenda that aimed to understand the social purpose of 
neofunctionalist European integration through an investigation of European 
migration management. This was attempted using empirical field research and 
interviews as well as using the theoretical tools provided by neo-Gramscian and 
dependency theory. 
 The third part presented the findings and conclusions. The practice of 
neofunctionalism in the area of migration management has resulted in the attempt 
to generate a reifying common European outlook on migratory movements. 
Internally, this permitted the partial harmonisation of asylum legislation. 
Externally, the EU has attempted to shield itself from irregular migrants through 
increased border surveillance. This policy of fortification has spilled over into the 
European neighbourhood, and the EU has strived to win over countries such as 
Turkey, Libya and Morocco through the offer of visa liberalisation programmes 
and financial assistance. EU policy has had a severe impact on the lives of 
irregular migrants in the European Union. Reification, commodification, 
biopolitics, the state of exception and xenophobia have become core aspects of 
these migrants’ everyday lives. True recognition, where migrants are recognised 
as fully fledged members of their host society, occurs rarely. Those who do attain 
EU citizenship tend to disassociate themselves from irregular migrants that 
remain at the margins. While EU migration management may be the outcome of 
the application of neofunctionalism’s technocratic logic, it is only through the 
context of the neoliberal hegemonic programme that it can be explained why 
neofunctionalist integration followed this particular trajectory. Nevertheless, 
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neoliberal migration management provides delivering fertile soil for nationalism 
and the increased application of biopolitics, as well as by reinforcing a divisive 
internal European division of labour that is in contradiction to an equally 
oppressive global division of labour. These contradictions may contribute to the 
unravelling of the European Union and a renaissance of nationalism which is a 
threat to the neoliberal order itself. 
 If the character of European integration is revealed at its weakest link, this 
forces one to draw a gloomy picture of the EU’s current state. While 
neofunctionalism implicitly assumes European integration to be a positive 
political project, the condition of Europe’s irregular immigrants leads one to 
question whether the EU is indeed a force for good. The technocratic character of 
the European Commission, the weakness of the European Parliament and the 
strength of the Council of the European Union rob the EU of the democratic 
accountability that the national governments of democratic states tend to possess. 
Democracy in the EU is further undermined by the evolution of the party system 
that was discussed briefly in Chapter 7: the grand coalition in the European 
Parliament and several member states including Germany reinforces the claim 
that there is no alternative to Europe’s current political economy and further 
marginalises the political left. 
 Nevertheless, it would false to portray the left as a victim of neoliberal 
neofunctionalism. In some cases, parties belonging to the Party of European 
Socialists have introduced nationalist rhetoric into own their electoral 
programmes. By abandoning the notion of class struggle, the left has permitted 
right-wing populist movements to occupy this terrain along with racism and 
xenophobia. In left-wing academia, this tendency is reflected by the tendency to 
refer to ‘neoliberal hegemony’ without identifying a particular social group with 
neoliberalism. There is no neoliberal class, there are merely classes whose capital 
accumulation strategy benefits from the implementation of neoliberal policies. In 
accordance with van Apeldoorn (2002) it was argued that a transnational capital 
class is a strong candidate for ascending hegemony. If the left fails to identify the 
danger inherent to the neoliberal social programme, the rise of nationalist political 
forces is one likely outcome. Apart from a new subalternity of irregular migrants 
in Europe, neoliberalism has resulted in increasing inequality and the growing 
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concentration of wealth in the richest segment of society (Piketty, 2014). Given 
neofunctionalism’s technocratic European governance apparatus, given the EU’s 
proneness to crises and neofunctionalism’s erroneous assumption that integration 
thrives on them, given the growing number of politically voiceless irregular 
migrants at the margins of European society, given that neoliberalism’s 
instrumental rationality has dominated the public debates of the early 21st century 
and given the ontological fit between neoliberalism and nationalism, nationalism 
becomes a possible alternative to neoliberalism. It is questionable to what extent 
the EU’s neoliberal free trade regimes can be sustained in the face of increasingly 
right-wing national governments with anti-EU agendas. Even the existence of the 
EU itself is threatened should a nationalist movement win elections in Germany 
or France, which, in turn, would lead to the re-erection of national boundaries. It 
is therefore high time for Europe’s political left to stop playing off the subaltern 
groups it claims to represent against another subaltern group that has recently 
arrived. 
 While it is clear that the arrival of millions of irregular migrants in the EU 
is unsustainable in the long run, a programme should be established to deal with 
the causes and consequences of irregular migration, which may contain the 
following points: 
  
1. Creation of a European asylum agency: as was shown in Chapter 5, EASO 
already plays an important role in supporting the work of national asylum 
agencies. This EU agency could be transformed into a full-fledged EU 
asylum agency to replace the 28 national asylum agencies. 
2. European asylum procedure: a common European asylum agency can 
only operate if there is a common asylum procedure. At the moment, the 
chance of one’s asylum application being accepted differs from member 
state to member state. The common procedures directive has been largely 
unsuccessful. This problem can be alleviated by instituting a common 
asylum procedure that is carried out by the European asylum agency. 
3. European asylum fund: the European Refugee Fund provides insufficient 
funds for upgrading the accommodation facilities in all member states to 
the highest levels found in the EU. Some member states do not possess the 
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necessarily public money to provide for high-quality accommodation. The 
ERF should thus be increased from €3.1bn to €20bn for 2014-20 without 
cuts in other parts of the EU budget. This money can furthermore be used 
to assist the setting up of the European asylum agency. 
4. European distribution key for asylum seekers: the Dublin system is no 
longer functional. Dublin transfers to countries such as Greece or Hungary 
have been suspended. The status quo should be maintained until the 
accommodation standards in all member states have been harmonised and 
until a common asylum procedure has been instated. When this is 
accomplished, a distribution key can help to distribute asylum seekers 
across the entire territory of the Union. The number of asylum seekers that 
each member state can accommodate should be determined by population 
size and economic strength. 
5. European registration centres in conflict zones: asylum seekers should not 
depend on the reifying practice of smuggling to lodge their asylum 
applications in the EU. The Union should set up registration centres in 
conflict zones to permit asylum seekers to submit their application before 
having to resort to smugglers. 
6. Deconstruction of fences along Schengen borders: border fences have not 
reduced the number of new irregular migrants in Europe. Furthermore, the 
incentive to construct them is significantly lower if the Dublin system is 
abolished and it no longer matters where an asylum seeker has entered EU 
territory. 
7. Creation of legal ways to migrate to Europe: a clear boundary needs to be 
drawn between asylum and labour migration. There have to be legal ways 
for refugees and labour migrants to enter the EU. The latter group should 
not have to rely on an asylum application to have a chance to live in the 
EU. As opposed to the United States, Canada or Australia, the EU 
possesses no fully fledged regular immigration system. Such an 
immigration system should not only permit high-skilled labour to come to 
the EU, but it should also give low-skilled labour the opportunity to start 
an apprenticeship at a European enterprise. It ought to be emphasised that 
there will always be clandestinos, no matter which migration policy is 
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pursued. An effort should be made to provide them with a residency permit 
allowing them to join the regular labour market of the entire European 
Union. 
8. Development policy: while Europe’s aging population has resulted in a 
need for immigration, it is clear that the EU cannot absorb unlimited 
numbers of new arrivals into its political economy. Therefore the causes of 
emigration from developing countries have to be addressed, requiring the 
EU to overhaul its development policy. By exporting subsidised 
agricultural products to developing countries, the EU has contributed to 
the destruction of local agriculture in these countries. This practice should 
be stopped immediately. Furthermore, the negotiation of free trade 
agreements with developing countries should be suspended. Agreements 
that had already been concluded with such countries should be phased out. 
9. Arms exports: the EU and its member states have not only contributed to 
the arrival of large numbers of irregular migrants through its misguided 
development policy. By exporting arms to conflict zones (e.g. Kurdistan, 
Israel) as well as to countries that export them to conflict zones (e.g. Saudi-
Arabia) the EU has fostered the escalation of several civil wars. Arms 
exports to countries outside the NATO alliance should be suspended 
altogether. 
 
Although the implementation of these points would improve the situation of 
irregular migrants in the EU, for the long-term, a more sustainably approach to 
development policy is urgently called for. Some points contained within this 
programme would represent first steps towards overcoming the subaltern 
condition of irregular migrants in Europe today. Moreover, they would abandon 
some of the legal conditions that prevented irregular migrants from achieving 
group consciousness. Crucially, it is not the state that can turn the EU’s irregular 
immigrants into a strong political group with its own institutions and a political 
agenda. It is up to these migrants to establish a counter-hegemonic force amongst 
themselves, possibly using the existing structures of refugee councils. It may be 
the task of academia to provide the theoretical tools for irregular migrants to 
understand their structural position and the causes behind their subalternity. 
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Nevertheless, the inaccessibility of academic literature to the subaltern is one 
obstacle that stands in the way of accomplishing this task.  
 
This dissertation has several limitations, which nevertheless open up interesting 
avenues for future research. Firstly, the number of interviews carried out with 
some groups of irregular migrants was lower than planned. At some research 
locations, one or more groups of interviewees could not be recruited. To some 
extent this was compensated for by interviews with members of other groups – 
nevertheless, a more balanced view could have been conveyed with more 
interviewees from all groups. Had there been no need for participant consent 
forms, this could have been achieved. However, interviews did not form the sole 
basis of my research. Visiting all research sites mentioned in this dissertation 
allowed me to get first-hand experience of the conditions on the ground. Secondly, 
and this relates closely to the first point, this dissertation contains an evident 
gender bias. Only three interviews were carried out with a female irregular migrant 
despite migration being a highly gendered experience. Although the inclusion of 
more female interviewees may have provided new insight into the experiences of 
biopolitics or reification, the conclusions as a whole would not have been majorly 
affected. This impression was reinforced by the interviews I carried out with 
women in Leipzig, which did not differ greatly from the interviews I carried out 
with men. Thirdly, the strength of the argument about neofunctionalism as an 
ideology of integration would have been greater had more interviews been cited. 
The influence of neofunctionalism on the course of European integration is 
arguably a research topic in itself. Finally, it was difficult to establish strict criteria 
for the selection of a critical case study. Flyvbjerg argues that ultimately “all that 
researchers can do is use their experience and intuition […] for their choice of 
case” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 233). While good reasons were stated for the selection of 
migration management as a critical case study of European integration, a certain 
amount of intuition was nevertheless involved. It is possible that another 
researcher may see a different policy area as a critical case. 
 The retroductive process of CGT does not have an end point. Theories can 
be deepened, broadened, refined and connected to other approaches. All three 
points mentioned in the paragraph above open avenues for future agendas for 
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emancipation and research. Further interviews could be carried out with irregular 
migrants where the interviewees are confronted with the findings made in this 
dissertation. Since refugee councils seem to be the most established institutions 
voicing the concerns of irregular migrants, their emergence, their membership and 
their relationship with the state could be more closely investigated to examine 
irregular migrants’ current level of subaltern development. The importance of 
neofunctionalism’s influence as an ideology of integration could in turn be 
assessed in other key areas of European integration such as monetary policy or 
security and defence policy. Interviews would have to be carried out with 
administrators and policymakers from the Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament. Moreover, Critical Grounded Theory’s compatibility with the single 
case study method could be further explored and more advanced criteria for the 
selection of case studies outlined. Finally, this dissertation did not explicitly delve 
into the notion of social reproduction. This would be a meaningful and 
complementary dimension to consider in potential future studies focusing on 
European integration and migration management (as informed by 
neofunctionalism) (Kofman & Raghuram, 2015). 
 
In his work, Gramsci repeatedly advocates ‘pessimism of the intellect’ and 
‘optimism of the will’ (e.g. 1971, 395). Gramsci painted a picture of the disunity 
of the subaltern and the hegemony of capital, while at the same fighting for 
emancipation in the Italian Communist Party. While this dissertation’s outlook 
on present and future of the European Union is undoubtedly gloomy, it is also 
important to highlight that irregular migrants have made an enormous difference 
to the trajectory of European integration, albeit being a subaltern group which 
represents less than one percent of the EU population. The absence of passport 
controls along the internal frontiers of the Schengen area was taken for granted by 
many Europeans. However, as the Schengen regime is increasingly being 
dismantled, it has become clear that irregular migrants have brought about radical 
changes through their unconsciously collective action. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that while the de facto merger of many European conservative and social-
democrat parties may well be an instance of trasformismo, it also represents the 
failure of pure neoliberalism. While social democracy has largely accepted the 
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neoliberal consensus, conservatives have in turn adopted key social-democrat 
demands into their own political programmes (e.g. minimum wage laws in 
Germany). Moreover, Europe’s social-democrats remain democratically 
organised – it is up to the party members who do not agree with the neoliberal 
consensus to develop an alternative vision of the European Union that embodies 
the spirit of Gramsci and the Ventotene Manifesto:59 
 
“This crisis must be exploited with decision and courage. In order to respond 
to our needs, the European revolution must be socialist, that is it must have 
as its goal the emancipation of the working classes and the realization for 
them of more humane living conditions” (Spinelli & Rossi, 2013). 
 
The pioneers of the European project did not intend to build an avenue to further 
capital accumulation, but to create a fair and peaceful society. 
                                                          
59 The Ventotene Manifesto was written by Alterio Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi during their 
imprisonment by Italy’s fascist Mussolini government. It is one of the foundational documents of 
European integration, forming the basic historical text of the European federalist movement. 
Spinelli served as European Commissioner for six years and as Member of the European 
Parliament for ten years. The largest building of the European Parliament in Brussels is named 
after him. 
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Epilogue 
 
In some ways I wish I would have carried out my fieldwork later. 
 
Since the summer of 2015 irregular migration has become the issue dominating 
discourse on European integration. Indeed, the question of whether migration 
management represents the weakest link of European integration has arguably 
been answered. The war in the Levant has escalated, with the so-called ‘Islamic 
State’ committing horrendous atrocities to the civilian populations of parts of 
Syria and Iraq. Afghanistan continues to be one of the least safe places in the 
world. This has caused hundreds of thousands of young Syrians, Iraqis and 
Afghans to embark for Europe, using mostly the perilous track across the 
Mediterranean that is described in this dissertation. In 2015 alone, 3,772 people 
drowned while trying to reach the European Union (IOM, 2016). Sweden, Austria 
and Germany have received the highest number of asylum applications per capita 
and the Dublin system is entirely dysfunctional. Germany alone received 1.1 
million asylum applications in 2015. Calls to introduce a quota system have been 
rejected by Central and Eastern European states for a variety of reasons, including 
the fear of islamisation. 
Hungary has built a fence along its frontier with Serbia and fellow EU 
member Croatia, forcing thousands of migrants to be stranded along the border. 
Austria has introduced a fixed upper limit on the number of asylum applications 
it will process per year. This is a significance step back from the civilizational 
accomplishment that the universal right to asylum represents. Austria, Germany, 
Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden have reintroduced border controls along their 
national frontiers. After more than twenty years of open borders such a move 
seemed unlikely to happen only a year ago – by now it seems likely that the 
Schengen system will remain dysfunctional for the time being. Jean-Claude 
Juncker, President of the European Commission, has stated on the 20th of January 
2016 that the Schengen system is “partially comatose,” adding that the euro 
“makes no sense” without the Schengen area (Escritt, 2016). The foundations of 
the EU as a whole are beginning to crumble. 
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Nevertheless, while this may have prompted me to change the focus of my field 
research to Germany and the Balkans, I would have only slightly changed my 
conclusions. The Dublin system is the product of a technocratic integration 
process that has arguably been informed by neofunctionalism. The failure of this 
system is in many ways the cause of the current crisis, which occurs because it is 
not possible for a single member state to deal with the crisis without the support 
of its European partners. It is pointless to evoke European solidarity – the Dublin 
system was never intended for burden-sharing. 
 I believe that the conclusion I come to in my dissertation is all the more 
poignant: the threat of nationalism looms over Europe like a sword of Damocles. 
Neofunctionalism has contributed to the current state of the EU through instilling 
its vision of technocratic governance. The European institutions have thus 
appeared distant and intransparent; popular identification with them has not 
sufficiently occurred, and the nation state remains as the main object of 
attachment. At the same time neoliberalism has inadvertently prepared the return 
of nationalism. In part, this was possible only because of the weakness of social 
democracy. In the UK, Germany, France or Greece it was social democrats who 
privatised parts of the welfare state and who introduced austerity measures. This 
undermined the credibility of a social democratic counter-narrative of European 
integration. Grand coalitions with the conservatives and Christian democrats 
have led to a blurring of the boundaries between the two traditional political 
camps. The extreme right has been portrayed as the common enemy, which has 
arguably become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, it no longer seems unthinkable 
for Marine Le Pen to win the French presidential elections, and the Alternative 
for Germany is disrupting the German political party system with its racist 
discourse. The war in Ukraine has shown that the Europeans of 2016 continue to 
be able to kill one another over nationalism. 
 
It is clear that the EU no longer functions. Nevertheless, while identification with 
the European institutions remains low, most Europeans continue to believe in the 
idea of European integration in general (European Commission, 2015). Perhaps 
this crisis has the potential to produce a better European Union. 
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